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Abstract 
Decentralization was first introduced in Indonesia by the Dutch colonial government 
in 1903. Since independence, the issue has always been on the agenda of the government. 
But the system remained heavily centralized until the collapse of Soeharto's regime. In 
1999, President Habibie, who succeeded President Suharto, introduced a radical law on 
decentralization that aimed to reverse the centralization that had been a dominant 
characteristic of the New Order system. This study, however, does not intend to examine the 
new. decentralization program in depth but focuses instead on the failure to implement 
significant decentralization under the New Order and the prospect for decentralization in the 
post New Order Era. This study attempts to explain why decentralization in the New Order 
Indonesia failed to devolve power in decision making to regional government. 
Political chaos following the 1965 attempted coup forced the New Order 
government, which came to power in 1966, to promise autonomy as broadly as possible to 
the regions in order to restore internal security. But in 1973, the concept of "broadest 
autonomy" was replaced by "real and responsible autonomy". To implement this concept, 
Law No. 5 on the principles of governance at regional levels was issued in 1974. 
Law No. 5 of 1974 established two tiers of autonomous regions: the province as the 
first level and the municipality and regency as the second level. The law emphasized 
decentralization of authority to the second level of government and the provision of local 
public services to the maximum extent possible by second-level governments. However, 
during 1979-1984, when the government experienced a boom in oil revenue, central 
government grants to provincial and local governments were increased dramatically as part 
of efforts to distribute development benefits more widely and more equitably. As a result, 
· V 
most infrastructure projects and public services were planned, financed and implemented by 
the central government, while decentralization was almost forgotten. 
When the government experienced budget constraints in the mid-1980, it was forced 
to reintroduce decentralization policy. A variety of programs were implemented, but they 
had very little impact on regional autonomy. Functions were decentralized to regional 
governments but authority for making decision over those functions remained at the center. 
This was because the program was actually designed to shift part of the central financial 
responsibility for providing public services to regional governments. 
This study concludes that the Indonesia's failure to form more independent regional 
governments under the New Order administration was primarily due to the fact that Law 
No. 5 of 1974 itself did not intend to devolve more power and authority to regional levels. 
Most of its provisions were concerned with the establishment and operation of a highly 
centralized political structure at local level. This structure was intentionally built to ensure 
continued political stability and economic development. These two objectives were very 
important to the military leaders of the New Order government who experienced continued 
political instability and economic bankruptcy under the parliamentary democracy and 
guided democracy. 
The socio-economic and political environment in the New Order Indonesia was also 
unsupportive to decentralization. The fiscal system was centralized, and this made the 
regions dependent heavily on financial transfers from the center. Party system was not 
competitive, and those who represented the government dominated local councils. Local 
politicians did not have much influence in local councils. The press was controlled. These 
all weakened regional demands for autonomy. As the pressure for decentralization was low, 
the issue did not get much attention from the policy makers and no real attempt was made to 
implement the Law. 
Vl 
The fall of the New Order regime opened another chapter in Indonesia's experience 
with decentralization. Mounting demands for democratization following the fall of 
Suharto's authoritarian regime forced the Habibie's administration to introduce Law No. 22 
of 1999 on regional government that granted more power to local authorities. In addition, 
the government also issued Law No. 25 of 1999 on fiscal balance that allowed regional 
governments to retain a substantial share of revenues produced in their regions. But the 
implementation of the two Laws, starting from January 2001, has raised concern about 
increasing conflicts that might lead to the nation's disintegration. This concern causes the 
debate on the right form of decentralization for Indonesia to continue. But recent political 
development seems more supportive to decentralization. Decentralization seems to have 
better prospect to progress in the near future Indonesia. 
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Chapter_ I 
Introduction 
In 1999, following the fall of President Soeharto's New Order regime in 1998, the 
new Habibie's government introduced a radical law on decentralization that aimed to 
reverse the centralization that had been a dominant characteristic of the New Order system. 
This study, however, does not intend to examine the new decentralization program in depth 
but focuses instead on the failure to implement significant decentralization under the New 
Order. Despite the fact that a variety of programs were introduced to strengthen the capacity 
of regional governments to perform more functions, power in decision-making remained 
heavily centralized until the collapse of Soeharto' s regime. This study attempts to explain 
why decentralization introduced in the New Order Indonesia failed to shift power in public 
decision-making from the national to sub-national levels of government. 
The study focuses on Indonesia's experience in implementing decentralization 
during the period of 1966 to 1998. Under the New Order government, especially during the 
1990s, attempts to devolve power to regional levels had been intensified. Their impact was 
however very limited. This study is intended to identify factors that hampered the 
decentralization of power to local levels and assess the prospects of decentralization in the 
post New Order era. 
1 
Decentralization in Indonesia 
The issue of decentralization has been the subject of internal debate since the early 
years of Indonesian independence. The debate, especially on the proper degree of power to 
be decentralized to sub-national levels of government, was a result of the paradox contained 
in two articles of the 1945 Constitution. While the first Article stated that Indonesia was a 
unitary state, Article 18 stipulated that its territory be divided into several autonomous and 
non-autonomous (administrative) units. The Constitution's elucidation stated that in every 
autonomous unit, a regional consultative body would be established. This provision implied 
the need to grant to the autonomous regions the authority to manage certain functions with 
minimal intervention from the central government. The 1945 Constitution, however, did not 
specify which functions those regions could autonomously exercise. Those functions were 
to be decentralized by the center and this matter was to be regulated by laws (see Walker III 
1967: 124). 
Various attempts to implement Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution have been 
initiated since the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945. In fact, the first law 
introduced following the proclamation of Indonesian Independence was concerned with the 
establishment of regional councils. But Law No. 1 of 1945 never had a chance of being 
implemented because of the revolution, especially in Java between 1946 and 1949 (Walker 
III, 1967:134-138). 
During the revolution, the Government of Indonesia did not actually have control 
over most of Indonesia. 1 Despite this fact, Law No. 22 of 1948 on regional administration 
was later issued to replace Law No. 1 of 1945. This law outlined the organization of 
1 Following the Japanese surrender, the Dutch returned to Indonesia and gradually reoccupied part of the 
archipelago. In 1948, the de facto territory of the republic of Indonesia covered most of Java, part of Sumatera 
and Kalimantan. 
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regional governments, functions to be performed by regional authorities, and methods of 
selecting regional heads, in the Western part of Indonesia. Following the formal transfer of 
sovereignty of Indonesia by the Dutch in December 1949, a similar law, Law No. 44 of 
1950, was introduced for the East Indonesia State, which had been under Dutch control 
during the revolution. These laws established three tiers of self-governing regions and 
required the appointment of regional heads by the central government. Implementation of 
these two laws, however, did little to counteract centralized administration of the regions. 
Both the content and the implementation of those laws, especially with regard to the 
appointment of the regional heads by the central government, created even more regional 
dissatisfaction, contributing to the outbreak of regional rebellions in the Outer Islands 
against the central government in 1956 and 1957 (Maryanov, 1957: 41-43; Walker III, 
1967: 167-168; Kahin, 1994:206). 
In response to increasing pressure for greater regional autonomy, the government 
issued Law No. 1 of 1957 to replace Law No. 22 of 1948 and Law No. 44 of 1950. This law 
was prepared based on the 1950 Provisional Constitution, which guaranteed broader scope 
of regional autonomy.2 In Law No. 1 of 1957, it was stated that matters within the purview 
of the central government included foreign affairs, defence, and currency (Maryanov 
1958:56-57). This implied that residual responsibilities would be left to the regions. This 
law, according to Feith (1962:552) also greatly increased the power of elected legislative 
councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities, and provided for the gradual 
elimination of pamongpradja from territorial jurisdiction.3 Under this law, regional heads 
2 From November 1945 to July 1959, the 1945 Constitution was not in effect. The 1950 Provisional 
Constitution was enacted to replace the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) , 
which was in effect from December 1949 to August 1950. In 1959, Indonesia returned to the 1945 
Constitution. 
3 Pamongpradja is the territorial staff of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
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were to be elected and discharged by regional councils. Unfortunately, these provisions 
\Vere never implemented. The enactment of Law No. 1 of 1957 coincided with a period of 
heightened tension between Jakarta and the Outer Islands, culminating in open rebellion a 
year later. In July 1959, Indonesia returned to the Constitution of 1945 by a presidential 
decree. This decision marked the beginning of 'Guided Democracy'. In September a 
presidential edict suspended those provisions of Law No. 1 of 1957 relating to the election 
and powers of the executive council (DPD) and to the election of regional heads. The edict 
provided for the return to appointed regional heads and created a new type of executive 
council, responsible to the regional heads. The edict, according to Legge, represented "not 
only a modification of detail, but a reversal of the central intention of Law No. l" (1961:60-
61). Central control over the regions became stronger under guided democracy (Mac 
Andrew, 1986: 10-11). 
The political chaos following the 1965 coup attempt opened a window of 
opportunity for the regions to revive their demands for greater regional autonomy. When 
the New Order government came to power in 1966, it desperately needed loyal regional 
support to restore internal security. This situation finally led to the enactment of MPRS 
decision no. XXI/MPRS/1966 that demanded that autonomy be given as broadly as possible 
to the regions. But "broadest autonomy" was soon replaced by "real and responsible 
autonomy" through MPR decision No. IV/MPR/1973. To implement this concept, law on 
the principles of governance at regional levels was issued in 1974. 
Law No. 5 of 1974 established two tiers of autonomous regions: the province as the 
first level and the municipality and regency as the second level. The law emphasised 
devolution of power to the second level of government and the provision of local public 
services to the maximum extent possible by second-level governments. However, during 
4 
1979-1984, when the government experienced a boom in oil revenue, central government 
grants to provincial and local governments were increased dramatically as part of efforts to 
distribute development benefits more widely and more equitably. As a result, most 
infrastructure projects and public services were planned, financed and implemented by the 
central government, while decentralization was almost forgotten. 
With the sharp decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s affecting central government 
revenue, concern about the capacity of the central government to continue financing 
expanded public services arose. Economic development during the 1980s led to a steep 
increase in demand for public services in Indonesia's cities and towns, exacerbating an 
already serious backlog in service provision (Bastin and Smoke 1992: 1). This situation 
forced the central government to implement its decentralization policy more seriously. 
Beginning in 1984, a variety of programs were designed and implemented in an effort to 
strengthen the capacity of local governments to assume more responsibility for planning, 
implementing and financing public services. 
Despite the fact that a great amount of resources had been devoted for many years to 
a variety of programs designed to strengthen the capacity of local governments, several 
studies showed those programs had little impact on the improvement of local autonomy.4 
Functions were decentralized to regional governments but authority for making decision 
over those functions remained at the centre. In fact, under the New Order government, 
regions were treated more like administrative units, depending on the central government 
for their authorities, policies and resources. 
4 See, among others, studies made by the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN) with the asistance 
of Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID), Jakarta, from 1992 to 1994, and by GTZ (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft Fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit) in 1996. 
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The worsening economy, coupled with the rise of an opposition movement, which 
led to the sudden resignation of President Suharto on 21 May 1998, opened another chapter 
for implementing regional autonomy in Indonesia. The fear that Indonesia could fall apart 
encouraged the MPR, which held a special session in October 1998, to issue its decision 
No. XV/MPR/1998 on the implementation of the fullest regional autonomy, fairer revenue 
sharing and fiscal balance. To implement this decision, President Habibie enacted Law No. 
22 of 1999 on regional autonomy and Law No. 25 of 1999 on fiscal balance in May 1999. 
In January 2001, Indonesia commenced the implementation of the regional 
autonomy policy. Only six weeks later, the Minister of Home Affairs and Regional 
Autonomy Surjadi Sudirdja announced that the government intended to revise the two laws. 
The government's move to revise the laws met strong opposition from the regions. But 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, who was elected President in July 2001, insisted on amending the 
Laws, especially Law No. 22 of 1999, for she believed that the law went against the 
principle of Indonesia as a unitary state, as laid down in the 1945 Constitution.5 
Fights between the central and regional administrations to control political and 
natural resources may continue in the near future. The implementation of Law No. 22 of 
1999, nevertheless, has strengthened the position of the regions vis a vis the center. This has 
changed the nature of relationship between the center and the regions. 
A Note on Indonesia's Political Structure 
Indonesia's system of government is based on the 1945 Constitution proclaimed at 
the beginning of the anti-colonial revolution in 1945 and re-introduced by President 
Sukarno in 1959. The 1945 Constitution was amended drastically between 1999 and 2002 
5 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
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after the fall of President Soeharto but the original version provided the legal foundation for 
the political system throughout the New Order era. According to the unamended 1945 
Constitution, Indonesia was a unitary republic in which ultimate authority was in the hands 
of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), which 
convened at least once every five years to elect the president and vice president and to 
determine the Broad Guidelines for State Policy (GBHN, Garis-Garis Besar Haluan 
Negara). During the New Order period its membership rose to 1000 of whom half were 
members of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR). 
The DPR can be considered as the Indonesia's parliament. Until 1997, 400 of the 
DPR's members were elected in general elections held every five years while the remaining 
100 were appointed members of the armed forces. In 1997 the number of military 
representatives was reduced to 75. 
Regional parliaments (DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) were also 
established at the provincial and district (kabupatenlkotamadya) level and included both 
elected members and appointed representatives of the military. In contrast to the national 
level where the MPR and not the DPR elected the president, at the regional level the DPRD 
formally elected the head of the regional government - although, as we will see later, in 
reality regional heads were in effect appointed. 
Under the New Order, the number of contestants in general elections was limited to 
three - the government-backed Golkar and two political parties, one representing nationalist 
groups (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) and the other representing Muslim interests 
(the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP). Elections were held in such a way that the 
Golkar always won overwhelming victories. 
7 
\ 
The presidency was the pivotal institution under the unamended 1945 Constitution. 
But President Soeharto ' s power was primarily based on his control of the armed forces. 
Military officers were always prominent in the cabinet and the bureaucracy. They were also 
often elected as governors at the first-level regions (provinces) and as district heads (bupati 
in rural districts and walikota in urban districts) in the second-level regions. In 1980 the 
total number of military personnel seconded to government positions had reached 8156 
although this decreased to around 6000 by 1995 (Lowry, 1996: 188). 
During Suharto's administration, the Indonesian bureaucracy played a very 
important role in policy process, and therefore, in analysing the causes for the slow progress 
of the decentralization in Indonesia under the New Order, it is also important to emphasize 
the behaviour of the bureaucracy. At the central level, the Department of Home Affairs 
(Departemen Dalam Negeri or Depdagri), the Department of Finance (Departemen 
Keuangan or Depkeu), the State Ministry of the Utilization of the State Apparatus (Kantor 
Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara or Menpan), the National Development 
Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional or Bappenas), the 
technical/sectoral departments such as Agriculture, Education, Health , Public Works , all 
took part in the process of policy making and implementation. At provincial and local 
levels, governors, regional offices of the central departments (Kanwil), Provincial 
Development Planning Boards (Bappeda Tk. I) and provincial sectoral offices (Dinas Tk. I) , 
bupati or walikota, District Development Planning Offices (BappedaTk. II) and local 
sectoral offices (Dinas Tk. II) may also have some control over policy implementation. 
During the ew Order the outcome of decentralization programs was especially shaped by 
the actions of these actors or agencies, which had interests in the preservation of a 
centralized system. 
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The Bureaucracy and Centralization 
Most studies of the nature of the modem Indonesian polity and the relationship 
between state and society in the New Order Indonesia emphasise the important role of the 
bureaucratic elite in the introduction and implementation of public policy (Jackson, 1978; 
Crouch, 1979 and 1986; King, 1982; Anderson, 1983; Emmerson, 1983; MacIntyre, 1990). 
Jackson, for example, using Rigg' s bureaucratic polity model, described how participation 
in policy formation under the New Order was confined almost exclusively to senior 
members of the state apparatus, military as well as civilian. The only opportunity to 
participate in national policy formation by interests outside the state elite occurred during 
policy implementation, and then, only minor local-level adjustments. Jackson also 
considered political relations among members of the state elite as being characterised by 
competing cliques held together by a network of personalised patron-client links. Influence 
could only be exercised through these patron-client links (Jackson, 1978: 5-18). 
Crouch compared Suharto's government to Weberian patrimonial polities in which 
'the government was able to rule in the interests of the elite without taking much account of 
the interests of the masses because the latter were poor, socially backward, politically 
passive and kept in check by the regime's military forces. Politics thus took the form of a 
struggle within the elite itself, among . rival factions and cliques that were concerned 
principally with gaining influence with the ruler who determined the distribution of rewards 
and offices (1979:572). King described the New Order government as a bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime where effective political power was very largely concentrated within 
the state structure and societal groups were excluded from the shaping of public policy 
(1982). 
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Despite differences in approach used in their analysis , all these scholars - who were 
writing in the 1970s or early 1980s - concluded that the Indonesian bureaucratic elite was 
largely unconstrained by societal interests in the determination of policy. Studies done in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, indicate that policy processes were not only the 
domains of central bureaucrats. The involvement of extra-state actors was quite significant. 
Liddle, for example, from his study on rice and sugar policies in Indonesia concludes, 
that it is true that central government officials are the key agricultural policy makers 
today and that . bureaucratic politics, that is conflict among state agencies with 
different agenda and ambitions, has a great deal to do with decision outcomes. But 
the central state apparatus does not monopolize the policy process. Other significant 
- sometimes decisive - actors include local officials, organized and unorganized 
producers , intermediaries, and consumers, members of parliament, and the press and 
intellectual community (Liddle, 1987: 129) 
Another study by MacIntyre on textile, pharmaceutical and insurance industries in 
Indonesia indicated that by the 1980s not only was the state bureaucratic apparatus involved 
in conflict and negotiation, but also parliamentarians and other extra-state actors. The role 
of industry groups was most salient. They were quite able to influence policy outcomes. 
The press proved to be important as an articulator of interests from both inside and outside 
the state (MacIntyre, 1990: 244-245). 
Although more opportunities were available for actors from outside government and 
they were more willing to take part in the policy processes in the 1990s, their involvement, 
however, was limited to only certain policy areas. During the New Order period, the issue 
of decentralization did not seem to be attractive to people outside the government 
bureaucracy for its benefits could not be visibly seen by the public. As Grindle and Thomas 
note, policies, which are not readily visible to the public, will only be fought over in the 
bureaucratic arena. (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 187). A study by Richard C. Crook and 
James Manor on the implementation of decentralization policy in four countries in Asia and 
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Africa also shows that pressure from civil society for decentralization played little part in 
those countries (Crook and Manor, 1995: 312). In Indonesia, however, public support for 
decentralization seemed strong after Soeharto' s fall. 
The end of Suharto's rule gave a rise to widespread demand for democratization, 
including demand for participation in policy making. The excessively dominant role of 
executive in the past led to increased demands for restriction of the power of the executive. 
This provided actors from outside the bureaucracy with more opportunity to affect the 
policy process. Despite this, the position of bureaucrats remained important in the 
policymaking. Their administrative capability, technical expertise, and control over 
information enabled them to influence the direction of public policy while the political 
controls of the regime enabled it to suppress popular demands. 
Approach and Methodology 
In an attempt to answer the question of why decentralization in the New Order 
Indonesia failed to devolve power in public decision-making from the national to sub-
national levels of government, this study analyses the process by which Law No. 5 of 1974 
was drafted and translated into action. Its focus is on factors that shaped the decisions on 
what should be the content of Law No. 5 of 1974 and on how the law was implemented. 
The content of Law No. 5 of 1974 was very important for it affected how the 
decentralization policy was to be pursued. It determined what kind of program would be 
introduced, where and when the program would be implemented, who would be the 
beneficiaries and who would bear the cost, where and when the program was to be 
implemented and who would be in charge of executing the program. In addition, the way in 
which the policy goals were stated was also important. As Grindle (1980: 8-10) notes, 
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whether the goals are stated clearly or ambiguously and whether political and administrative 
officials are in agreement about those goals have a major impact on the manner in which the 
policy is to be implemented. Policy content is the result of conflict and bargaining among 
actors involved in the formulation of the policy. 
As previously discussed, during the New Order period the state apparatus played a 
decisive role in defining the content of particular policies. In making decisions, these 
officials were relatively unconstrained by the interests of certain classes or organized 
groups in society. In deciding what problems they needed to address and what solutions 
they needed to introduce, those officials could be expected to be influenced by their 
individual characteristics, such as their professional training, experiences, organizational 
positions, interests and goals. But they were not fully autonomous. Their choices were also 
influenced by the environment during which the decision was made. As Grindle and 
Thomas (1993 : 37) argue, the contexts within which they operate set limits on what 
solutions are available to them. 
This study uses qualitative analysis. Much of information used in this study is 
obtained from in-depth interviews with relevant government officials at central , provincial 
and local levels, and experts who had been directly or indirectly involved in the preparation 
and/or implementation of the projects. In addition, some eminent academics from prominent 
universities in Indonesia were interviewed to elicit their opinions. 
In addition to primary data, secondary data was also collected from many sources, 
including Indonesian Government publications from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the 
1 ational Planning Board, the Office of State Minister for the Utilization of the State 
pparatus ational Institute of Public Administration, ational Archive, Department of 
Finance Department of Home Affairs and other related sectoral ministries, Other sources 
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included World Bank and other international publications on Indonesia, and previous 
relevant studies. These sec,ondary sources provide information about government policies , 
legislation and programs introduced for decentralization and the progress of 
implementation. 
A six-month field trip to Indonesia was conducted from March to August 1997. 
During the trip, the following provinces were visited: West Java, East Java and East 
Kalimantan. The choice of provinces were based on the fact that those regions were 
involved in the implementation of the three projects selected for the case studies: the Pilot 
Project of Decentralization initiated by the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State 
Apparatus (Kantor Menteri Negara PAN); the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development 
Project (IUIDP) of the Department of Public Works; and the Health Project III of the 
Department of Health. An additional visit to Indonesia was made in 1999. 
In this study, analysis is largely limited to the preparation and implementation of 
Law No. 5 of 1974 and other legislation related to this law. The experience of implementing 
similar policies during the 1950s is also discussed briefly to assist understanding the 
background of decentralization in Indonesia. A chapter focus on post-New Order reform is 
also made to show how the issue of decentralization was addressed immediately after the 
fall of the New Order government. 
Structure of the Study 
This study is divided into the following chapters. Chapter I explains the background 
and purpose of the study. It also discusses the approach and methodology used in preparing 
the study. 
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Chapter II discusses the politics of decentralization in developing nations. It begins 
with a brief discussion of related concepts and theories on decentralization. The emphasis is 
on factors that motivate the adoption of the policy, the outcome and conditions that affect 
the outcome. This chapter is expected to provide a broader perspective in analysing the 
process of decentralization in Indonesia. 
Chapter ill provides the historical context of decentralization in Indonesia. It 
explains why the founders of Indonesia chose to adopt the idea of decentralization in the 
unitary state. It also discusses how this idea was implemented during the 1950s and 1960s. 
The discussion of the previous experience provides background to the problems of central-
regional relations that existed during the New Order administration. 
Chapter IV focuses on the formation of decentralization policy under the New Order 
government. This chapter analyses how Law No.5 of 1974 was prepared and obtained 
approval from the parliament. It also discusses factors that influenced the content of the 
law. 
Chapter V discusses the way in which Law No. 5 of 1974 was translated into action 
and its relation with the formation of a strong state in New Order Indonesia. This chapter 
tries to answer why the Law failed to promote greater regional autonomy. 
Chapter VI reviews the implementation of the pilot project on decentralization. This 
pilot project was introduced by the State Minister for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
(Men. PAN) and the Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri) in 1994. This project 
emphasized the transfer of responsibilities, personnel, funds and facilities to the second 
level of government. Twenty-six districts were selected as the locations of the pilot project. 
Chapter VII discusses the sectoral experience in decentralizing public service 
provision. Two projects were chosen to be studied. The first one is the Integrated 
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Infrastructure Development Project (IUIDP), which was launched by the Department of 
Public Works in 1986. This project was aimed at improving local capacity in the provision 
of public services such as water supply, waste management, and road maintenance. The 
second project is the Health Project III (HP III), which was introduced in 1987 by the 
Department of Health for the purpose of strengthening local capacity to provide basic health 
care. These two projects represent the point of view of sectoral ministries on how 
decentralization policy should be pursued. 
Chapter VIII analyses Indonesia's expenence with decentralization immediately 
after the fall of the New Order regime. This chapter discussed why a new regional 
autonomy law was adopted and what made the concept different from the one introduced 
previously. It also discusses the problems associated with the implementation of this new 
Law. 
Chapter IX draws some conclusions about factors, which prevented the transfer of 
power to regional government from happening in New Order Indonesia. It also assesses the 
prospect of decentralization in the near future. 
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Chapter II 
Political Decentralization in Developing Countries 
Decentralization has been an off-and-on goal in developing countries. Beginning in 
the 1950s in Asia and in the 1960s in Africa, various attempts were made to establish 
decentralized systems of government. It was argued this system would bring the 
government closer to the people and tap the creativity and resources of local communities 
by giving them opportunities to participate in development. But by the early 1970s, most of 
these initiatives had been vitiated by distrust and interference from above, and by political 
rivalries and shortages of resources and expertise in elected councils and local communities. 
As a result, governments tended to swing back to centralization. But, in the early 1980s, as 
centralized regimes failed to deliver desired national unity and economic progress, 
decentralization was again on the agenda. In most cases, the focus was on delegation of 
administrative authorities. Some countries tried experimenting with limited forms of 
political decentralization (Mawhood, 1983:8: May, 1997:1; Crook and Manor, 1998:2). The 
results were, however, not promising. 
Since the latter part of the 1980s, there has been growing interest in devolution. A 
World Bank study noted, "of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations 
greater than 5 million, all but twelve have started decentralizing political power to local 
units of government" (Dillinger, 1994:8). Despite rhetoric that claimed the policies were 
aimed at promoting local self-governance, recent studies suggest that government in most 
developing countries remains centralized. Even in countries where local governments were 
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granted greater autonomy, the policies neither promoted responsiveness nor strengthened 
accountability. 
This chapter discusses motives behind the introduction of decentralization, 
particularly political decentralization, and forces that hampered the formation of 
decentralized system of governments in developing countries. This discussion is of 
particular importance for analysing the problems in implementation the policy in Indonesia. 
The Concept of Decentralization 
Decentralization covers a broad range of concepts. Litvack and Seddon (1999:1) 
classify those concepts into political, administrative, political, fiscal and economic or 
market decentralization. Each concept is briefly discussed in this chapter. But the study 
focuses on political decentralization. It is concerned with the territorial distribution of 
power (Mawhood, 1983:3; Smith, 1985: 1; Wolfers, 1985: 3). 
Political decentralization generally refers to the devolution of power in public 
decision-making from national to sub-national governments. Such devolution requires the 
creation of political institutions, which have the right to make policies for the areas over 
which they have jurisdiction. These sub-national authorities, therefore, acquire a measure of 
autonomy (Smith, 1995: 9). 
Political decentralization is sometimes referred to as "democratic decentralization" 
(Smith, 1995: 9). It aims to give citizens or their representatives more influence in 
formulating and implementing policies. Advocates of political decentralization believe that 
decisions made with greater participation will be better informed and more relevant to 
diverse interests in society than those made only by national political authorities. Political 
decentralization is often associated with pluralistic politics and representative government. 
18 
It is believed that the selection of representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows 
citizens to better know their political representatives and allows elected officials to better 
know the needs and desires of their constituents (Litvack and Seddon, 1999: 7). 
Administrative decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and 
its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations area-wide, regional or 
functional authorities, or nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations (Rondinelli 
and Nellis 1986:5; Litvack and Seddon, 1999:1). It both refers to functional and areal 
decentralization. The former involves the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks and 
activities from the central ministries and agencies to their field offices, while the latter 
refers to the transfer responsibility for public functions to organizations within a specified 
political or geographical boundary, such as a province, district, municipality or river basin 
(Rondinelli, 1983: 137). 
There are three types of administrative decentralization: deconcentration, delegation 
and devolution Deconcentration is the redistribution of decision-making authority and 
financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government. 
It is often considered the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in 
unitary states. Delegation is the transfer of responsibilities and power from the central 
government to semi-autonomous organizations (like a public corporation or a housing 
authority) not wholly controlled by the central government but ultimately accountable to it. 
It is a more extensive form of decentralization. Devolution is the transfer of authority for 
decision-making, finance, and management of services to quasi-autonomous units of local 
government, such as municipalities that elect their own mayor, raise their own revenues, 
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and have the authority to make investment decision. It is the type of administrative 
decentralization that underlies most political decentralization . (Rondinelli, 1983: 137-139; 
Prud'homme, 1994:2, Litvack and Seddon, 1999: 2). 
Fiscal decentralization is the transfer of authority to raise revenue and make 
expenditure decisions. Fiscal decentralization is intended to allow local governments and 
private organizations to carry out decentralized functions effectively. Financial 
responsibility is a core component of decentralization. If local governments and private 
organizations are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they must have adequate 
revenues-raised locally or transferred from the government as well as the authority to make 
expenditure decisions . Fiscal decentralization can take many forms , including: expansion of 
local revenues through property or sales taxes or indirect charges, self-financing or cost 
recovery through user charges, and intergovernmental transfers of general revenues from 
taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses 
Privatization is the transfer of responsibility for functions from the public to the 
private sector. Privatization allows functions that had been primarily or exclusively the 
responsibility of government to be carried out by businesses , community groups, 
cooperatives, private voluntary associations , and other nongovernmental organizations. 
Privatization and deregulation are usually accompanied by economic liberalization and 
market development policies. Privatization-Privatization can range in scope from the 
provision of goods and services based entirely on the free operation of the market to public-
private partnerships in which government and the private sector cooperate to provide 
services or infrastructure. 
Decentralization is related to the existence of multi-level government. In most 
countries, the government is stratified into more than one level, where each stratum is 
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responsible for a particular set of public sector functions. In a federal system, functions are 
allocated to the federal <1nd state governments by the constitution. Each level has full 
responsibility over functions falling under its jurisdiction. Thus, decisions made by the 
states cannot be simply overridden by the federal government. Neither can the federal 
government abolish the states. In a federation, various kinds of decentralization may also 
take place. In a unitary system, on the other hand, responsibility over some functions is 
delegated from the central/national government to sub-national levels. Decisions made by 
sub-national government can be overruled by the central government. Moreover, regional 
and local authorities can be suspended. This is because the central government is the 
sovereign authority and other forms of government . are subordinate to the central 
government (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984:497: Wilson, 1984: 11: Smith, 1985:9; King, 
1993: 15 6). 1 
The distinction between federal and unitary states, according to Smith (1985: 14), is 
much less clear that it is sometimes believed to be. This is because it is not unusual for a 
federal constitution to contradict the principle of federalism. In Canada, for example, the 
constitution empowers the central government in certain specific and limited fields to 
modify provincial law. In many countries, the imposition of national standards may allow 
the federal govem-ment to have some control over programs implemented by states and 
local authorities. Federal grant-aided programs in the USA, for instance, require some 
policies to be implemented under close supervision of the federal government. Conversely, 
it is also possible for a unitary state to devolve substantial powers to provinces so that a 
quasi-federal arrangement exists. In the case of the Philippines, its 1991 local government 
1 In a federal system, each of the constituent parts of a federation may be regarded as unitary states each with 
its internal system of local government (Smith, 1985:2). 
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act assigns a wide range of functions and significant power to local governments. 
Consequently, a unitary state may not be necessarily more centralized than a federation. 
Several arguments have been made for decentralization. Economists justify 
decentralization on the grounds of allocative efficiency. Their rationale is that people's 
preferences differ geographically and therefore decisions about public expenditure made by 
a level of government that is closer to the beneficiaries will be more likely to reflect 
demand for local services than decisions made by a remote central government (Oates, 
1972:35; Boadway and Wildasin, 1984:498; King, 1993:157; Litvack and Seddon, 1999:6). 
Decentralization is also believed to improve government responsiveness. As Barooah 
(1993: 133) argues, any government needs to act in a manner consistent with what its 
citizens' desire. Failure to do so over a sufficient period of time, will, in one way or another, 
weaken the government's authority. In democratic countries, people express their desires 
through their votes. Devolving resource allocation decisions to locally elected officials, 
therefore, would encourage local governments to better satisfy the wishes of their citizens 
(Tiebout in Burki, 1999:3). Another potential benefit of decentralization is that people are 
more willing to pay for services that respond to their priorities, especially if they have been 
involved in the decision-making process for the delivery of these services (Litvack and 
Seddon, 1999:6). 
Politically, decentralization 1s said to strengthen accountability, enhance 
participation and promote political stability. The creation of sub-divisions of the state, 
which are autonomous and governed by institutions that are founded in the area, can 
strengthen accountability. The existence of these self-governing units will also encourage 
more participation in decision-making. In this sense, it supports democratization. More 
participation means more political equality and stability because decentralization provides 
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an institutional mechanism for bringing groups with different interests into a formal 
bargaining process. This may ease frustrations, which if left unattended, could jeopardize 
stability (Benaissa, 1995: 1; Litvack and Seddon, 1999:2) 
From an administrative point of view, decentralization is necessary because the day-
to-day management of public functions requires members of the public to have access to 
state agencies and the state agencies to reach individuals, families, and private associations. 
"Administration has to be geographically dispersed for the purpose of revenue collections, 
the maintenance of law and order, land registration, the provision of other cash benefits to 
people in need, and a host of other activities that simply cannot be conducted from the 
nation's capital" (Paddison in Smith, 1985:47). Decentralized administration is believed to 
promote efficiency by reducing overload and congestion in the channels of administration 
and communication (Rondinelli , 1984: 29). 
Decentralization is not without its critics. Economically, it may not always be 
efficient, especially for standardized, routine, network-based services (Litvack and Seddon, 
1999: 5). It may increase the costs of production of local services. "It may create expensive 
layers of government while reducing the benefits of economies of scale" (Scott, 1997:5). 
The proliferation of administrative arrangements at the local level can bring about 
deterioration in the quality of administration in a context where a larger number of officials 
are employed with less education, narrower outlooks and less experience (Mukerji, in 
Smith, 1985:7; (Burki , Perry and Dillinger, 1999:3). Decentralization can sometimes make 
coordination of national policies more complex and may allow functions to be captured by 
local elites (Litvack and Seddon, 1999: 7). It is also vulnerable to local patronage and 
corruption and, especially where the capacity and experience of local politicians and 
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officials 1s weak, it gives no guarantee of supenor administrative performance (May, 
1997:3). 
It 1s also argued that decentralization does not necessarily promote democracy. 
Local government may be highly decentralized but power is transferred to a local elite and 
this may help augment the dominance of those who, because of wealth or status, are already 
powerful at the local level (Smith, 1985:20-33; Slater, 1980: 514-20). Another criticism 
doubts the efficacy of the electoral process. As Prud'Homme argues, 
Preferences are complex and manifold. They relate to the importance of local public 
sector output (that is the total amount of local taxes paid) and to the structure of this 
output to the set of regulations that will be locally imposed, to the supply efficiency 
that is expected, to the distributional implications of the tax-expenditure package that 
will be decided. How could all that be expressed in a single vote? Local elections, 
when they exist, are usually decided on the basis of personal loyalties or political 
party loyalties ... Moreover, the platforms on which local elections are fought, when 
they exist, are often vague and/or unrealistic. The menus offered for choice to the 
electorate are unlikely to be a good vehicle for expression of the electorate's 
preferences (Prud'Homme, 1994:7). 
It may, therefore, reinforce narrow, sectional interest. Local decision-making, in these 
circumstances, will neither strengthen the accountability nor improve the responsiveness of 
local government to the desires of the people if a proper voting mechanism is not in place 
(Hunter, 1977:20). 
Theoretically, decentralization may also widen regional disparities in the provision 
of public services. As Burki, Perry and Dillinger note, 
Disparities, per se, are not undesirable. As with private goods, effective demand for 
local public services is likely to vary with income. But disparities matter when they 
have distributional implications. Thus, disparities in spending on primary education 
and primary health may be cause for concern (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 1999:4). 
Increasing inequality between richer and poorer regions can also bring damaging 
consequences for unity (Smith, 1985:5). 
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Decentralisation is believed to be more likely to produce a better result if certain 
conditions are met. Dillil)ger (1995: 8-18), for example, argues that decentralisation of 
responsibility for public services provision will only be effective under the following 
conditions. Firstly, functional responsibilities are clearly assigned among different levels of 
government because a clear division of responsibilities between different levels of 
government is critical for ensuring accountability. If responsibilities are diffused, it is 
difficult to identify who is responsible for which decision. Secondly, revenue sources must 
match functional responsibilities. He argues that providing local authorities with revenues 
that match their expenditures is fundamental to making a clear division of responsibilities 
workable. Thirdly, a system of accountability that balances central regulation and local 
political participation is instituted. Even if local governments are assigned clearly defined 
functions and have the means to finance them, local political leadership will not necessarily 
respond to the interest of their constituents unless an effective system of accountability is in 
place. 
Similarly, Ayee (1995:48-49) emphasizes the need to have revenues match 
responsibilities. For this purpose, he suggests that functions assigned to sub-national levels 
should be determined based on local financial capacities. In addition, he said, the 
availability of manpower should also be taken into account. This implies that the extent of 
decentralization should be in accordance with the availability of finance and manpower. 
Ayee particularly emphasizes the importance of granting local authorities genuine 
autonomy to manage their affairs and resources. 
Another scholar, Manor (1995: 87), believes that "if higher authorities want to see 
decentralized institutions achieve things, they must see they have adequate resources and 
they must seek to ensure that elected councillors possess the power to make bureaucrats 
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accountable to them and that councillors can be made accountable to citizens". Like Ayee, 
Manor also argues for adequate power to be given to local authorities. He suggests that 
central politicians and bureaucrats not control local bureaucrats, but strengthen the 
capabilities of local councillors to deal with local bureaucrats. 
Crook and Manor (1997:302-303) also emphasize the importance of an effective 
accountability mechanism. They argue that the result of decentralization not only depends 
on the appropriateness of the program, but also on a supportive socio-economic and 
political environment, especially for ensuring accountability. They indicate some essential 
prerequisites for an accountability mechanism to work effectively. Firstly, the system tends 
to work where there is already a competitive party system, which can generate pressure in 
the council chamber from a group of people who want to expose any faults of the 
administration. Secondly.lit works where there is a free press. Thirdly, it works when there 
are elected politicians not only at the central but also at the local level. Fourthly, it works 
when there is a professional civil service so that more constructive relations can be 
developed between the officials and elected politicians. Crook and Manor's prerequisites 
seem to suggest that decentralization will only work well under democratic governments. 
The Politics of Decentralisation in Developing Countries 
As previously discussed, attempts to introduce a decentralized system of 
government have been off and on in developing countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
following their independence, most developing nations attempted to introduce decentralized 
government. Nationalists usually argued that dispersal of power to local levels was essential 
for democratization. Aye Khan of Pakistan, for example, called the establishment of local 
councils a prerequisite for "Basic Democracy' (Friedman, 1983: 37). Such arguments could 
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be just rhetoric and motivated by political considerations. The national leaders ' 
preoccupation with decentralization could have stemmed from their struggle for control 
over the territory. On the other hand, their realization of the inability of central government 
to serve local people had also made them argue for decentralization. Kasfir, for example, 
notes that in Africa, poor communications and transport facilities, illiteracy, and poverty 
also strengthened the case for government managed by local people. The enormous 
linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity that marked all African countries further support the 
insistence of officials that decentralization was the most pragmatic policy they could adopt 
(1985:31). 
The. formation of decentralized governments in developing nations was also part of 
the colonial legacy. In Africa, when negotiations were held to prepare independence 
constitutions, the departing colonial rulers - anxious to leave their domains in good order -
tried to leave behind formal democratic constitutions that required the establishment of 
local self-government (Kasfir, 1983:30). In India, the British government also tried to 
reorganize the traditional system by creating locally elected councils (Friedman, 1983:36). 
In Papua New Guinea, the formation of provincial governments had also been initiated 
before its independence, partly in response to problems of inefficiency in the highly 
centralized colonial administration and the increasing demand for greater participation in 
government (Regan, 1997:10). 
The trend, however, reversed in the late 1960s. Shortly after independence some 
governments, such as in Senegal, Guinea, and Ivory Coast eliminated election of municipal 
officials in favour of appointment by the Central government. In Zaire, the autonomy of 
provinces was stripped and urban communes were transformed into administrative units 
reporting to the central government. In Nigeria following the 1966 coup d'etat, the military 
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appointed "sole administrators" and made them responsible for all functions formerly 
carried out by divisional , district and local councils (Kasfir, 1985:32-33). In India, some 
modifications were made to limit self-government in local affairs (Friedman, 1983:36; 
Tummala, 1997:50). The 1960s saw an increase in the role for central governments in the 
provision of services in Latin America. By the end of the 1960s, in most developing 
countries, government became more centralized. 
In most countries, central domination of local governments was partly due to the 
desire to prevent internal diversity from fragmenting the new nations. The centralized 
leadership was seen as necessary for national consolidation. As Manor notes, 
"Since many of the emerging Asian and African leaders seemed heroic figures after 
years in opposition to foreign rule, it was easy for people to trust and even to revere 
them, to share the leaders' belief in the moral rectitude of commandist governance. 
Ordinary folk worried far less than they do today about ensuring that politicians be 
held accountable for their actions. Faith in these leaders, who seemed more inspiring 
than prominent figures in the private sector, translated easily into faith in the 
concentration of state power over which they presided (Manor, 1999:21). 
This tendency was reinforced by the belief that rapid economic development required 
rational planning and centralized government. 
Central planning was also prescribed by international agencies, such as the World 
Bank, for the purpose of promoting "modernization" and accelerating social and political 
change in developing nations (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983: 10-11). In India, for example, 
the Gandhian vision of self-sufficiency had encouraged the expansion of community 
development program during the early days after independence. However, when India 
experienced food shortages, pressure began to build from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, the Ford Foundation, and other agencies to pursue more centralized, 
technology-led approaches to rural development. The contributions of 1ocal bodies pursuing 
micro-level projects were de-emphasized. This policy, together with the desire of state-level 
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legislators in India's federal system to claw back powers that had been decentralized, led 
gradually to the demise of the Community Development Program (Manor, 1999: 19). 
In Africa, according to Kasfir, the removal of decentralized government was also 
motivated by the fact that the imposition of imported institutions contradicted traditional 
social practice. Diverting economic resources from local governments for the benefit of 
one's extended family or ethnic allies may be regarded as a moral act in Africa. The 
continuing influence of traditional moral beliefs about political obligations meant that the 
expectation of proper public conduct required by the imported institutions of the West could 
not be fulfilled. The fundamental poverty of Africa has further undercut support for 
decentralized government. Revenue had never been sufficient to permit adequate 
implementation of the tasks assigned to local government. Trained manpower was difficult 
to find at the local level because the few educated went to work for the central government 
as soon as the opportunity opened up. Corruption was rampant as a result of poverty 
(Kasfir, 1985:36). 
The desire of national leaders to stay in power was another overriding reason why 
central government officials dismantled local government. Before independence, 
decentralization provided leverage in the struggle for self-rule. But thereafter, it became a 
threat to the government in power. As Kasfir notes, 
In many African countries, leaders reached national office by building coalitions of 
local or regional notables who could contribute their followings for particular 
political activities. Political leadership of this sort can be effective only when the 
ruler has the access to resources and the willingness to use them to maintain a 
following of clients-who will in tum be given the means to do the favours of 
clients of their own. But political support based predominantly on material 
incentives is unstable-a rival leader can always offer a potentially more lucrative 
arrangement. Decentralized government would provide opportunity for those out of 
power to create competitive patronage networks (Kasfir, 1985: 37) . 
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In Latin America, rapid urbanization laid bare the inability of local governments to 
meet growing demands for urban infrastructure. Virtually every government in this region 
reacted not by strengthening municipal government, but by creating new central 
government bodies that stripped municipalities of their formal role as service providers at 
the local level. As a result, a widespread process of "demunicipalization" took place 
throughout the subcontinent. Responsibility for the delivery of important services such as 
the urban water supply, transportation, public housing, primary health ' care and education 
was transferred to the central government (Nickson, 1995, in Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 
1999: 10). 
In the late 1970s, discontent over the results of centralized planning and 
administration and a new belief in the value of participation and rural development, led 
some developing nations to reintroduce decentralization (Benaissa, 1995: 1; Maw hood, 
1983: 8; Rondinellie at al. , 1984: 3-4). The need to implement decentralization policies was 
also strengthened by the central government's intention to shift part of the burden of 
financing public services to local levels. In the 1970s, most developing countries faced 
severe financial problems, decreasing levels of exports, rising prices for energy and 
imported goods, and diminishing foreign assistance. Decentralization appeared to be at least 
a partial solution to their growing problems (Rondinelli at al., 1984:3). 
In the 1970s, the most frequent form of decentralization introduced was 
deconcentration. In Asia, fi eld agencies of central ministries were created to assume 
responsibilities previously exercised by central offices. In addition, provincial and district 
authorities were also given the opportunity to propose and implement local projects . For 
this purpose, they received grants from the central government. In addition, regional 
development councils, for example in Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
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Thailand, and Sri Lanka, were established to translate national development goals into local 
projects and to coordinate the activities of national ministries and their field offices within 
the region (Mathur, 1983:69).2 
In countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, "mixed" arrangements were introduced 
(May, 1997:2; Mawhood, 1983:8; Rondinelli et al., 1984: 13). Local authorities now 
performed a number of responsibilities, which had previously been carried out by the 
central agencies. The government of Sudan, however, made extensive attempts at 
devolution. Provincial councils and provincial commissioners were given responsibility to 
manage nearly all public functions, except national security, post, communications, foreign 
affairs, banking, and judiciary, which were reserved to the central government. Provincial 
governments also had power to impose local taxes and fees, maintain law and order, finance 
public projects, prepare annual budgets, recommend development projects to central 
government agencies, and establish and administer self-financing development activities. 
Responsibilities for local services were given to localities (Rondinelli, 1984:21). 
Despite the vast scope of the various programs, the results were rather ambiguous. 
In Asia, decentralization succeeded in expanding the capacities of central bureaucracies to 
administer local development projects in more effective and efficient ways, but at the 
expense of local governments. Local governments were viewed as bureaucratic instruments 
of implementation. They were permitted technical and administrative authority to 
implement, but not the political authority to introduce programs suited to their local 
environments. In Asia, local leaders were seen by central government officials merely as 
communicators and solicitors of support for national policies, rather than as channels 
2 Regional development councils in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, were linked with central 
institutions in a way that clearly constrained their discretion (Martur, 1983:69). 
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through which the conditions and needs of local communities were articulated and made 
known to central planners and policy makers. Nor were they seen as mobilizers of local 
resources for promoting development from "bottom up" (Friedman, 1983: 41-43,). In 
Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania, despite the attempts made to decentralize development 
planning and administration, their systems remained essentially centralized (Rondinelli, 
1983:77-79). In fact, in most countries, decentralization programs created greater local 
dependency on decisions and resources from the centre (Mathur, 1983:74; Harris, 
1983:197). 
A study by Rondinelli et al. shows that most countries experimenting with 
decentralization faced senous problem of implementation. Some problems arose from 
insufficient central political and bureaucratic support and others from ingrained centrist 
attitudes and behaviour on the part of political and administrative leaders . In some 
countries, decentralization policies and programs were inappropriately designed, organized 
and carried out. Nearly everywhere it was tried, decentralization was weakened by the 
failure to transfer sufficient resources to those organizations to which responsibilities were 
shifted (Rondinelli et al. 1984: 46-69). As Larmour argues, constitutional and legal 
autonomy means little if local governments lack resources, staff, money and authority 
(1985:356). 
The 1990s saw an increased interest in political decentralization. A World Bank 
study shows that 75 out of 87 developing and transitional countries have been moving 
towards a more decentralized system of government (Dillinger, 1994:8). One explanation 
for the renewed interest in political decentralization in developing countries lies in the 
increasing political demands for democratic self-rule in countries previously governed by 
authoritarian regimes. This is the case in Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, and many others, 
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which have undergone the transition from autocratic to democratic rule in recent years (Azis 
and Arnold, 1996:1; Brillantes, 1998: 44; Martinussen, 1995: 39). 
Another explanation for increasing attempts to devolve more power to local levels 
of government has been growing demand from different social groups for greater political 
autonomy. A fundamental attempt at devolution was introduced in Sri Lanka in 1987 in an 
attempt to offset separatist demands in the northern and eastern parts of the country (Slater, 
1997:254). The establishment of provincial governments with a considerable degree of 
autonomy in Papua New Guinea was partly due to the emergence of nationalism in 
northeast Gazelle and Bougainville (Regan, 1997: 10). Thus, decentralization was seen as a 
means for coping with problem of political instability created by secessionist movements. 
One other explanation for growing interest in decentralized government has to do 
with regimes' need for legitimacy and grass roots support (Crook and Manor, 1998:1). In 
Ghana, for example, decentralization was initiated in 1988 by the Provisional Defence 
Council (PNDC) government, which was born out of a military coup in December 1981, in 
an attempt to resolve the legitimacy crisis faced by the Rawlings' military regime (Oquaye, 
1995:210; Crook and Manor, 1998: 204-205). Similarly, the Bangladesh experiment in 
democratic decentralization (1985-1991) was the creation of General Ershad who had 
seized power in a military coup in 1982. The establishment of sub-district councils was seen 
as a strategy to obtain allies in rural areas and to facilitate the creation of Ershad's own 
Jatiyo party (Crook and Manor, 1998:86-89). The enactment of the 1991 Local Government 
Code, which guaranteed a significant degree of autonomy to local governments in the 
Philippines, was partly motivated by the urgent need of the Aquino government to obtain 
support from local politicians (Rood, 1998:61). 
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One other important explanation of widespread political decentralization has been 
pressure from international donor agencies . In some African countries , the World Bank 
made decentralization conditions for the grant of Structural Adjustment loans (SAPs ), 
which were aimed at promoting "good governance". In Bangladesh, the Philippines, and 
many others, foreign donor agencies also played a greater role in encouraging 
decentralization. However, the drive from donors seldom led to decisions to adopt 
decentralization (Manor, 1999:29). Those decisions seemed to arise primarily in response to 
domestic pressures and were rooted in the domestic political concerns of the regimes 
(Crook and Manor, 1995:312). 
As motives behind the introduction of political decentralization varied, the form and 
extent of decentralization also varied among countries. In part of Africa, decentralization 
was marked with the creation of political entities in the territories that were formerly 
administered by the central government. In Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Argentina, decentralization was a shift from centrally appointed to locally 
elected mayors and later elected governors. In these countries, this process was 
accompanied by the transfer of major services to sub-national levels of government (Burki , 
Perry and Dillinger, 1999: 12). In Asia, the focus was on transforming the function of local 
governments from mere instruments or agents of central governments into more 
autonomous units or levels of governments. In most countries, the devolution of power to 
local levels was also accompanied by significant increases in intergovernmental transfers 
(Dillinger, 1994:8; Azis and Arnold, 1996; Fukasaku and Hausmann, 1998:13). 
It is hardly surprising that the form and extent of decentralization introduced in one 
country differs from that adopted in another country. As Smith argues, the decisions about 
the decentralized structure of a nation-state are political rather than technical. The 
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distribution of power between levels of government, as well as the choice of institutions for 
decentralization is the outcome of political forces in conflict (1985:201-2). In Mexico, for 
example, substantial power and resources were devolved as opposition parties became 
increasingly influential in the congress. More genuine decentralization measures were the 
price the government party had to pay for support from the opposition parties on other 
legislation (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 1999: 2). 
Although intensive attempts have been made for decentralization, recent studies 
suggest that the gap between the goals of decentralization and the results of policy 
implementation remained wide in developing countries.3 Despite the rhetoric that 
decentralization was aimed at promoting local self-government, most governments 
remained centralized with the regions taking directives from the national capitals. In Ghana, 
local governments were created but power to make decisions was given to the executive 
committee, formed mostly from among the elected and nominated members of the district 
council, and chaired by the district secretary, who was appointed by the central government. 
Local budgets must be approved by the central government, and all decisions on staff 
hiring, promotion and dismissal were made by the central government. Similarly, 
devolution of power was also restricted in Nepal, as the legal frameworks did not confer 
any wide-ranging power to local authorities. The central government not only had formal 
power to intervene and direct the local authorities, but also the right to suspend and dissolve 
popularly elected bodies. In India, municipal councils were locally elected, but state 
governments could legally dismiss mayors whose performance they found unsatisfactory 
3 Among others are studies by Ayee (1995), Estache (1995), Martinussen (1995), Sl ater (1 995), Azis and 
Arnold (1996), Crook and Manor (1998), and Fukasaku and Hausmann (1998). 
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(Ayee, 1995; Dillinger, 1995: 8; Martinussen , 1995: 51). Limited political autonomy 
granted to local institutions has been a great constraint on local self-governance. 
In some countries, local governments did enjoy greater autonomy. However, having 
greater discretion over local affairs did not automatically make them more responsive to 
locally felt-needs. In countries with a caste system, the distribution of power in local 
institutions reflects the distribution of wealth in society. In Kamataka, India, for example, 
20 percent of council's seats were reserved for disadvantaged groups (the lower castes). 
This arrangement did not prevent landowners and members of other relatively well-off 
castes from maintaining their dominance in councils at both district and Mandal levels 
(Crook and Manor, 1998:279). In Bangladesh, where most local councillors were elected 
from the local elite, local decisions tended to cater to the interests of those councillors, or 
their class interests, rather than those of the masses . As Zarina Khan notes, 
Only an extremely limited number of "middle farmers" or owner-cultivators gained 
places on the lower level union council. Scarcely any become union chairmen and 
thus gain a seat on the district councils. Since decentralization created significant 
openings for village elites to influence government institutions, its overall impact 
was to intensify already extreme inequalities" (Khan in Crook and Manor, 1998:99). 
Thus, the way in which the society is structured will also affect the outcome of 
decentralization. 
In most countries, transferring decision-making power to local levels did not affect 
the amount of public services available to the people. In Ghana, the impact on the output of 
development projects between 1982-1992 was marginal. Some projects were stopped due to 
inadequate financing. While power to raise revenue was limited, attempts to maximize 
revenues were hampered by lack of local capabilities. Moreover, establishing local 
institutions was expensive. As a consequence, about 80 percent of local budgets were spent 
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on recurrent expenditure, such as travelling, and maintenance of district assembly vehicles 
(Ayee, 1995:44). A similar tendency was also found in Nepal (Martinussen, 1995:114-123). 
In addition to lack of funds, inadequate manpower was also to blame for poor 
performance in Nepal. Neither the District Development Committees (DDCs) nor the 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) possessed suitably qualified and adequately 
trained staff to perform the functions formally assigned to them (Martinussen, 1995: 130). 
In the Philippines, together with the shift in responsibility for the delivery of basic services 
was the transfer of personnel from national government agencies to local governments. This 
policy, however, could not be fully implemented because the transfer of personnel would 
bring the consequence that more than half of local budgets would be used for salaries 
(Brillantes, 1995:202). 
In Bangladesh, where resources allocated to local authorities were substantially 
increased by the central government, development outputs undoubtedly increased compared 
to the previous forms of administration. There was a question, however, whether those 
outputs corresponded with popular needs, due to elite bias (Crook and Manor, 1995: 320). 
Similarly, in the Ivory Coast, outputs clearly improved during the initial phase (1985-1989), 
but the commune executives tended to favour infrastructure projects such as school 
buildings or town halls, vvhich were not necessarily highly valued by ordinary farmers or 
the poor (Crook and Manor, 1995:321). Thus, local decision-making does not necessarily 
increase the responsiveness of local governments to local needs and preferences. 
Decentralization also tended to increase government spending. The transfer of 
responsibilities for some services to sub-national levels did not cause national spending on 
those areas to decrease. On the other hand, the transfer made regional authorities spend 
more (see Estache, 1994). In Latin America, local decision-making has been accused of 
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contributing to the problem of overspending and budget deficits. As responsibilities over 
some functions were shared by more than one level of government, local governments were 
able to extract more resources from the central government by choosing to underprovide in 
areas of joint jurisdiction. Such practices caused the central government to spend more on 
local services. As Fukasaku and Hausmann argue, "a clear separation of roles and 
responsibilities is necessary because it can permit a better control of central government 
budgets, better planning and provision of services, a more transparent use of state and local 
resources" (1998:28). 
Decentralization seems to have failed to promote accountability in many countries. 
In Nepal, making bureaucrats accountable to local politicians was difficult. Local 
bureaucrats felt very reluctant to accept the guiding role of newly created councils or even 
provide information to elected politicians as they looked down on local representatives who 
had little experience and modest education (Matinussen, 1995: 95). A similar problem 
occurred in Ghana. As Manor argues, "in countries where democracy has been either non-
existent or an off-and-on phenomenon, bureaucrats tend to have little regard for 
politicians-especially the sort of small fry who get elected to decentralized councils" 
(Manor, 1995:85). 
In Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, where villagers had a "servant-master" relationship 
with council representatives, the accountability of local politicians to the citizens was also 
weak. Such a situation did not support the making of complaints about bad behaviour or 
lack of accountability (Crook and Manor, 1997:296-288). In Latin America, weak 
accountability was especially due to their inefficient electoral systems. Under a multi-party 
system with proportional representation, local politicians had few incentives to listen to 
their voters (see Fukasaku and Hausmann, 1998). Relationships between elected councillors 
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and voters also tended to be weak in countries with a single-party system, or where the 
ruling party is so dominant that in practice most of the country is under a single party 
(Crook and Manor, 1998:294-296). 
Why Political Decentralisation Failed 
It is clear from the discussion above that political decentralization did not work well 
in many developing countries. Programs were inappropriate and the necessary conditions 
were not met. The main obstacles to effective political decentralization in developing 
countries have been political rather than technical. 
In many countries , the division of responsibilities between different levels of 
government was not clearly defined even though the procedures for differentiating roles are 
technically straightforward. The reason was that shared arrangements allowed the centre to 
retain a degree of control over decisions made by local authorities. As Conyers notes , the 
decision on which functions are to be decentralized, and to where, is a complicated and 
sensitive matter since it determines the effective control or authority which the central and 
subordinate levels of government have over functional activities which are decentralized 
(Conyers, 1986: 94). 
In developing countries, as Bahl and Lynn point out, the argument for fiscal 
centralization was also strong (1994:4). One justification was that their economies were less 
diversified and more vulnerable to international fluctuations in commodity prices, natural 
disasters , worldwide recession and so forth. Therefore, central control over the main taxes 
and borrowing instruments was very important for maintaining stability of the country. 
Another justification was that capital was scarce in developing countries and its use should 
be controlled by the central government in order to maximize returns. One other 
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justification is related to income distribution. Regional disparities in income and wealth 
may be accentuated by fiscal decentralization because wealthier regions will benefit most 
from the decentralization of tax powers. Centralization allows governments to reduce 
differences (Bahl and Lynn, 1994: 4). Consequently, local revenues were minuscule and 
local _budgets depended heavily on transfers from the centre. Local reliance on the central 
government for funds further reduced their autonomy. 
In most countries, leaders did not feel they were ready enough to experiment with 
more independent local governments, especially with local institutions that function as 
instruments for wider political participation. In addition, many leaders did not have much 
confidence in local politicians and administrators. While local pressure from citizens was 
weak, greater power was believed to lead to corruption. Therefore, it was believed that only 
the central government could correct the bias in allocating resources among the different 
groups in the society. Moreover, national leaders did not feel like relinquishing their control 
over regions. As Olowu points out, 
... when African policy makers speak of decentralization they are actually seeking 
extension of the power and tentacles of the central bureaucracy to control the 
countryside rather than the promotion of self-governance (in May and Regan, 1997: 
2). 
The expressed concern of central politicians and bureaucrats that decentralisation would 
lead to more corruption at the local level may have disguised their real interest in keeping 
corruption opportunities within their own sphere of authority It was not surprising, 
therefore, if they introduced programmes which only created new arrangements for the 
bureaucracy to control the countryside. As Crook and Manor conclude, both decisions to 
decentralise and the form which decentralisation took owed much to domestic political 
calculations and to political tradition and experience (1995: 312). 
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The importance of decentralisation has been advocated in Indonesia since its 
independence. The 1945 Basic Constitution requires the formation of administrative and 
autonomous sub-national levels of government. Attempts to decentralize power to the 
regions have been initiated since the 1950s. But all laws on decentralization introduced 
between 1945 to 1965 failed to establish a decentralized system of regional government in 
Indonesia. It was primarily due to difficulties in finding a combination of central control 
and local autonomy that benefits both the center and the regions. As Turner and Hulme 
(1997: 152) say, "All system of government involves a combination of centralized and 
decentralized authority. However, finding a combination of central control and local 
autonomy that satisfies regime needs and popular demands is a persistent dilemma for 
governments." 
During the New Order government, a new law on decentralization was issued. This 
lavv, however, did not intend to devolve power to sub-national government. Instead it was 
designed to strengthen central control over the regions. Some decentralization initiative had 
also been introduced which the supports of donor agencies such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, USAID, and GTZ. But most of common type of decentralization 
introduced had been deconcentration. Those initiatives had provided more opportunity to 
local authorities to implement development programs. But they could not satisfy regional 
needs for more power in public decision-making. 
The fall of Suharto's government in 1998 has given rise to a widespread demand for 
democratisation. This has paved the way for the introduction of political decentralisation in 
Indonesia through the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional government. At the 
same time, fiscal decentralization was also introduced through the issuance of Law No. 25 
of 1999 on fiscal balance. The implementation of these two laws affects not only the 
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intergovernmental relations , but also the way all levels of government interact with 
community. Although controversies surround those laws still continue, nevertheless, the 
programs have given the regions with opportunity to experience a degree of autonomy in 
managing local affairs. 
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Chapter III 
Historical Background of Decentralization 
in Indonesia 
Decentralization was first introduced in Indonesia by the Dutch colonial government 
in 1903. Although the program did not intend to establish a genuine decentralized system of 
government, this experience had its legacy in the period immediately after World War II. 
Since 1945, decentralization had always been on the government agenda. Unfortunately, 
none of the programs introduced between 1945 to 1998 effectively countered the 
centralizing tendencies in the administration of sub-national levels of government in 
Indonesia. Debates on the need to grant more autonomy to regional levels continued, and 
still continue to this day. 
This chapter discusses Indonesian expenence 1n implementing decentralization 
policy before the New Order period. 1 This discussion is expected to help understand the 
historical context of decentralization in the New Order Indonesia. Past experience is 
important because it influences the perceptions of decision-makers on what is appropriate in 
dealing with a particular problem. Legacies may also set a limit on what is currently thought 
possible to implement. 
1 This chapter is mostly drawn from previous studies, such as those by Furnivall (1939), Maryanov (1957), 
Legge (1961), Walker III (1967), Gie (1968 , 1993) and Kansil (1991). 
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The Legacy of the Colonial Administrations 
By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the regions, which now comprise the 
Republic of Indonesia, had been brought under Netherlands East Indies (NEI) rule. This 
colony was governed by a governor-general in Bogor, West Java, based on the Reglement 
op het Beleid der regering van Netherlandsch-Indie (S 1855/2), the basic law for the 
government of the NEI. To standardize the administrative system of the NEI, the Dutch 
expanded the system of government it previously developed in Java to the Outer Islands. 
In general, two broad systems of administration were applied in the East Indies: 
direct rule (Direct bestuur gebied/Gouvemements gebied) and indirect rule (Indirect bestuur 
gebied/Landschapsgebied). The former refers to the system of administration imposed in 
the areas which were under the direct control of the NEI government, while the latter refers 
to the system of government in areas where agreements between the NEI and traditional 
rulers granted a degree of recognition to particular principalities as self-governing states 
within the framework of the colonial government. The agreement could be in the form of a 
"long contract" or a "short declaration".2 In these areas, the lower administrative units were 
only indirectly controlled by NEI government (Legge, 1961:22-23; Walker III, 1967:63). 
Territory under the direct rule system was divided into five levels of administrative 
units: the gewest (also called residentie), the afdeling, the onderafdeling, the distrikt, and 
the onderdistrikt. The first four levels were headed by the Dutch officials called Governor 
or Resident, Assistant Resident, Controleur, and Gezagherber respectively. The 
2 A long contract was a bilateral agreement which enumerated the rights and duties of both signatories but 
guaranteed huisholding (household) rights, i.e. to manage internal affairs, to the states. In contrast, a short 
declaration was a unilateral treaty under which the native submitted to the sovereignty of the East Indies 
government, agreed not to have political relations with foreign nations , acknowledged the right of the Indies 
government to impose administrative regulations on the state, even over huisholding affairs. Long contracts 
were made between the NEI and the traditional rulers in Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Java), Pontianak (West 
Kalimantan), and Deli-Serdang (East Sumatra). Short contracts were mostly found in the eastern islands. 
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onderdistrikt was usually led by a native civil servant (pangreh pradja). 3 The villages were 
left to the traditional village heads to govern based on adat (traditional) rules. In Java, 
native administrators were also appointed to the positions of Bupati (equal to assistant 
resident) and below. In the Outer islands, due to lack of native administrators, the activities 
of the Dutch officials were expanded to onderafdeling level (Kansil, 1991:15-16). 
In Java, the boundaries of these administrative units usually coincided with those of 
the traditional administrative divisions. In the Outer Islands, in contrast, the territory of 
these administrative units was not necessarily based on the boundaries of the native states or 
of smaller adat communities, but rather based upon the size of the territory that could 
conveniently be supervised by the controleur or the gezagherber (Walker III, 1967:65-66). 
The administration of the regions during the colonial era was highly centralized to 
effectively exploit and control the colony. This system caused every central government 
official to carry a heavy administrative load. To alleviate this burden, in the early 1890s De 
Wall, the Colonial Minister, proposed the establishment of residency councils to allow 
decisions over certain matters to be made at the residential level. The proposal was rejected 
by NEI government, as were several later plans with the same objective (Fumival, 
1939:261-262). However, the Ethical policy, which vvas introduced at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, helped pave the way for limited decentralization and the beginning of 
popular participation in government in the Netherlands Indies (Walker III, 1967:77).4 
3 The pangreh pradja originated from old gentry who were given special privileges by the Dutch colonial ruler 
(Nordholdt, 1987: 18). 
4 The ethical policy had two objectives: promoting development by western enterprises and promoting social 
welfare through the villages (Furnival, 1939:227). The Welfare goal was, however, not the main reason why 
Western enterprise was promoted. 
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Figure 3 .1. The Structure of Regional Administration under Dutch Administration. 
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In 1903 the first decentralization law, the Staatsblad 1903/329, was issued. This law 
allowed the formation of several levels of locale ressort possessing a degree of autonomy 
over their own affairs. In addition, these autonomous units were also given the power of 
zeljbestuur, the obligation to implement legislation issued by the centre or a higher level of 
administration. For this purpose, a certain portion of the central budget was to be allocated 
to these regions. These regions were also to be equipped with their own councils and their 
own administration. To implement this law, the Decentralisatie Besluit was passed in 1904. 
Based on this besluit, the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies issued Locale Raden-
ordonantie that established three types of regional councils: Gewestelijke Raad for the 
residencies; Plaatselijke Raad for units under the residencies, and Gemeente Raad for urban 
centers (Kansil, 1993:17; Gie, 1993a: 16). In the case of the residencies, the councils were 
to be chaired by the residents who were members of the civil service, and members were to 
be nominated from among all the major communities, such as the Dutch, Indonesian, Arab, 
Chinese and Indian. For the urban councils, the law provided for elections with a limited 
franchise for a portion of seats allotted to each community and allowed the appointment of a 
burgemeester who was not necessarily a member of the civil service (Walker III, 1967:80). 
The implementation of this decentralization law, however, caused disappointment on 
the part of native Indonesians who had expected to play a larger role in the government and 
to use the council as an arena for political influence and training (Gie 1993a: 17). Residency 
and municipal councils were established in Java and the Outer Islands during succeeding 
years, but decentralization was little more than administrative decentralization, except for 
the municipal councils, which had larger Dutch populations. The regional council was more 
a means of facilitating the task of the central government than a means of enabling a 
genuine expression of the will of the local population. Council members were appointed 
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from among government employees, both European and Indonesian (De Kal Angelino, in 
Legge, 1961:6). "The effective power lay with the chairmen of councils who were officials 
of the central government. The council system enabled the chairmen to draw on a reservoir 
of local knowledge and to acquaint themselves with local feeling. It was thus designed to 
offer greater efficiency, rather than greater autonomy"(Legge, 1961: 6). 
A new reform measure, Bestuurhervorming was enacted in 1922. This law enabled 
the regrouping of the existing residencies to form a new but larger territorial division called 
the province. This unit was further divided into several regencies (regentschap/ 
groepsgemeenschap) and municipalities (staad gemeente) and charged with the 
management of their local affairs. The structure of gove111ment in these units was made 
uniform. Governors, regents and burgemeesters headed the provinces, regencies, and 
municipalities respectively. At each level , raad (regional councils) and college van 
gedeputeerden (boards of deputies) were also established. These boards of deputies were 
charged with assisting the regional heads in carrying out their duties. 
To implement this law, a provincial ordinance was passed 1n 1924. This law 
established several administrative areas, which were known as "governments". These units 
were later to be converted into provinces or autonomous units, once their provincial 
councils were established. The provincial council had the right to select the Board of 
Deputies from the senior members of the council or from qualified non-members. The 
regional head or Governor who was appointed by the Governor-General chaired these two 
bodies. In addition to being head of the regional government, the Governor was also a 
representative of the central government and was responsible for the general coordination 
and execution of central government administration in his region. He or she also had the 
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right to veto any decision if he or she felt that it did not serve the general interest (Legge, 
1961:6-7; Walker ill, 1967:83). 
The law specifically regulated the composition of the councils. The number of Dutch 
members was usually equal to, or greater than, the number of Indonesian members, while no 
more than five percent of the total represented the Chinese, Indian and Arab communities. 
Of the Dutch and Indonesian members, about half were elected, the other half nominated. 
The representatives of Foreign Asiatic groups were appointed from among those persons of 
foreign ancestry who had taken Dutch citizenship. These provisions enabled the government 
to control a majority in the councils. The fact that the Secretary of the Governor also served 
as the Secretary of the regional councils made the control over councils even tighter. 
The law also divided the provinces into sub-regions designated as autonomous 
communities with their own councils. In Java this article was interpreted as applying only to 
regencies. The general structure of the regency council resembled that of the province. 
Elections were indirect and based on proportional representation (Kat Angelino in Walker 
ill, 1967:85). A board of deputies was also established in every regency. The regent chaired 
both bodies. The appointment of the regent was made by the provincial governor. The 
secretary of the council was also the secretary of the regency. However, the regent did not 
have veto power. If he felt the actions of the council were inconsistent with the public 
interest he could refer it through the provincial board of deputies to the Governor-General. 
Following the adoption of this law, governments were set up in Java, Sumatra, 
Sulawesi and the Great East. The transformation of governments into provinces was soon 
implemented in Java but the process was very slow in the Outer Islands. When the Second 
World War broke out in 1941, none of the governments in the Outer Islands had been 
converted into a province. According to Walker ill, the process was complicated not only 
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by the wide variety in size and composition of the native states but also because these areas 
consisted of both directly and indirectly ruled regions. Moreover, neither the Dutch nor the 
Indonesian nationalists really took initiatives to introduce immediate reform in the Outer 
islands. The Dutch considered these islands of little importance to the economy of the 
Indies. Raw materials were abundant, but inaccessible for profitable exploitation. Moreover, 
labour was scarce. The nationalists too, who were mostly based in Java, were not really 
concerned with political reform in the Outer Islands. Consequently, the demand for 
decentralization in these areas received a much lower priority (Walker III, 1967: 93-94). 
The outbreak of the Second World War terminated the experiment. In 1942, the 
Japanese occupied the Netherlands Indies. The territory was soon transformed into three 
military regions: Java and Madura, under the control of the Japanese army commander 
(Guisenkanbu) of Java in Jakarta; Sumatra, under the control of the army commander of 
Sumatra in Bukittinggi; and other islands, under the control of the navy commander 
(Minseibu) in Makasar. All regional councils set up by the Dutch were abolished. In the 
outer islands the structure of regional government inherited from the previous regime was 
continued with few changes. But in Java, all provinces as well as senior positions in the 
provincial administration were abolished, and the former residencies revived. These units 
(called shu) became very important administrative units. The residents assumed, for the 
areas under their jurisdiction, all the functions formerly held by the Governor-General, the 
governor, the provincial councils and their boards of deputies. The Residents, who were 
Japanese military or civilian officers, were directly responsible to the commander-in-chief 
in Jakarta. As the representatives of gunseikan, their veto over decisions of lower 
administrators was absolute. Police responsibility for the entire residency also emanated 
from the residents' offices. Important ports were classified as municipalities (tokubetsu shi), 
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which were placed under the close scrutiny of the military commander (Walker III, 
1967:110-111). 
Principalities on Java, such as Yogyakarta, Pakualaman, Mangkunegaran and 
Surakarta, were excluded from the law. In these areas, the administration of the pre-war 
regime was retained, but Japanese officials now filled the position of governor and some 
other important positions. The Sultans were required to break their ties with the Dutch 
Government. The administration of villages was also left untouched except that the 
headman was now elected for a specific period of four years (Walker III, 1967:114-115). 
To mobilize support for the war effort, the Japanese allowed the formation of a 
political organization called Poesat Tenaga Rakyat (Center for People Effort) or Poetra in 
1943. Four leading Indonesians were appointed to lead it: Sukarno; Hatta; Ki Hadjar 
Dewantara; and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur.5 The formation of Poetra was intended to be the 
first stage in preparing the nation for self-determination. But in 1944, this organization was 
dissolved because it was seen as accomplishing more for the Indonesian nationalist 
movement than for the war effort. Poetra was replaced by Java Hokokai (Java Service 
Association), which was designed to provide an umbrella organization for mobilizing the 
people of Java. This organization had the organizational means to penetrate even the 
villages (Ricklefs, 1993: 204-206). 
5 Soekarno was the founder of Partai Nasional Indonesia or PNI (the Indonesian National Party). When PNI 
was dissolved 1931, he joined Indonesian Party (Partai Indonesia or Partindo), which had the same goal as 
PNI of achieving independence through non-cooperation and mass action. Soekarno was sent into exile several 
times for his political activities. He became the first president of the Republic of Indonesia. Hatta was the 
chairman of Perhimpunan Indonesia (the Indonesian Association), an organisation for Indonesian students in 
the Netherlands (1925 to 1930). In 1927 he was arrested for encouraging armed resistance to Dutch rule in 
Indonesia and spent five months in prison in The Hague. Following his return to Indonesia, he joined PNI. He 
became the first vice president of Indonesia. Ki Haj ar Dewantara was a relative of Pakualam (Y ogyakarta 's 
Sultan of Pakualaman). In 1911 he joined a political party called the Indische Partrij (Indies Party). In 1913 he 
was exiled to the Netherlands for his affiliation with Indische Partij and released in 1919. On his return, he 
founded Taman Siswa, a school that combined modern European-style education and the traditional Javanese 
culture. Kiai Haji Mas Mansur was the chairman of Muhammadiyah, a modern Islamic organisation focusing 
on educational and welfare efforts. 
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At the same time, the Japanese began to promise some Indonesians involvement in 
the affairs of government in Java. A Central Advisory Council (Chuo Sangi In) was 
established in Jakarta with Soekamo as chairman. A regional council (Shu Sangi-kai) was 
formed in every residency (Shu Sangi-kai) and municipality (Tokubetsu Shi Sangi-kai). 
These councils were charged with providing advice to military authorities concerning such 
problems as discovering new ways of collecting rice and food, attracting popular 
enthusiasm for war effort, and conscripting labourers for building strategic defences 
(Gandasubrata in Walker III, 1967:117). 
To gain more support for the worsening war, the Japanese also began to promise 
independence for the East Indies. In March 1945, the Japanese announced the formation of 
an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan 
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or BPUPKI) composed of the most 
outstanding leaders of Java from all the main schools of thought, such as the nationalists, 
the socialists, religious leaders, and bureaucrats. In addition, seven Japanese representatives 
were also appointed to the committee. This committee was chaired by Dr. Radjiman and 
met several times in Jakarta from May 28 to July 17 1945 in the Volksraad building in 
Jakarta (Nasution, 1995:10; Ricklefs, 1993:208-209). 6 Its tasks, as stated in the Makloemat 
Gunseikan No. 23 on the formation of BPUPKI, was to investigate any political, economic, 
administrative, legal and defence measures needed for the formation of an independent 
Indonesia. This committee was required to report regularly to the Gunseikan (the Japanese 
Military Commander) in Jakarta (Kan Poo, NO. 66-2605, in Simandjuntak, 1994:75). 
6 Dr. Radjiman was a medical doctor and member of Boedi Oetomo, an organisation for Javanese priyayi (members of official class), focusing on promoting education and entrepreneurship. 
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BPUPKI's Debate on Decentralization 
From the first day of the BPUPKI' s first session, conducted from 29 May to 1 June 
1945, the committee was confronted by three basic questions: the philosophical foundation 
of the state; the territory; and the form of the state and government. With regard to the form 
of government, Yamin, speaking on the first day, proposed the future Indonesian state be a 
republic V:7i~_h a unitary system.7 He rejected the idea of a monarchy for its feudalism. Ji:e 
argued that only in the form of a republic could a democratic state be realized. He argued 
for a unitary system on the ground that a federal system might prevent Indonesia from 
becoming a strong state. Yamin thought, the geographical and ethnic diversity of the 
archipelago, and the various forms of rule under Dutch occupation, might cause difficulties 
to the centre in exercising its authority, if a federal system was adopted. He regarded a 
strong state as necessary for Indonesia's continued existence and believed that only through 
a unitary system could a strong state be built (Sekretariat Negara, 1995: 21-29; 185-188). 
Hatta, who apparently spoke after Yamin, also raised this issue but his speech is no 
longer available. 8 During the BPUPKI' s second session, it was clear that he was one among 
those who fought for a republic. As he explained later in one of his speeches, 
the experience with colonial autocratic government had given rise to the ideal of a 
democratic constitutional state in the minds of the younger generation of Indonesia. 
The state it was believed should have the form of a Republic based on the 
« overeignty of the people {Hatta in Feith and Castles, 1970:35). 
7 Mohammad Yamin was a lawyer who had interest in literature. He was the chairman of Partindo (1 932 -
1938), and member of POETRA. He was ones of the main drafters of the 1945 Constitution. 
8 The records of the BPUPKI's first meeting are not complete. Unfortunately, only the record of speeches from 
Yamin, Soepomo and Sukarno could be found in both Yamin ' s collection and also in Pringgodigdo ' s 
collection that was discovered in the early 1990s in the Netherlands. The two collections, however, have no 
significant differences. From Soepomo 's speech on the third day of the meeting, however, it was clear that 
Hatta also spoke either on the first or on the second day of the meeting. 
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He was also an advocate of a parliamentary system with a cabinet responsible to the 
parliament because he feared that a presidential office vested with excessive power would 
ignore the people's aspirations (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:262-263; 324-326). 
As a strong advocate for regional autonomy, it might be expected he would have 
argued for federation. However, when the debates on the structure of government occurred 
during the second session, he did not seem to reject the idea of a unitary state. He seemed to 
believe that in a unitary state power could be decentralized to local levels (State Secretary, 
1995:41). Following independence he strongly advocated greater autonomy for the regions 
(Kahin, 1994:204). In one of his speeches in 1956, he argued that decentralization would 
not violate the sovereignty of the central government, 
there are still many fields of endeavour that can be governed (by local areas) 
according to its own desires .... All matters, which exclusively concern the affairs of 
a region, can be decided with fully authority by the people of that region (Kedaulatan Rakyat, in Maryanov, 1956: 12). 
Soepomo, an expert in adat (traditional) law, however, insisted that the question of 
Indonesia's Staatsidee (state' s philosophical foundation) be the top priority because all else 
flowed from it, including whether Indonesia should become a republic or a monarchy, a 
unitary state or a federation, and what sort of relationship should exist between the state and 
society (Sekretariat Negara 1995:32). In his speech, Soepomo argued that the political 
system of the Indonesian state must coincide with the unique structure of the Indonesian 
community as it once was and would be in the future. The example of other states, he said, 
provided cautionary guidance on what to avoid rather than models around which the 
Indonesian state could be constructed. Based on this argument, he rejected state 
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organization based on liberalism and Marxism (Sekretariat Negara, 1995 :31-43).9 Inspired 
by the totalitarianism prin~iples of German National Socialism and the structure of the 
Japanese state, particularly the harmonious relations between the Emperor and his people, 
Soepomo proposed to establish an integralistic state: a state based on the totalitarian ideas of 
unity between state and societies; leaders and people; centre and periphery; and on the 
indigenous principle of family (kekeluargaan). 10 
On the form of government, Soepomo was not really concerned whether the future 
Indonesian state would be a monarchy or a republic, provided the unity of leader and his 
people, of state and society, and of centre and periphery could be guaranteed. Nor did he 
worry whether the head of the state resembled a king, a president, or a fuhrer, as long as he 
possessed all attributes of real leadership. Soepomo seemed to believe in the need for strong 
leadership in order to unite the Indonesian society. As he argued, "as a leader, the head of 
the state must point out the way to the noble ideals and aspirations of the people. Moreover, 
the head of the state should also have the capability of maintaining unity of the state and 
nation" (Sekretariat Negara 1995:36). But in his speech, he specifically argued for a unitary 
system. His rejection of a federal system stemmed primarily from his preoccupation with 
the integralistic idea of the state. As he argued, "a federation would create states under the 
state" (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:41; 271-272). The existence of autonomous sub-national 
9 For detailed discussion, see Marsilam Simandjuntak, 1994, and David Bourchier, 1996). 
10Soepomo's concept failed to gain majority support during the BPUPKI meeting, but his integralistic idea 
seems to have had a strong influence on the nature of the 1945 Constitution and the way the Constitution was 
further interpreted by the Sukarno as well as Suharto governments, especially with regard to state-society 
relations and the relations between the centre and the regions. During the period of guided democracy, 
Sukarno applied Soepomo's idea of an integralistic state by integrating legislative, executive, and judicial 
institutions, integrating the three social forces, nationalists, religion and communists (Nasakom), and 
integrating the ruler and the ruled, state and society by eliminating opposition (Dawam Rahardjo, 1995:57-58). 
During Suharto's period, Soepomo' s concept had also inspired the military in formulating its security concept 
of Wawasan Nusantara (Kuntjoro-Jakti, 1981:135). 
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governments clearly conflicted with his integralistic idea of the state where regions were 
only sub-sets of the total system. 
Soekamo, who gave his main speech on 1 June, also emphasized the importance of 
the unity of the archipelago in the struggle for independence (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:63-
84). He quoted Ernest Renan's statement that "the basic requirement for a nation is the 
desire to be united". He also quoted Otto Bauer's statement in his book Die 
Nationalitatenfrage that "a nation is a community of character which had grown out of a 
community of shared experience" (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:72). On this basis, he argued 
that their shared experience under the Dutch colonial time had brought the Indonesian 
archipelago together to form a nation. He further argued that neither religion nor ethnicity 
could ensure the unity of these islands. Based on this argument he rejected making Islam the 
basis for establishing an Indonesian state. He saw the idea of an Islamic state as a possible 
source of friction among the Indonesian founders, some of whom were non-Moslem. To 
avoid this friction, he proposed to build a national state based on his idea of Pancasila (five 
basic principles). 11 These principles were designed in such a way as to accommodate all the 
conflicting opinions so far expressed, particularly between those who wanted Indonesia to 
be an Islamic state and those who did not. These principles, according to Kahin, synthesized 
western democratic, Modernist Islamic, Marxist, and indigenous village democratic and 
communal ideas, which formed the general basis of social thought of a large part of the 
post-war Indonesian political elite (Kahin, 1952: 123). 
On the form of government, Sukarno strongly argued for a republic with a unitary 
system. He believed a republic would ensure the application of democratic principles. In a 
11 They were: Nationalism (Kebangsaan); internationalism-humanitarianism Internationalism (Peri-
kemanusiaan); unanimous consensus and representation (Musyawarah dan Perwakilan); social welfare (Kesejahteraan Sosia[); and Belief in God (Ketuhanan). 
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democratic state, he said, the head of the state was elected by the people, but in a monarchy 
people could not choose tpeir leader because the state head's position was inherited. In 
contrast to Hatta and Yamin, who preferred a parliamentary system, Soekamo favoured a 
presidential system because this system would allow a concentration of power in the 
executive. Like Soepomo, Soekamo also seemed to believe in strong leadership to unite all 
parts of the country. His preoccupation with the unity of the archipelago, therefore, caused 
him to argue for a unitary system. 
When the BPUPKI' s first session ended on 1 June, no decision had been made either 
on the form of the state, on the territory, or on its philosophical foundation. The second 
BPUPKI meeting began on July 10, when the committee agreed that Indonesia would be a 
republic based on the idea of Pancasila. The following day, three sub-committees were 
formed: on the constitution, chaired by Soekamo; on defence, chaired by Abikoesno; and on 
finance and economy, chaired by Hatta. 12 
When the constitutional sub-committee met to decide whether the future Indonesia 
should be a unitary or a federal state, a majority agreed with a unitary system proposed by 
Yamin. Others wanted to form a bondstaat (a federation). They argued that this system was 
more suitable to the condition of Indonesia where hundreds of small kingdoms with a degree 
of autonomy under Dutch administration (zelfbesturende rijken and landschappen) existed. 
If a unitary state was chosen, power might be concentrated at the centre and regions left with 
nothing. Consequently, these regions could not be expected to integrate into the republic 
because of their fear that this system would threaten their continued existence and the 
autonomy of their traditions and cultures (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:211). 
12 Abikoesno was the leader of Serikat Islam (Islamic Union) and member of POETRA. 
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In response, Yamin urged the Constitutional Committee not to worry that power 
would be concentrated if a unitary state was adopted. In a unitary state, according to Yamin, 
power could also be given to the regions through "deconcentration", the division of power 
among units under the central government, and "decentralization", the division of power 
between central and regional governments. "The division of power between the centre and 
the regions could be made in a just and righteous way", he said (Sekretariat Negara 
1995:185-186). 
In addition, Yamin again warned his colleagues of the dangers of federalism because 
it might hinder the natural unifying process and weaken the resolve of the new nation to 
defend its independence against Dutch colonial ambitions. Under a federal system, he said, 
channels of communication between the central administration and the regions would not be 
available. Only in a unitary system could the Outer Islands properly assert their claim to be 
integral parts of the nation, with rights to participate in the machinery of national 
government. From the angle of nation building, Yamin also feared that federalism would 
accentuate insularist feelings and possibly give rise to secessionist sentiments. Moreover, he 
also feared that the differences in the possession of natural resources among the regions 
might result in a problem of inequality in the society (Sekretariat Negara, 1995:187). 
Yamin's argument seemed effective. When the supporters of a unitary system were 
asked to stand up, only two out of 19 members of the sub-committee remained seated. The 
decision was final: a unitary state was to be adopted. The majority apparently believed a 
unitary system was necessary to ensure unity as well as nation building. However, they 
were fully aware that geographical and ethnic diversity of the archipelago might be better 
managed if a degree of regional autonomy was allowed. On July 17, the committee finished 
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its work by drafting the first constitution, which called for a unitary republic but with a 
degree of decentralization. , 
In July 1945, the Japanese renewed their promise that independence would be 
granted to Indonesia within the next few months. On 7 August, a new Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 
PPKI) was formed. Its members consisted of the members of BPUPKI and representatives 
from Java and other islands. 13 This committee was scheduled to meet on August 19. 
However, Japan surrendered to the Allies on 15 August and a plan for Japanese-sponsored 
independence came to a halt. Older Indonesian leaders were uncertain what to do, but the 
youth saw Japan's surrender and the absence of Allied forces as an opportunity for 
Indonesia to declare its independence. On the morning of 17 August 1945, Soekarno read 
the declaration of independence in front of a small group outside his house. 
On the following day, the PPKI met for the first time. After long debate, the 
Committee accepted the draft constitution prepared by the BPUPKI. Soekarno was 
appointed President and Hatta Vice President. A Central Indonesian National Committee 
(Komite National Pusat or KNIP) was established to assist the President (Ricklefs, 
1993:210-213). During the meeting, the issue of decentralization was again debated. The 
majority agreed that the newly proclaimed independent Indonesia would be a unitary 
republic (Article 1) with a presidential system (Article 3). But considering the existence of 
hundreds of Kooti or self-governing territories (zeljbesturende lanschappen) in Java and the 
Outer Islands, many delegates wanted regional governments to be allowed to manage their 
own affairs (1995: 272). Some members from the Outer Islands, such as Dr. Amir from 
Sumatra and Dr. Ratulangi from Sulawesi, demanded broad autonomy for the regions. They 
13 Kansil, 1991:20; Ricklefs, 1993:209 
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also wanted the division of power between the centre and the regions to be clearly stated in 
the constitution. Soepomo, however, rejected this idea preferring this matter to be regulated 
by another law. Due to pressure to determine the coristitution immediately, all members 
finally accepted the clause on regional government, as drafted, to be Article 18 of the 
Constitution. This article stated that, 14 
the division of territory into larger or smaller units and the forms of their 
administration shall be laid down by law with due regard to and due observance of 
the principle of consultation in the governmental system of the state and the 
traditional rights in the special areas (the 1945 Constitution). 
In the Elucidation of the 1945 Constitution, it was further stated that, 
Par 1. Because Indonesia is an eenheidsstaad (a unitary state), regions within its 
boundary cannot be a staad (a state). Indonesian territory is divided into provinces 
and the province will be divided into several smaller regions. These regions can be 
autonomous or administrative regions. At every autonomous region, there will be a 
badan perwakilan daerah (regional representative body) because the government 
in the regions will be based on permusyawaratan (a democratic principle). 
Par 2. Within Indonesian territory, there are approximately 250 seljbesturende 
lanschappen and volkagemeenschappen like desa in Java and Bali, negeri in 
Minagkabau, doesoen and marga in Palembang and so on. These regions have their 
traditional structure, and therefore can be considered as special regions. The 
Republic of Indonesia recognizes the position of those special regions and any 
regulation regarding those areas should regard asal usul (the historical background) 
of these regions. 
Both Article 18 and its Elucidation tell little about the nature of central-regional relations. 
However, they suggest that a uniform system of local government for the whole of 
Indonesia might not be appropriate and that traditional right should be taken into account in 
the establishment of the autonomous units. 
14 The English version of the 1945 Constitution is taken from Simorangkir, J.C.T, and Mang Ram Say, B., 
1980. Around and about the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, Penerbit Djembatan, Jakarta. 
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Decentralization during the Revolution 
Two days after the, proclamation of Indonesian independence, the PPKI issued its 
decision regarding the temporary structure of the regional government in Indonesia. In this 
decision it was stated that the Indonesian territory was to be divided into eight provinces: 
West Java; Central Java; East Java; Sumatra; Borneo; Celebes and Maluku and the Lesser 
Sunda. Each province would be further divided into regencies. The head of province, the 
Governor, together with the Regional National Committee (Komite Nasional Daerah or 
KND), was given the responsibility to take over management of each region's affairs. The 
KND was to be responsible to the Central National Indonesian Committee (KNIP) which 
was located in Jakarta. 
On August 23, the PPKI issued another decision on the establishment of the KNIP 
and the KND. The Central National Committee, which consisted of 150 representatives 
from the civil service, Moslem communities, nationalist groups and commercial groups , 
was formed on August 29. The formation of the KNIP was gradually followed by the 
establishment of KNDs in the provinces, most of the residencies, municipalities and even in 
some villages in Java (The Liang Gie, 1993a:45). 
The euphoria of independence, however, lasted only a few days because Allied 
Forces began to arrive to accept the Japanese surrender. In September, Australian troops 
occupied the major cities of East Indonesia. With them came Dutch troops and 
administrators. Demonstrations were put down and some republican officials were arrested. 
In the meantime, British troops moved into Java and Sumatra. As Allied troops appeared, 
tensions mounted in Java and Sumatra. Street fights occurred between young Republicans 
on the one hand, and former Dutch prisoners, Dutch colonial troops, Chinese, Indo-
Europeans and Japanese on the other (Ricklefs, 1993: 216). 
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In November 1945, the system of government was transformed into a parliamentary 
system through a Vice Presidential decision called Makloeniat No. X. 15 The KNIP was now 
given legislative power, to be carried out through a Working Committee (Badan Pekerja) of 
the KNIP. The cabinet was made responsible to the KNIP instead of the president (Gie, 
1993a:46; Ricklefs, 1993:218). This decision was totally in disagreement with the 1945 
Constitution, which provided for a presidential system. However, the 1945 Constitution 
remained in force, if only in theory. 
Following the issuance of Makloemat No. X, a new cabinet was formed and Sjahrir 
became the first Prime Minister as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Interior 
(Ricklefs, 1993: 218). 16 One of Sjahrir's main agendas was to establish a system of regional 
government based on people's sovereignty (Gie, 1968c:9). For this purpose, the first law, 
Law No. 1 of 1945 concerning the setting up of regional councils, was introduced a few 
days later. This law had actually been drafted by the working committee of KNIP right after 
its formation and sent to the president for approval in October 1945. 
The preoccupation with the question of decentralization after the Japanese surrender, 
according to Walker III, was based on two important objectives of the Indonesian 
nationalist leadership. Firstly, the creation of autonomous sub-national levels of government 
would weaken the traditional powers of the pangreh (later pamong) pradja, the centralized 
civil service inherited from the colonial period. 17 Secondly, the creation of representative 
15 In the 1945 constitutional debate, Hatta strongly argued for a parliamentary sys_tem. When Sjahrir took over 
the government In November 1945, Hatta issued Maklumat (decree) No. X, which significantly reduced the 
power of the president and greatly increased the power of the parliament. 16 Sjahrir was one of the prominent leaders of the Indonesian Association in the Netherlands. On his return to 
Java, he founded Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Education), which was also called 
PNI Baru (New PNI), in 1931. In 1934 Sjahrir was arrested and sent to Digul. When the Japanese came to 
Java, he refused to cooperate and led an underground movement for independence. 17 The provisional articles of the Constitution of 1945 allowed the continuation of existing official insti tutions 
and regulations until new ones in accordance with the constitution could be set up. This article provided for a 
continuation of the pamong pradja. According to Walker III (1967:134-135), the nationalists who framed the 
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institutions at various levels was considered to be the most direct method of democratizing 
political institutions and ?f encouraging an active modem political life (Walker ill, 
1967: 134). On the other hand, Indonesian scholars, such as The Liang Gie and Solly Lubis, 
saw the introduction of Law No. 1/45 more as an effort to counter the Dutch accusation that 
the Republic was fascist and merely a Japanese creation. They both regarded the 
establishment of the regional councils as part of the effort to show to the world the 
democratic image of the Republic (Gie 1968a: 15; Lubis 1975:51). 
Law No.l of 1945 
Law No. 1 on regional government, which was passed on 23 November 1945, was 
very brief and general. This law established three types of autonomous regions: the 
residency (keresidenan); the regency (kabupaten); and the municipality (kotapraja). The 
autonomy of the provinces was abolished and the provinces were turned into administrative 
regions. An assembly called People's Regional Representative Committees (Badan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or BPRD) was to be established in every residency, regency, 
municipality and wherever else the Minister of Interior designated (Articles 1, Law No.1 of 
1945). This assembly, together with an executive board (Badan Eksekutif), consisting of 
representatives from the BPRD and the regional head, was responsible for the management 
of their region. Both bodies were to be chaired by the regional head who was appointed by 
the central government (Article 2, Law No.1 of 1945). But the relationship between BPRD, 
the regional head and the executive board was not clearly defined in this law. 
constitution were not inclined to hand the country back to this corps whose training and experience had taken 
place largely under the highly centralized administrative systems of the Dutch and Japanese. However, there 
seemed to be no alternative because the assemblies set up by the Dutch and Japanese lacked experience to 
handle administrative function. The only officials with experience were the members of the pamong pradja. 
The termpangreh pradja was changed to pamong pradja because pamong has a more positive meaning. 
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In Law No. 1 of 1945, responsibilities were divided between the centre and the 
regions based on hierarchical limitations. The regions were allowed to deal with any matter 
not specifically pre-empted by the centre or by a higher local government (Gie, 1993a:60). 
But powers given to the regions were of two categories: the power of autonomy and the 
power of medebewind. The former referred to the right to carry out "household affairs" 
which were fully surrendered to regional governments. The latter referred to the obligation 
to execute tasks that were incompletely surrendered. That is, where implementation was 
turned over to regional government, but the right of initiative was retained by the central 
government. 18 
Article 2 of Law No. l of 1945 provided that the existing KND be transformed into 
BPRD. The abolition of the KNDs, according to the Minister of Home Affairs, was due to 
the problem of dualism. KNDs were formed when sovereignty over Indonesia was formally 
still in the hands of the Japanese and the pangreh pradja who were appointed as the 
members of KND at that time were still part of the Japanese Government. As sovereignty of 
Indonesia was now in the hands of the Republic, legislative power should be withdrawn 
from KND and a new assembly established to assume that power. The membership of this 
new assembly should represent all groups in the society, including the pamong pradja who 
now belonged to the Republic. Thus , the transformation of KND into BPRD was expected 
to strengthen the position of the regional councils (Gie, 1968:49; Lubis, 1975:53). 
Following the law, BPRDs were set up at various levels throughout Java and 
Madura. In Sumatra, based on the Governor's Decree (Makloemat) No. 8 of 1946, the 
councils were instituted not only at residency and municipal levels, but also at the provincial 
18 According to Prof. Bhenyamin Hussain, the scope of medebewind is more limited compared to the scope of 
zeljbestuur. Under medebewind, the regions are given the obligation only to implement central government's 
tasks delegated to them according to central government's directions. Under zeljbestuur, the regions had the 
obligation to translate central legislation into local legislation (interview, April, 1997) 
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level (Gie, 1993a:85). This decree seemed to contradict Law No. 1 of 1945 because the 
establishment of a provincial council made the province of Sumatra an autonomous region. 
However, the formation of BPRDs at kabupaten (regency) level did not begin until 1948 
because kabupaten did not exist outside Java at that time. In other islands, BPRDs were 
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formed mainly on the initiative of the officials in charge of the region. For the most part, 
members were again appointed from pamong pradja (formerly called pangreh pradja) 
officers, who had become part of the republican government, and had the approval of 
prominent nationalists in the area. But in some areas, such as in the residencies of Kediri 
and Bodjonegoro in East Java, local elections took place. These were either suggested by 
the resident or initiated by various local groups (Walker III, 1967: 137). 
The system of regional government introduced in Law No.1 of 1945 was strongly 
influenced by the system imposed under the colonial law. As in colonial law, under Law 
No. 1 of 1945 regional autonomy was restricted to "household affairs". What was meant by 
"household affairs "was left unexplained in the law. Therefore, it could be expected there 
would not be many changes in the scope of autonomy from the colonial law. 
The position of regional head also remained as it was under Dutch colonial law. The 
regional head was expected to exercise a dual role: as the head of regional government, he 
or she chaired the BPRD and the executive council; as the representative of the central 
government in the region, he or she continued to coordinate and supervise the execution of 
central tasks in the region. Since regional heads were appointed by the central government, 
it was not surprising that some governors put more priority on the implementation of central 
tasks which were delegated to the regions (Gie, 1993a: 61). The position of the executive 
board was also the same as that of the college under the Dutch administration. 
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The exigencies of the revolutionary situation, particularly in Java during 1946 to 
1949, made any further experiments in decentralization and democratization of local 
government impossible except in the domains of the traditional rulers in Yogyakarta, Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono and the Paku Alam. Attempts to conduct elections and to form local 
governments had to be abandoned because of the pressures of resistance and guerrilla 
warfare against the Dutch troops. However, the structure of local government as outlined by 
the Sultan's government was important because it had a strong influence on the basic law of 
local government, passed by the Republic of Indonesia in 1948 when its capital was 
temporarily moved to Yogyakarta (Walker III, 1967: 138). 
Decentralization after Independence 
Despite the revolutionary situation, decentralization remained on the agenda of the 
second and third Sjahrir cabinets. 19 But Law No.1 of 1945 was seen as inadequate to bring a 
democratic system of regional government to the country. Therefore, another law to replace 
it was drafted by the Department of Home Affairs based on the experience of the Sultanate 
in Yogyakarta (Gie, 1993a: 97). This new law, Law No. 22 of 1948 on regional 
administration, was proclaimed from Yogyakarta on 10 July 1948. It was passed with 
minimal debate by the 47-member Working Committee of the KNIP (Walker III 1967: 
145). This law outlined the formation and organization of regional governments , functions 
to be performed by regional governments, and the principle of selection for the position of 
the regional head (kepala daerah). 
19 In his first cabinet (14 November 1945-12 March 1946), Sjahrir called for the establishment of regional 
government based on people's sovereignty, and in his second cabinet (12 March - 2 October 1946) he 
launched another program called the Establishment of a System of Democratic Regional Government (Menyusun Pemerintah Daerah yang Demokratis) (Lubis 1975:58). In his third cabinet (2 October 1946-3 July 
1947) this programme was retained. 
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Law No. 22 was well received by the regions. But the innovation proposed by the 
law was not implemented for a considerable time due to the internal problem caused by the 
Madiun affair and a series of negotiations with the Netherlands government.20 In December 
1949, the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS) was established, and 
the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty of Indonesia to the RIS government. Under the 
RIS Constitution, Law No.22 of 1948 remained valid for the formation of regional 
governments in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan. But the implementation of the law 
effectively began only after the establishment of the new Unitary Republic in 1950. 
Law No.22 of 1948 
Law No.22 of 1948 established three tiers of "self-governing regions" (daerah 
swatantra): the province, the kabupaten and the desa or its equivalent. 21 Large towns were 
to be equivalent in status to a kabupaten, and small towns were to be equivalent to a desa . 
In addition to these "ordinary" self-governing regions, there was provision for the formation 
of "special regions" (daerah istimewa), composed of units or groups of units, which, 
because of their character or historical traditions, did not lend themselves to ordinary 
classification. The so-called "self-governing states" (swapradja), which had been brought 
under Dutch authority by means of the short declaration or the long contract and which had 
been subject to a form of indirect rule in colonial days were expected to fit into this category 
20 On September 18, 1948, the supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) took over Madiun, one of 
the big cities in East Java, killed some pro-government officers and announced over the radio the formation of 
a National Front government. Musso, Amir and other PKI leaders hastened to Madiun to take charge of this 
government. On the next day, about 200 PKI and other leftist leaders remaining in Yogyakarta were arrested 
and Sukarno denounced the Madiun rebels over the radio and called upon Indonesians to rally to himself and 
Hatta rather than Musso. In October, Musso, one of the communist leaders and in December, Amir, another 
leader, and about 300 pro-PKI soldiers were arrested (Ricklefs 1993:229). 
21 The remaining administrative divisions-residency, kewedanaan, and kecamatan-were not mentioned in the 
Law, though its explanatory appendix appeared to look forward to the gradual disappearance of these units. In 
practice they were retained for the time being. 
67 
(Legge, 1961 :28-29). A special region , according to its size and level of development, might 
be equivalent in status to either a province, a kabupaten, or a desa (see Article 1 (2)). 
As established in Law No. 1 of 1945, in Law No.22 of 1948 power to be exercised 
by the swatanta regions was classified into two categories: autonomy and medebewind. 
Autonomy ref erred to the right to deal with "household affairs", or functions which were 
fully surrendered in principle and in terms of implementation to regional government, while 
medebewind was the obligation to assist in the execution of central government tasks 
delegated to them by · the law, or tasks belonging to and delegated by a higher local 
government level (Article 1 and 23(1)). In the case of medebewind, implementation was 
turned over to local government, although the right of initiative was retained by the central 
government. The powers of autonomy were not enumerated in detail in Law No. 22, but it 
was provided that they were to be elaborated subsequently in further legislation required to 
establish each region as a region of local government under the basic law (article 23 (2)). 
For example, the powers of self-government that the province of West Java could expect to 
receive were determined in Law No. 11/1950 on the establishment of the province of West 
Java. But the actual transfer of powers to West Java province was not made by 
parliamentary decision, but rather by a government decision (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 30 
of 1951. The powers, once assigned, could also be withdrawn by a similar government 
decision (for detailed discussion on the process , see Walker III, 1967: 148). 
The institutions through which regional self-government would be conducted were 
to be similar for all three levels. At each level , two councils were to be established: a 
representative council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, usually abbreviated DPRD), to 
be elected in a manner to be determined by law (article 3(4)), and an executive council 
(Dewan Pemerintah Daerah, DPD), to be elected by and from the members of the DPRD 
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according to the method of proportional representation (Article 13 (1)). 22 The DPRD was 
entrusted with legislative powers in the fields falling within the competence of the region. 
(Legge, 1961 :30). The chairman of the DPRD was to be elected from its members. 
Legislation of local government was not to conflict with legislation of the central parliament 
or higher levels of local government (Article 28). The DPD was charged with day-to-day 
conduct of government, executing decisions of the DPRD, administering the various fields 
of activity belonging to the region, performing such other functions as were specifically 
conferred in the Law .23 This body was to be chaired by the regional head. The members of 
the DPD collectively and individually were to be responsible to the DPRD (article 34). This 
principle followed the principle of the parliamentary system, which was being practiced at 
that time at the central level. 
Law 22 introduced the principle of consultation in the appointment of the regional 
head, something that was not laid down in the previous laws. The regional head was to be 
appointed by the central government from a list of candidates submitted by the DPRD 
concerned. In the case of a province, the appointment was to be made by the president from 
a list of candidates nominated by the DPRD of the province. The head of a kabupaten or a 
large city was to be appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs from a similar list proposed 
by the DPRD concerned. The head of a village or a small town was to be appointed in a 
similar fashion by the Head of the province in which it was situated. (article 18 (1, 2, 3)). In 
. the case of a special region different arrangements were to be made. Here the kepala daerah 
22DPD was a collegial body, designed to avoid the possibility of a single party obtaining exclusive control over 
it. 
23 Certain powers of supervision of the conduct of local governments at a lower level and of the budgets of 
lower local governments were given to the DPDs also. Powers in medebewind might be surrendered to either a 
DPD or a DPRD (Article 24). If such powers were surrendered to the DPD, it would not be responsible to the 
DPRD for its handling of that function. 
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(regional head) was to be appointed by the president from the traditional ruling family of the 
area (if it still retained power), with the proviso that the appointee must be suitable in terms 
of his ability, justice, and loyalty. Normally the traditional ruler would become the kepala 
daerah (Legge, 1961:31). The head of the region could be discharged by the appropriate 
authority at the request of the DPRD concerned, though it was not obligatory for the 
authority to accede to such a request (see explanatory appendix, par. 24). 24 
Like in Law No.lof 1945, the head of the region in Law No. 22 of 1948 was also 
expected to exercise a dual function. As chairman of the DPD he was to be the head of the 
local government with some responsibility to the DPRD. He was also charged with the 
supervisory powers over the DPD (Article 36). As head of the region the kepala daerah was 
to be the representative of the central government in the area, supervising the execution of 
governmental tasks which did not fall within the competence of the local government and 
exercising the same type of coordinating function as had formerly fallen to the appropriate 
officer of the pamong pradja, or central administrative service, such as the Governor in the 
case of a province, the bupati in the case of a kabupaten, and the mayor in the case of a 
town. As Legge pointed out, 
The concept of the dual role had its theoretical difficulties. The fact that he was an 
organ of the local government, bearing a responsibility together with his colleagues 
on the DPD to the representative body on the one hand and having responsibility to 
the higher levels of administration on the other, left open the possibility of a conflict 
of interest between two capacities- a conflict which was particularly likely to occur 
in view of his specific power to delay measures of the local councils which appeared 
to him to be contrary to the general interest or to run counter to the measures of 
higher government. (Legge, 1961 :38). 
Obviously the position of the kepala daerah, as provided in the law, called for great 
qualities of skill and tact if a clash of interest was to be avoided (Legge, 1961 :39). 
24 The power of the central government to remove such an officer on its own initiative without any request 
from the DPRD was not specifically provided, but it appeared to be assumed by officers of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. 
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Despite the fact that considerable power was transferred to the regions, the central 
government was still anxious to retain a measure of supervision over the activities of 
regional authorities, even in those fields specifically surrendered to the regions (Legge, 
1961:32). The first feature of the control system was supervision exercised by the regional 
head on behalf of the central government. According to Article 28 (6), the regional head's 
signature was necessary for ordinances of the legislative council. He or she was also 
empowered to delay the operation of decisions of either council if they appeared to conflict 
with higher legislation or to run counter to the general interest. In the event of such a 
delaying veto, the matter was to be reported within seven days to the president in the case of 
provinces and to the DPD of the next highest level in case of lower local governments. If no 
contrary decision was made by those authorities within three months, the original decision 
was to come into effect (article 36 (1, 2, 3)). This method of control was called "preventive 
supervision" (Legge, 1961 :32-33). In addition, the DPD was also empowered to repeal 
decisions already made by the DPD or DPRD of the level below them, if they conflicted 
with the general interest or with higher legislation. This type of supervision was called 
"repressive supervision" (article 42). 
The second feature of the control system was to be found in the fact that the three 
levels of autonomy, like the six levels of administration, were hierarchically arranged. The 
pro_vinces, while concerned with the field of activity specifically assigned to them, 
possessed a supervisory power over kabupatens and large municipalities within their 
boundaries, and so on down the scale. Indeed, it was through this hierarchy of authority that 
the preventive supervision was made effective, since the imposition of the delaying veto 
automatically brought the whole question before a higher level (Legge, 1961 :33). In 
addition, Article 25 of Law No. 22 also provided opportunity for the central government to 
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intervene directly in the regions when, in the opinion of the centre, a regional government 
was neglecting its task. In these circumstances a central instruction could be issued in the 
form of a government regulation requiring the regional government to act in a certain 
manner. 
The implementation of decentralization policy in western Indonesia during the 
1950s did not really correspond with the plan set out in Law No. 22 of 1948. One deviation 
was related to the appointment of the regional head. Disputes over the conduct of local 
elections had caused the formation of regional councils and the selection of regional heads 
by the regional councils to be delayed. This situation provided the opportunity for the 
central government to use the escape clause of Law 22 of 1948, which enabled the centre to 
appoint regional heads until the election could be held. The existing senior pamong pradja 
official in the region was then named kepala daerah: thus the governor became kepala 
daerah for the province, the bupati, the kepala daerah for regencies; and walikota the 
kepala daerah for municipalities. The appointments of pamong pradja officials as kepala 
daerah reflected the continuation of the central government's control over the region 
(Walker III 1967: 151). 
Another deviation from the original plan was related to the implementation of local 
elections. Law No. 22 stipulated that regional councils be elected, but provided, with details 
of the electoral system to be elaborated in separate legislation (Article 30 (4)). In 1950 an 
electoral act , Lavv No.7 of 1950, was passed, providing for the indirect election of DPRDs at 
the higher levels. Electoral colleges for provincial , kabupaten and municipal elections were 
to be composed of electors chosen by desas or their equivalent (Articles 8, 57, 69). Law 
No.7 of 1950, however, could not be implemented, except in Yogyakarta when in 1951 an 
election was held for the DPRD of the special region of Yogyakarya. But elsewhere the 
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central government argued that problems of inadequate administration in the regions and the 
difficulty of securing unifqrmity in the surrender of powers to areas with widely differing 
experience and capacity made it impossible to establish fully autonomous bodies 
immediately. The government used the escape clause in Law No. 22 which allowed for the 
appointment of "temporary councils" (DPRD sementara) in a manner to be determined by 
government regulation. In 1950, Government Regulation No.39 was issued which provided 
a legal basis for the appointment of representatives on the basis of established party and 
other organizations. Political parties and groups such as labour unions or women's 
organizations were entitled to representation on kabupaten and municipal councils if they 
possessed a central executive and were established in at least three kabupatens and 
municipalities in a province and with kecamatan branches in those kabupatens and 
· municipalities. Members of the provincial DPRDs were to be chosen by the DPRDs of 
kabupatens and municipalities. However, this regulation was open to abuse. A party could 
increase its representation on councils by forming sub-organizations for the specific purpose 
of claiming extra seats. In response to this situation, Hadikusumo from the PNI called for 
the disallowance of the regulation and the freezing of councils already established. 
Parliament agreed with Hadikusumo' s motion, and no further councils were established for 
the time being, though already formed councils were allowed to continue in operation until 
further arrangements were made (Legge, 1961:46-48). 
The third deviation was regarding the establishment of autonomous units. The law 
provided the establishment of three-tiered autonomous regions. But the third level 
autonomous regions were never established, except in some small towns in Java. The third 
level autonomous units at desa or equivalent were regarded as worthless. Since the colonial 
time, the desa (in Java), negeri (in western Sumatra) and marga (in southern Sumatra) had 
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already elected their headmen, possessed their own officials (pamong desa), and their 
village assemblies, which functioned according to local customs. Another reason was 
because a desa or its equivalent was seen as too small in terms of both area and population 
to serve effectively as the basic unit of local government (Legge, 1961:46). 
As Walker ill (1967:154) concluded, "Except for providing opportunity for many 
more individuals to hold public office, the law did not basically change the government 
structure from what had existed before the war." He felt the law failed to introduce a more 
democratic system of regional government because decentralization was implemented in 
only a half-hearted manner. He believed this half-hearted manner was "a reflection not so 
much of the shortcomings of the law as in the reluctance of the central government to give 
the law any real meaning" (1967:167). The law, according to Walker ill, required that 
decentralization be accomplished in two steps: by devolving significant powers of local 
government to the subordinate units; and by gradually curtailing the power of the pamong 
pradja, the territorial administrative corps of the Ministry of Interior. He saw the obstacles 
as both political and logistical. Firstly, the central government kept emphasizing the need 
for creating a strong sense of national unity in order to rationalize its hesitancy to devolve 
powers to local levels. Secondly, the political elite, the primary proponents of 
decentralization and of the democratization of local government, was split over other 
political issues and indecisive about the methods of implementation. Moreover, they also 
felt insecure in their political strength at the local levels and preferred to await better 'grass-
roots ' organization before putting their voting strength to the test. Therefore, until sure of 
their support in the regions, the parties were unwilling to push meaningful implementation 
of the laws. Thirdly, the administrative elite in the field and in the Ministry of Interior in 
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Jakarta found that the laws would abolish their jobs. Not surprisingly, the corps did not 
seem in a hurry to devolve its powers (Walker ill, 1967: 167-168). 
The Law itself did not set a specific timetable for the devolution of power. For 
whatever reasons, the centre could deliberately delay the transfer of many duties to the 
regions. Moreover, local governments were not ready to assume their responsibility due to 
lacked trained staff and budget at local level. Most of educated people were absorbed by the 
central government agencies, and Law No. 32 of /1956 on the fiscal balance did not help 
much in improving regional revenues. 
Law No. 44 of 1950 
On December 1949, the Netherlands formally transferred sovereignty to the United 
States of Indonesia (RIS), a federal state composed of the Republic of Indonesia and several 
Dutch-created states.25 Under the RIS Constitution, Law No. 22 of 1948 remained in force 
for regional government in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan. For the Eastern Indonesia State, 
a similar law, Law No. 44 of 1950, was issued by the government of the state. This law 
outlined the system of regional government within the administrative provinces of Sulawesi 
(Celebes), Maluku (Moluccas) and Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sundas) into which the East 
Indonesia State was now to be divided. 
This law was passed after the remaining states of the United States had agreed on the 
formation of the unitary republic but were waiting for the acceptance of the Provisional 
Constitution (Walker ill, 1967:163). Therefore, the main principles of Law No. 44 of 1950 
25 The idea of a federal state was first introduced by the Dutch at a conference in Malino (South Sulawesi), in 
July 1946. More than 30 representatives from Kalimantan and Easter Islands supported the idea. In December 
1956, the State of East Indonesia was created. In May 1947, the state of West Kalimantan was established. In 
the meeting at Linggarjati (West Java), the Dutch recognized the Republic as de facto authority in Java, 
Madura and Sumatra, and both sides agreed to cooperate in the creation of a federal United States of 
Indonesia, in which the Republic would be one of the states. 
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resembled those of Law No. 22 of 1948. The same hierarchy of autonomous levels was 
proposed, with higher levels exercising some control over the authority of the next lowest 
level. But this region had a different administrative history. Before the creation of the 
Negara Indonesia Timur (the Eastern Indonesia State), this region had been divided into 
many self-governing states. Many of these states were too small to be effective self-
governing units. Therefore, during the Denpasar conference in 1946, these states were re-
grouped into 13 daerah, the subordinate units of the negara, which possessed a considerable 
autonomy. In most cases, the daerah were made up of federations of swapradja 
(autonomous units under indirect rule) or of neo-swapradja (autonomous units under direct 
rule). In Law No. 44 of 1950, the daerah units were to be used as the second level of 
government, and the swapradja and neo-swapradja units were to be made as the third level 
of government (Legge, 1961:41; Walker III, 1967:157-163). 
Law No.44 of 1950 also followed Law No.22 of 1948 in proposing provisions for 
the appointment of a regional head. An important difference between the two laws, 
however, was that Law 44 had no escape clause, which enabled the central government to 
make direct appointments to that office during a transitional period. As a consequence, in 
each case the regional head was chosen by the centre from a list of nominees submitted by 
the DPRD, except in a special region where a member of the ruling house was to be 
appointed. A possible explanation for the difference, according to Walker III (1967: 164), 
was that while the drafters wished to ensure the election of a republican, they also wished to 
prevent the appointment of regional head from another region. 
Law No. 44 of 1950 also differed from Law No. 22 of 1948 1n defining what 
powers would be conferred on regional authorities. In Law No. 22, powers were to be 
surrendered to the local government by the central government. In Law No. 48, a reverse 
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procedure was adopted. The powers assumed by the central government were defined: those 
undefined were left to the local government until such time as this distribution was revised 
by the centre. "The net result was to leave local government with a greater range of powers, 
at least on paper, than was the case in the rest of the republic "(Legge, 1961:42). 
In 1952, the territory of the Eastern Indonesia State was divided into three provinces. 
But provincial governments with elected assemblies had not yet been introduced into the 
islands of East Indonesia. Following the formation of the provinces, the daerah were again 
regrouped so that their size would be more or less equivalent to kabupaten in Java. The 
swapradja and neo-swapradja were abolished to allow the formation of more equal-sized 
daerah bawahan (units under daerah). The municipalities were given the status of second 
level. To avoid too sudden a change in the governmental structure, the process of 
administrative integration in Eastern Indonesia was slowly carried out. 
Decentralization under the Parliamentary System26 
Since its introduction, Law No.22 of 1948 had been criticized by central and local 
politicians for its escape clauses and the dualism in the position of regional head. The way 
in which the law was implemented a few years later caused even more criticism. In 1951, 
Dr. Sukiman, a leader of the Muslim Masyumi party who later became prime minister, 
already knew that a program of decentralization could not be carried out until Law No. 22 
was revised (Maryanov, 1957:65). In addition, the formation of the Unitary Republic also 
provided a strong reason for the drafting of a new, all-embracing law to replace Law No. 22 
and Law No. 44 (Legge, 1961 :43). When the first cabinet under the prime ministership of 
26 During the Parliamentary Democratic Period (1950 - 1959), there were regular changes in government due 
to fragmented party system. Each cabinet consisted of a multi-party coalition. Some cabinets only survived for 
a few months. 
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the PNI leader, Ali Sastroamidjojo, took office in 1953, all attempts to carry out Law No. 
22 were finally abandoned (Walker ill, 1967: 189). 
In 1954, Dr. Hazairin, the Minister of Home Affairs under the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet, proposed to the parliament a draft bill designed to replace both 
Laws No. 22 and 44. This bill was particularly aimed at facilitating the setting up of the 
lowest-level autonomous regions. These units were proposed to be called sadat, and these 
sadat were to be formed based on the adat structure of the communities. These units were, 
of course, not expected to be uniform throughout the country. According to Hazairin, this 
was the most realistic approach to implementing local government on this lower level 
(Walker ill, 1967:190). Furthermore, the bill proposed that the regional head be appointed 
from central government officials by the President for the province, by the Minister of 
Home Affairs for the kabupaten and by the governor for the sadat. The bill did not contain 
provision for nomination of candidates by the DPRD. Hazairin's draft was rejected by the 
parliament. Dr. Hazairin, who represented the small Greater Indonesia Union party then 
resigned and was replaced by Sunarjo Dipodiningrat of the PNI. 
In 1955 Sunarjo proposed a draft based on suggestions made by members of the 
parliament. In this draft, Sunarjo introduced the concept of "real autonomy" to replace the 
previous concept of "autonomy as broadly as possible". In his concept, the degree of 
regional autonomy would be defined according to their financial and administrative 
capacity. Sunarjo also proposed two levels of autonomous regions. In some cases a third 
level could be formed. The regional head in this draft was to be elected directly by the 
people and would chair both the DPRD and the DPD. 
o decision had been made when the Ali Cabinet was replaced by its successor, the 
Burhanudin Cabinet, in August 1955. Burhanudin was from the Masyumi party. Under 
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Burhanudin, the PNI' s Sunarjo, who was reappointed as the Minister of Home Affairs , 
continued to prepare his draft but it was held in abeyance until the new cabinet as a result of 
the 1955 general elections was formed (Walker III, 1967:190-191; Gie, 1993b: 112-113). 
In 1956, the new government based on the 1955 general elections, the Ali-Roem-
Idham Cabinet (a coalition of three big parties: PNI-Masjumi-NU), was formed. In response 
to increasing pressure to further democratize regional government and create a basis for 
uniform local government throughout the country, this government immediately introduced 
its decentralization bill in the parliament. This bill proposed that the regional head (kepala 
daerah) be popularly elected and therefore; not responsible to the central government. For 
the purposes of general supervision, a Government Commissioner (Komisi Pemerintah) was 
proposed to be established, acting as the central government's agent in local government, 
and coordinating activities of local resorts of different levels. This idea met with strong 
parliamentary opposition for fear that such commissioners would be "the spies of the central 
government", or "take on the same position as the assistant residents of the colonial period" 
(Sunaryo Dipodiningrat, in Walker III 1967:191). After prolonged negotiations between the 
party leaders and Sunarjo, who still served as the Minister of Home Affairs, a compromise 
agreement was finally reached. The victory seemed to go to the political parties who fought 
for greater independence at regional levels. The bill was accepted in its final form in 
December and promulgated in the following January as Law No. 1 of 1957 ( Legge, 
1961:52). 
Law No. 1 of 1957 
Law No. I of 1957 was the only decentralization law before 1999 to offer real 
autonomy to the regions. The introduction of such a democratic law became possible 
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following the transformation of the federation into the unitary republic in 1950. Fear that the 
regions' short experience with broader autonomy under the federal system might cause 
problems for the formation of the unitary republic had forced the new republican 
government to give more concessions to the regions. For this reason, the concept of 
"autonomy as broadly as possible" introduced in the RIS Constitution was maintained in the 
provisional Constitution of 1950, despite the fact that such concept was intended for a 
federal system. 27 In Article 131 of the provisional constitution, which was actually taken 
over without any modification from Article 132 of the RIS Constitution, it was stated that, 
The division of Indonesia into large and small regions with the right to govern their 
own affairs, together with the form of government for these regions, shall be 
established by law, keeping in mind the basis of consultation and representation as 
in the system of government of the State. 
These divisions shall be given the greatest possible measure of autonomy to manage 
their own affairs (RIS Constitution). 
The spirit of Article 131 made every cabinet formed following the formation of the unitary 
state include statements of intention to proceed with decentralization in its programs (Gie, 
1993b: 111-116). This mood provided an opportunity for political parties to assert their 
demand for greater regional autonomy. It was under such circumstances that a related law, 
Law No.32 of 1956 on the Central and Regional Fiscal Balance, which gave a better share 
of revenue to the regions, was also introduced a few months earlier. 
Like Law No. 22 of 1948, Law No.I of 1957 also proposed three levels of 
autonomous regions, with a Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPRD) 
and Executive Council (Dewan Penierintah Daerah or DPD) at each level. But in many 
respects, Law No. I of 1957 differed from the previous law. This law greatly increased the 
27 Despite the fact that the Provisional Constitution of 1950 established a unitary state, many of articles in this 
constitution were taken over as they were from the RIS Constitution. 
80 
-~· .. , 
--cy-, ,,· .. 
power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies and municipalities. DPRD 
decisions no longer needed ratification by the regional head, although legislation of the 
regional government was still not to conflict with legislation of the central parliament of any 
higher level of regional government. But the DPRD was now given the power to challenge 
the central parliament or higher levels of regional government if it considered their 
decisions as against the interests of its region and people living in its jurisdiction 
(Gie,1993a: 116). Moreover, the law gave more powers and responsibilities to the regions. It 
proposed that matters within the purview of the central government would include foreign 
affairs, defence, and currency. As Maryanov pointed out, this implies that the residual 
responsibilities would be left to the regions (1958, 56-57). 
Law No. 1 of 1957 was also intended to remove the dual status of the regional head. 
He or she was no longer the chief of the executive as under the previous law, but merely 
chaired the DPD. As chairman of the DPD, the regional head was now to be elected by the 
DPRD; the central government had only the power to ratify the results. The regional head 
was now made responsible to and could be discharged by the DPRD. Under this law, the 
power of the regional head was significantly reduced. 
Changes in the character of the regional head brought some changes in the way 
central supervision would be implemented. Regional government was still to form a 
pyramid with higher levels exercising some control over the lower, both preventive and 
repressive. But those preventive and repressive powers were now given to the next higher 
executive council, or to the Minister in case of the first-level regions (Article 64). 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Home Affairs could still delay or veto any decisions of the 
DPRDs of the kabupaten or of the third-level units if the DPD of the immediately higher 
level failed to exercise its supervisory responsibility (Article 65). 
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Law No.I of 1957 also provided a stipulation for gradual elimination of the pamong 
pradja corps from the regions. Following the law, a ministerial instruction was issued on 
December 5, 1957 to transfer the power of the pamong pradja to the local authorities. In 
most regions, the bupatis were then removed from their kabupatens to the offices of the 
Residents. But in East Java and Yogyakarta, this policy was strongly opposed by the 
association of pamong pradja (Serikat Sekerdja Kementerian Dalam Negeri or SSKDN). 
Further conflict between the regions and the SSKDN, however, could be avoided through 
the intervention of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Legge, 1961: 126-127). 
Following the law, elections were held in Java and Madura in early 1957 and in 
South Sumatra and Kepulauan Riau in late 1957, and in four provinces in Borneo between 
February to October 1958. Right after the elections, the DPRD and DPD were formed. 
Elections, however, could not be held in North and Central Sumatra because both were 
about to be divided and because the central government experienced difficulties in 
commanding the loyalty of certain dissident groups in those areas. In Eastern Indonesia, the 
elections had also to wait until the process of restructuring the administrative division of 
these regions was completed. Where elections were not held, the previously established 
DPRD-Peralihan (Transitional) remained in office (Walker III 1967:199). The division of 
Central Sumatra into the provinces of West Sumatra, Jambi and Riau was finally made 
formal in 1958. In addition, three new provinces were also established in the province of 
Nusa Tenggara: Bali, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara. A number of new 
kabupatens were also formed in these newly established provinces . 
Between 1957 to 1959, several government regulations were issued for the purpose 
of transferring more responsibilities from the central ministries to the first-level regional 
governments. However, the process of transferring those responsibilities was not as smooth 
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as expected. One problem was the slow process of preparing local legislation necessary for 
the regions to take up these responsibilities. Another problem was due to the unwillingness 
of the central ministries to give the whole set of those activities to the regions. For example, 
responsibility for the management of land transportation was given to the first-level 
government, but authority to issue permits for the operation of trucks or buses were retained 
by the central ministry. Such arrangements enabled the central ministry to retain a degree of 
control over responsibilities, which were now under the jurisdiction of the regions. To find 
the solution to these problems, an interdepartmental committee was established in 1958 
(Gie, 1993b: 142-163). 
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Figure 3.2. The Structure of Regional Government according to Law No. 1 of 1957. 
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Meanwhile, some initiatives were also made to implement Law No.32 of 1956 on 
fiscal balance. Previously, r~gional governments were highly dependent on central grants to 
finance their activities. Most taxes were collected by the central government and then 
redistributed to the regions based on population. The way the centre allocated its revenue 
had become a source of conflict between the centre and the regions. The basic Law No.32 
of 1956 was introduced to settle this conflict. Under this law, regions were given some 
financial sources. Following the law, Government Regulation No. 3 of 1957 was 
introduced to allow the transfer of eight state taxes to the first and second levels. One year 
later, the central government also issued Government Regulation No. 12 of 1958, which 
allowed regional authorities to retain certain portions of state revenues originating from 
their regions. However, this regulation stipulated the maximum amount a region could 
collect from both local taxes and retention of central taxes could not exceed the total amount 
of subsidy previously received from the centre in 1957 (Article 6). But if the total amount 
collected was lower than the amount of subsidy it previously received, the gap would be 
filled by central grant (Article 7). These two articles were eventually seen by many as 
reflecting the centre's unwillingness to consequently implement Basic Law No. 32 of 1956. 
The controversies surrounding these two articles made the government abolish them a few 
months later (Gie 1993b: 164). 
In July 1959, implementation of Law No.1 of 1957 was abruptly terminated by the 
introduction of the Presidential Decree on the return to the 1945 Constitution. In September, 
the Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959, which suspended those provisions of Law No. 1 of 
1957 relating to the election and the powers of the DPD and to the election of the regional 
head, was issued. This edict provided for the return to the idea of appointed regional heads 
and also created a new type of executive council responsible to the regional head. This 
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edict, according to Legge (1961:60-61), represents 'not only a modification of detail, but a 
reversal of the central intention of Law No. 1'. 
Decentralization under Guided Democracy 
Shortly after the formation of the cabinet as a result of the 1955 general elections, 
rebellions broke out in some regions. In December 1956, in Central Sumatra, the former 
members of Banteng (Buffalo) Division of the Military during the revolutionary era formed 
the Banteng Council, which called for improvement in every field of government. This 
council successfully took over the government of Central Sumatra province from its 
governor and proclaimed its independence from the central government. In Medan, North 
Sumatra, Colonel Symbolic, the commander of Military Region I (North and Central 
Sumatra) also renounced the authority in Jakarta. A countercoup was successfully carried 
out few days later by Colonel Glinting, who was appointed by the centre to replace Colonel 
Symbolic. On 2 March 1957, Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel, the military commander of the 
East Indonesian Military Region (comprising Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara) 
assumed control of the administration of these provinces. A few days later, similar 
developments occurred in Kalimantan and South Sumatra (Gie, 1993b:202; Legge, 
1961:202-203; Kahin, 1958:563). 
Many believe the action taken by these regional military commanders was initially 
motivated by their dissatisfaction with the internal organization of the Army and its 
relationship with central government.28 But the action was also supported by local 
politicians who had been unhappy with the implementation of Law 22 of 1948. The process 
28 See Mc Vey, Ruth, 'The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army' (Part 1), Indonesia, No . 11 (April 1971) pp 131-176. 
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of establishing autonomous regions in the Outer Islands had been slow and their formation 
was inconsistent with local aspirations, which demanded that boundaries be defined on the 
basis of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. When the Banteng Council took control of the 
Central Sumatra province, its regional commander proclaimed the formation of the new 
provinces of Riau and J ambi. This proclamation forced the centre to compromise with these 
regions by formally dividing Central Sumatra into three provinces - West Sumatra, J ambi 
and Riau - and establishing the provinces of Central Kalimantan and Maluku in 1958 (Gie, 
1993b:235). Regional frustration was further fuelled by the central appointment of Javanese 
pamong pradja officials to important posts in the regional government (Maryanov, 1958; 
Kuntjoro Jakti, 1981:136-:-137). 
Allocation of the central budget was another source of conflict between the centre 
and the Outer islands. Government spending was seen as unfairly divided between Java and 
the rest of Indonesia because the central budget allocations were based on population. 
Foreign exchange, primarily earned by Sumatra, was allocated for imported goods needed 
by people in J ava'.29 This situation caused exporting regions to demand some control over 
the foreign currency they earned. Moreover, to prevent foreign currency from flowing to 
Jakarta, they bartered their commodities illegally for imported goods and military 
equipment. This smuggling made the relationship between the centre and the regions even 
worse (Fryer, 1957:195;; Legge, 1961:235-236; Booth 1986). 
Having been strongly criticized for their inability to deal with the regions, five 
Masjumi Party members of the Ali cabinet resigned. The cabinet itself was dissolved on 14 
March 1957. The fall of the Ali Cabinet was immediately followed by Soekarno's 
29 A study by Thalib Ma' Azis published in "Mimbar Indonesia" in February 1957 showed that 71 % of foreign 
exchange was earned by Sumatra and 16. 7 % by Java. On the other hand, 7 5 .2 % of foreign exchange was spent 
for Java while Sumatra only received 20.8%. 
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declaration on a "state of siege and war." On 9 April 1957, Soekarno announced a new 
cabinet, despite opposition from some parties in the parliament, with the non-party 
technocrat, Djuanda as the prime minister. This non-party cabinet was called Kabinet Karya 
or Working Cabinet, and its immediate agenda was to restore internal stabilization (Gie, 
1993b:203). On 12 July 1957, Soekarno announced the formation of the Dewan Nasional 
(National Advisory Council), which was charged with providing advice to the president. 
This council was composed of 42 representatives from the "functionalist" groups, the 
military, members of the cabinet , and those who were thought to understand the problems 
of the regions (Gie,1993b:203). 
Following the formation of the Kary a Cabinet, a number of attempts were made to 
restore unity. The East Indonesian Military Region was reorganized to restore central 
control over the greater part of this area. A series of consultations with other military 
commanders was also organized to secure their loyalty to the centre. A national conference 
was held in Jakarta from 10 to 14 September and attended by about 200 civil and military 
leaders from the regions . This conference, however, failed to reconcile the differences 
between the centre and the regions. Another conference was then conducted in Jakarta from 
25 November to 4 December 1957, during which it was agreed to normalize the region-
region relationship based on existing laws and regulations. However, the agreement was 
never implemented. Exporting regions continued their illegal trade with foreign countries, 
causing central revenues to decline. At the same time, military commanders in Central 
Sumatra called for the resignation of the Working Cabinet. Military officers involved in this 
action were immediately dismissed by the central government, and their civilian 
counterparts were sent into exile. But on 15 February 1958, the formation of the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) was proclaimed by 
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dissident military officers and politicians at Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. On 17 February, 
Lieutenant Colonel Somba, on behalf of the people of North Sulawesi, declared their 
independence from the central government in Jakarta and their support for the revolutionary 
republic in Bukittinggi. 
In March 1958, the parliament renewed for the second time the "state of 
emergency". Under the emergency act, the freedom of regional authorities was restricted. 
the Penguasa Perang Pusat, later renamed Penguasa Perang Tinggi (Central War 
Authority), and its regional branches Penguasa Perang Daerah or Peperda (Regional War 
Authority) were established. The administration of the regions was put under Peperda, 
which consisted of the regional head, the members of DPD, and the regional chief of police, 
with the regional army commander as the chairman. The rebellions were soon defeated, but 
the conflict between centre and regions was still to be resolved (Gie, 1993b:205). Soekarno, 
who blamed the parliamentary system imposed under the Provisional Constitution for 
causing the political instability, proposed to implement his idea of guided democracy. His 
idea was supported by army leaders (Kuntjoro Jakti, 1981:285). To pave the way for the 
implementation of his concept, Soekamo proposed a return to the 1945 Constitution. He 
argued that under the 1945 Constitution, political stability could be maintained because the 
cabinet could not be easily overthrown. The idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution was 
rejected by the Constituent Assembly, which had been working for two years but was still 
unable to produce a new constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution. In response, 
Soekamo abolished the assembly and issued a presidential decree on the return to the 1945 
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Constitution on 5 July, 1959 ( see Adnan Buyung Nasution, 1993). 30 The return to the 1945 
Constitution allowed the concentration of power in the hands of the president. 
Following the decree, the first presidential cabinet, called Kabinet Kerja (also 
translated as Working Cabinet), was formed on 10 July. This was followed by the 
establishment of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyarawatan Rakyat Sementara or MPRS), a supreme body that was to elect the 
president and to determine the main direction of state policy (Presidential Edicts No.2 and 
3 of 1959). In this, ass·embly the political parties became the minority because more than 
half of its seats were now occupied by representatives of regions and functional groups who 
were appointed by the president. 31 In addition to the MPRS, the provisional Supreme 
Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung Sementara or DP AS) was also formed 
through Presidential Edict No. 3 of 1959 to replace the Dewan Nasional. The parliament 
(DPR) was later transformed into the provisional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Gotong Royong or DPRGR), the membership of which was now dominated by 
representatives of the functional groups and other organizations who supported returning to 
the 1945 Constitution. 
To be consistent with the presidential system at the central level, organization of 
regional government, which had been based on Law No.1 of 1957, also needed to be 
rearranged. For this purpose, Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 was issued on 9 September 
1959, followed by some minor revisions two months later (see Lembaran Negara 
No.129/1959 and TLN 1896; Gie, 1993b:215). This edict suspended the provisions of Law 
No. l of 1957 relating to the election of regional heads. 
30 Ad nan B uyung N asution discusses this issue in detail in his 1993 PhD dissertation. 31 Functional groups represented various economic and social sectors such as workers, peasants, entrepreneurs, professionals, religious communities, women etc. 
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Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 
Presidential Edict No.6 of 1959 was designed to ensure stability and improve 
efficiency in the regions by strengthening central control through regional heads. The 
regional head was now made a state official.32 He or she was to be appointed by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs for the first level and by the governor for the second level from a 
list of candidates provided by the relevant DPRD. But the edict also stipulated that if 
candidates nominated by the DPRD failed to meet the qualifications set by the central 
government, the DPRD would be required to submit another list of candidates.33 If the 
names on the second list also failed to meet the requirements, the President and the Minister 
of Home Affairs were empowered to make appointments from outside of the list of 
nominations. This stipulation would enable the central government to appoint regional 
heads from the pamong pradja and the armed forces who were loyal to the centre. 
Consistent with Law 22 of 1948, the presidential edict also expected the regional 
head to exercise a dual function. As an organ of regional government, the regional head was 
responsible for the execution of matters falling within the field of autonomy. As an organ of 
the central government, he or she was responsible for matters which had previously been 
under the responsibility of the pamong pradja. He or she was also empowered to delay 
decisions of the DPRD which were in conflict with higher legislation or national interests. 
For handling regional matters, the regional head was still to be responsible to the DPRD, 
but the nature of the responsibility was clearly limited by the fact that he or she could not be 
32 State officials (pegawai negara) differ from civil servants (pegawai negeri). The former category includes 
the President and the Ministers, while the latter category included all those whose salaries and conditions were 
regulated by the normal civil service regulation (The PGPN). Members of the pamong pradja were civil 
servants. 
33 A presidential decree was issued to implement the presidential Edict No.6 of1959. But the conditions for the 
position of regional head laid down in this regulation were very vague. 
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dismissed by this council. Moreover, the regional head was made the sole administrator in 
the region. He or she did not share executive power with the DPD because under 
presidential edict No. 6 of 1959 this council no longer existed. The edict made it clear that 
regional government now consisted of only the regional head and the DPRD. 
Another council, the Executive Council (Badan Pemerintah Harian - BPH) was 
established. Unlike the DPD, this new body was a group of assistants to the regional head. 
Its members were appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy for 
the fi rst-level of government and by the governor for the second level of government, from 
the members of respective DPRD and from elsewhere (Kansil, 1991:68-69).34 Even though 
appointments were based on the lists proposed by the DPRD, the members of BPH were 
accountable to the regional head, not the DPRD. This new arrangement fundamentally 
changed the existing system of regional government. 
The edict was also intended to eliminate the influence of political parties 1n 
government. It stipulated that regional heads and members of the BPHs should be free from 
party affiliations . This stipulation, combined with the decline in the political importance of 
the parties, eventually removed the incentive for civil servants to join political parties , and 
caused those pamong pradja, who formerly had joined parties to safeguard their future 
advancement, to terminate their political affiliations. But, as Legge argued, in the short run 
their resignation from their parties did not change their sympathies (Legge 1961:221). 
The power of the political parties in the regional council was further reduced by 
presidential edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the establishment of the gotong royong 
parliament or DPRGR. In this edict, the regional head was allowed to appoint additional 
34 Under Kabinet Kerja , the 1'1inistry of Home Affairs became the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy. 
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members to the regional council from functional groups. This put political parties in the 
minority on the regional council. In addition, the edict also made the regional head the chair 
of the DPRGR. This meant that both legislative and executive powers were concentrated in 
the hands of the regional head. Under such a situation, the regions could no longer function 
as effective political forces in Indonesian politics. 
Presidential Edict No.6 of 1959 was supposed to be part of the effort to implement 
the 1945 Constitution, especially Article 18. But as criticized by Kuntjoro Jakti, 
The restoration of the 1945 Constitution did not in fact revive its Article 18 on 
regional government. New presidential decrees treated the regions as mere 
administrative units within the framework of a highly centralized national 
bureaucracy, totally subservient to the will of the central regime (Kuntjoro Jakti, 
1981:139). 
The regional head became merely a representative of the central government in the region, 
providing a link between the centre and the pamong pradja such as the residents, the 
wedanas and the assistant wedanas whose positions were now revived. 
Law 18 of 1965 
Following the Presidential Edict, the Badan Perancang Nasional or National 
Planning Board was set up. This board was given the task of formulating national 
development plan for the whole nation. A year later, a blueprint called Pola Pembangunan 
Nasional Semesta Berencana Tahap Pertama 1961-1969 was submitted to the MPRS. This 
document proposed that autonomy be granted at two levels: to residencies (the first-level) 
and to kecamatan (the second-level). The provinces were to be turned into administrative 
regions. Large cities would be regarded as first-level, and small towns as second-level 
government. Kabupaten were abolished for both economic and political reasons. Firstly, 
these units were not large enough to accommodate the development of economic activities 
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such, as industrial estates. Secondly, kabupatens had been formed by colonial government 
and allegedly possessed certain feudal characteristics; therefore, they should be abolished 
(Gie, 1993b:242).35 
The second reason was a bluff: after independence the government's division into 
administrative areas continued administrative divisions from colonial times. The real reason 
might have been to eliminate the issue of "Javanisasi". As previously mentioned, the term 
kabupaten originally refers to the administrative division under the residency in Java. The 
Outer Islands did not really have the counterpart of the kabupaten. 
The proposal was approved by the MPRS with minor revisions. With regard to 
regional government, the MPRS suggested the government prepare a new law to replace the 
presidential edict and Law No.I of 1957, which had been partially suspended. One reason 
for doing so was to provide legitimate measures for the new arrangement of regional 
government introduced by the presidential edict No.6 of 1959. This was not considered 
powerful enough to replace Law No.I of 1957 since it had not passed through the 
parliament. In 1961, a committee was set up for the purpose of formulating the legislation. 
Soeroso, the main drafter of Law 22 of 1948, was selected chairman. After long debates in 
the parliament, Law No.18 of 1965 on regional government was enacted on I September 
1965. The enactment of this law made all other legislation related to the system of regional 
government invalid. 
There were no substantial differences between Law 18 of 1965 and President Edict 
No. 6 of 1959. The law established a three-tiered system of autonomous regions: Daerah 
Tingkat I (first-level) at provincial and kotaraya level; Daerah Tingkat II (second-level) at 
35 The boundaries of kabupatens were usually defined based on the territories of the traditio nal rulers. The 
heads of kabupatens were appointed from the rajas or sultans's family. 
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kabupaten and municipal level; and Daerah Tingkat III (third-level) at kecamatan and 
kotapradja level.36 Each regional government consisted of the regional head and the 
regional council (DPRD). Nearly all other provisions on the position and power of the 
regional head in this law were taken over from the President Edict No.6 of 1959, where 
regional heads were given both legislative and executive powers. One main difference was 
that in Law No. 18 of 1965, the stipulation that the regional head and the members of BPH 
were prohibited from party affiliation no longer existed. 
This law was again short-lived, even though it theoretically remained in force until 
1969. One month after its enactment the attempted coup of 1965 occurred. The political 
turmoil following the coup forced President Soekarno to issue the letter of instruction of 11 
March 1966 (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, abbreviated Super Semar), which allowed the 
Commander in Chief of the army leader, General Suharto to take control of the country. 
This transfer of authority was then legitimized by the MPRS decision No. IX of June 21 
1966. This decision marked the end of the Guided Democracy period. 
Why Decentralization Failed 
This chapter has shown that decentralization programs initiated in Indonesia from 
1945 to 1965 had failed to achieve its objective to devolve part of the central authority to 
the regions despite the fact that this issue had been on the agenda of all governments since 
1945. The idea of decentralization in the unitary republic seemed too difficult technically 
and politically to be translated into action. Any attempt to draft legislation intended to 
clarify this concept had always been confronted with the same outstanding issues, for which 
solutions were difficult to obtain: 1) what powers should or could be given to sub-national 
36 Kotara ya refers to Jakarta, the capital of the Republic. 
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levels of government?; 2) to which levels the powers should be given?; and 3) how central 
control over the regions should be enforced so that national integration could be 
maintained? 
The scope of autonomy was one issue over which much of the parliament and the 
government had always been deeply divided. While many members of parliament favoured 
broad autonomy for the regions, the government tended to narrow the scope of regional 
autonomy as much as possible. In such a large country as Indonesia, composed of different 
ethnic groups , the question of how much power should or could be given to the sub-national 
governments was not easy to answer because both too much and too little power could 
cause political instability, which might result in national disintegration. Since the balance 
was difficult to define, the division of power between the centre and the regions was never 
made clear in any decentralization law passed from 1945 to 1965. In Law No. 1 of 1945, 
responsibilities were divided between the centre and the regions based on a hierarchical 
limitation method. Regional governments could deal with any issue, as long as it was not 
specifically pre-empted by the centre or by a higher regional government. However, the law 
stipulated that autonomy could be exercised only over household affairs. But the law itself 
did not provide any detail on what those household affairs should be. It implied that the 
household affairs were not necessarily the same as matters, which were not covered by the 
higher level of government. 
Under Law 22 of 1948, the fields in which regions had authority were enumerated, 
and all residual powers were left with the central government. But among activities 
transferred to the regions, the power of autonomy could be exercised over only a limited 
number. Moreover, the same general subjects appeared in the establishment of all levels of 
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government - provinces, municipalities, and kabupatens. No attempt was made to allocate 
different fields to different levels. 
In contrast to Law 22 of 1948, matters within the purview of the centre in Law 1 of 
1957 were elaborated and residual powers were left with the regions. This provision in 
principle provided more room for local initiatives. Unfortunately the idea was never really 
implemented because Law No.1 of 1957 did not automatically suspend previous legislation 
on the establishment of regional government, which stipulated in detail what a particular 
region could do. Moreover, the reluctance of central ministries to transfer the whole set of 
activities, which were supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the regions, also reduced the 
scope for regional discretion. The outbreak of regional rebellions which were partially due 
to the slow progress of decentralization provided the centre with an even stronger reason to 
further reduce the scope of regional autonomy. 
At which level(s) of government the autonomous units should be established was 
another outstanding issue. Law No.1 of 1945 followed the Staadblad 329 of 1903 in 
proposing autonomy for the residencies, the kabupaten and municipalities . However, 
residencies were seen as too small to serve as the first or highest level. Therefore, in Law 
No. 22 of 1948 the provinces became first-level regions and residencies became mere 
administrative units. In Law No. 22 of 1948, the kabupatens and municipalities were made 
second-level regions and desas were proposed to be the third-level of government. During 
implementation, the plan to establish the third level at the desa level was abandoned 
because they were seen as too small to be effective self-governing units. Despite the 
controversy over the effectiveness of establishing third-level government at the village 
level, Law No.1 of 1957 still proposed the same levels of autonomous regions. But in 1960, 
another arrangement was proposed by the National Planning Board. Autonomy was granted 
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to two levels: to residencies (the first level) and to the kecamatans (the second level). The 
reasons were both economic and political. While residencies were seen as too small to 
become economically and politically independent from the . central government, the 
kecamatans were regarded as large enough to effectively serve as a unit for public services. 
This proposal was opposed by the parliament because it was not in conformity with Article 
18 of the 1945 Constitution. 
The degree of central supervision over the regions was another issue over which the 
government and the political parties in the parliament disagreed. The government (Ministry 
of Home Affairs) had always considered that, as a unitary state, supervision over the 
conduct of the regional government was necessary and that the most effective system of 
supervision was through the direct appointment of pamong pradja officials as regional 
heads. However, parliament demanded the position of regional head be political and that 
supervision be restricted to a minimum. This demand was granted under Law No.1 of 1957. 
However, this law was never implemented. Its enactment coincided with heightened tension 
between the centre and the regions. This tension led to the proclamation of martial law, 
which greatly strengthened central control over the regions. This law was partly suspended 
by Presidential Edict No.6 of 1959 and totally replaced by Law No. 18 of 1965. This Law 
reintroduced the appointment of regional heads. Under this law, central control over the 
countryside became stronger and remained strong during the early days of the New Order 
government. 
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Chapter IV 
Law No. 5 of 1974: the Legal Framework for Decentralization 
in the New Order Indonesia 
In 1974, the New Order government issued Law No.5 of 1974 on Principles of 
Government in the Regions. This law established a framework for the implementation of 
decentralization policy in Indonesia. This chapter discusses the process in which the Law 
was formulated and translated into action. The analysis focuses on the influence of the 
circumstances and the distribution of power among the key actors on the Law's content and 
implementation. 
The study shows that Law No. 5 of 1974 failed to increase regional autonomy in 
Indonesia. Its failure was primarily due to the fact that the law itself did not intend to 
devolve more power and authority to regional levels. Instead, most of its provisions were 
concerned with the establishn1ent and operation of a highly centralized political structure at 
local level. This structure was intentionally built to ensure continued political stability and 
economic development. Historical context and circumstances during the Law's drafting 
significantly influenced leaders' objectives and their perceptions of what was the 
appropriate relationship between the center and regions in order to achieve those objectives. 
Background of the Decentralization Policy 
The political turmoil following the 1965 coup attempt and the rapid decline of 
Sukarno's power provided the regions with an opportunity to revive their old demand for 
autonomy. This time, the window was opened by the center. The New Order government, 
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which came into power in 1966, faced an immediate challenge in restoring internal security. 
This task was not easy, especially in regions where regional army commanders openly 
declared their sympathy for President Sukarno (MacAndrew 1986:11; Crouch 1978:214). 
The New Order's urgent need for regional support forced it to compromise with political 
parties and the regions, which demanded greater regional autonomy. Moreover, there were 
also perceptions that all laws introduced during the period of guided democracy should be 
abolished, including Law No. 18/65 on regional government, because they did not conform 
to the intention and spirit of the 1945 Constitution. This situation finally led to the adoption 
of MPRS decision No. XXI/MPRS/1966 regarding regional government (Kuntjoro-Jakti 
1981:142; Bhenjamin Hoessain 1996:58). 
Inspired by the spirit of Law No.I of 1957 on regional government, the MPRS 
decision stipulated that autonomy would be given as "broadly as possible" to the regions to 
allow them to become self-reliant (swadaya) and self-sufficient (swasembada) as quickly as 
possible. In the MPRS decision, it was stated that this objective would be achieved by: 1) 
transferring all government responsibilities to the regions, including staff and financial 
resources, except for those functions considered as strategic for national purposes; 2) 
restructuring central-regional fiscal relations; and 3) giving regional governments control 
over their personnel and authority to manage local affairs. To implement this decision, the 
government and the DPRGR were requested to prepare legislation for the implementation of 
the decision soon. 
In response to the MPRS decision , the Department of Home Affairs prepared three 
draft laws: on the position and relationship between central and regional governments, on 
swatantra (autonomous) regions and on deconcentration. The first two drafts were 
submitted to the parliament in 1968 and the third in 1970 (The Kian Gie 1995: 83). A series 
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of debates following submission of the first two drafts, however, failed to reach compromise 
between the political parties' s demand for greater power to regional assemblies, as in law 
No. I of 1957, and the government's insistence that this was administratively and financially 
impossible (Gie 1994: 83). Although a new law had still not been worked out, the 
Government and DPRGR agreed to issue Law No.6 of 1969 which stated that Law No. 18 
of 65 was no longer in effect. 
Meanwhile, the MPRS decision to grant autonomy to the regions "as broadly as 
possible" had encouraged regions to demand a greater financial share. At the 
1967conference of governors in Solo, regions demanded that 30 percent of annual central 
revenue be ear-marked for regional budgets, both in order to meet their long neglected 
financial needs and to support the expected implementation of the MPRS decision (Sinaga 
in Kuntjoro-Jakti 1981:147). To address this demand, the New Order government came up 
with the ADO (Alokasi Devisa Otomatis or Automatic Exchange Allocation) scheme, in 
which regions were automatically given a share of revenue and foreign exchange in the 
form of a 10 percent export tax on all exports from their respective ports. The receipts, 
which accrued in the form of foreign exchange, could then be directly sold by the regions to 
prospective importers, or used to import capital or consumption goods under their own 
regional economic policies. The Rupiah proceeds could be used to finance self-initiated 
regional development projects. With this scheme, the government hoped the provinces 
would stop raising money through smuggling and unauthorized local trade taxes. While the 
regions perceived this decentralization scheme as a concession, it was seen by the Central 
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government as a means to get support from the strongest export regions outside Java 
(Kuntjoro-J akti 1981: 147-148). 1 
The ADO scheme was actually a temporary solution to the problem of regional 
budgets, because another team in the Department of Finance was preparing a new law on 
fiscal balance. This proposal was sent to the parliament in 1968, but parliamentary debates 
ended in deadlock. Inspired by the concessionary nature of the ADO scheme, during the 
debate regional representatives in the parliament demanded 50 percent of the total central 
revenue to be allocated to the regions. To compromise, the central government agreed to 
allocate 30 percent of the total central budget, as requested in the 1967 conference of 
governors, provided that half is used to finance operations of the Department of Home 
Affairs in the regions. In addition, the government also offered 10 percent of revenues from 
exports for provinces able to reach the targets set by the center, and 2 percent for those 
unable to reach the targets (Frans Seda 1976: 61-70). Debate on this measure was delayed: 
in 1973 no final agreement on the matter had been reached by the two sides. The 
government's delaying tactics provided it with enough time to finalise the law on regional 
autonomy, which would provide a framework for future policy on fiscal relations. 
Meanwhile, the ADO, which had been effective in reviving exports and ending 
smuggling practices in the Outer Islands, was abolished in 1969 on the grounds that this 
scheme had produced a highly discriminatory redistribution effect. Under the ADO system, 
export regions tended to receive more revenues than their non-export counterparts. To 
replace the decentralized ADO scheme, the government introduced a centralized subsidy 
scheme, the SPP ADO (Sumbangan Pemerintah Pengganti ADO or Grant in lieu of ADO). 
1 Conflict between the center and the regions over the allocation of the central budget had encouraged export 
regions in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, to smuggle their commodities to Singapore, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. 
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This scheme was also designed to support the implementation of the Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun Pertama (Repelita I, or the First Five Year National 
Development Plan), which started in 1969 (Kuntjoro-Jakti 1981:149). 
In 1971, the government withdrew the three draft laws on regional autonomy for 
further refinement. Following the withdrawal, Major General Amir Mahmud, Minister of 
Home Affairs, formed a team charged with drafting a new proposal. The team consisted of 
several army officers who were being seconded to several related central agencies and 
civilians from the Department of Home Affairs. Manihuruk, a high-ranking army officer, 
who was also the Head of BAKN (Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara or the 
National Board for the Administration of the Civil Servants), was made Team Leader. 
Suyamto, Secretary General of the Department of Home Affairs and a civilian, was the 
team's secretary. This team simplified the previous draft laws and combined them into a 
single nevv proposal (Manihuruk 1991; Bhenyamin Hoessein 1996:59). 
In September 1972, Manihuruk' s team finalized the new draft legislation on regional 
government. In this draft, autonomy to the regions was defined as "real and responsible 
autonomy", instead of the "broadest autonomy" as stated in the MPRS' s decision. This new 
definition implied that regional autonomy would be restricted within limits defined by the 
center. Manihuruk' s team seemed to believe that broader regional autonomy was not 
suitable to Indonesia's situation at that time. Since its content very much conflicted with 
the MPRS decision No. XXIJMPRS/1966, the team realized that submitting the document to 
the parliament could result in another deadlock. To pave the way for the new concept of 
regional autonomy, the content of the MPRS decision had to be corrected by another MPR 
decision. For this purpose, the submission of the draft law to the parliament had to be 
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postponed to allow the new MPR resulting from the 1971 general elections to revise the 
content of the 1966 MPRS decision. 2 
Meanwhile, the destruction of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1966 had 
allowed the army to emerge as the main political force. The effective dismissal of Sukarno 
in 1967 and the success of the military reorganization made central control over the regions 
more effective, and reduced the regime's dependence on support from political parties in the 
regions (Pabottingi 1995:247). The consolidation and transformation of hundreds of 
functional groups into a single political party, Golongan Karya or Golkar, in 1969, followed 
by Golkar's remarkable military-supported victory in the 1971 general elections reduced the 
power of political parties in the DPR and MPR. 
The enactment of Law No. 16 of 1969 on the MPR/DPR/DPRD, which enabled the 
president to appoint one-fifth of the members of the DPR and three-fifths of the members of 
MPR, further reduced the proportion of political party representatives in the DPR and 
MPR.3 This new balance of power in the parliament and in the MPR, the highest 
institution, guaranteed their acceptance of the government's concept about the future 
direction of the state policies. 
At the same time, the success of the technocrats in combating rampant inflation and 
restoring the declining economy inherited from the old regime provided the New Order 
regime with a stronger economic base. More securely in power, the New Order government 
moved from the liberal central-regional policy as envisaged in the 1966 MPRS decision, to 
a centralized framework. 
2 As stated by Manihuruk in a seminar on 24 July 1991: and by Bhenyamin Hoessain, personal conversation, 
April 1997. 
3 In 1967, Suharto had managed to get an important agreement from the leaders of political parties that one-
fifth of the parliament (DPR) and three fifths of the MPR be appointed by the president in order to safeguard 
the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. After the 1971 election, the DPRGR was replaced by the elected DPR 
and the provisional MPRS was replaced by the MPR. 
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In 1973, the MPR resulting from the 1971 elections issued its decision No. 
IV/MPR/1973 regarding Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN, the Broad Outline of 
the State Objectives). Its clause on regional government stated that, 
To speed up the implementation of development efforts which take place throughout 
the country, and to maintain political stability and the nation, a harmonious 
relationship between the center and the regions should be built based on the unity of 
the Unitary State, and directed toward the implementation of real and responsible 
autonomy which ensures the development of the regions, and would be implemented 
together with deconcentration (translated from the Appendix of GBHN, Chapter IV 
on Pola Umum Repelita II). 
In addition, the MPR also issued decision No. V/MPR/1973, which stated that the MPRS 
decision No. XXI/MPRS/1966 was no longer valid because its content had been 
"accommodated in" (another word for "not in conformity with") the newly introduced 
concept of autonomy formulated in the MPR decision No. IV/MPR/1973. 
Parliamentary Debate on Regional Autonomy La,v 
As planned, the government submitted its draft law on regional government to the 
DPR in 1974. A series of parliamentary debates was conducted from May 20 to July 2, 
1974, during which several issues were raised by the political parties. The PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party), which was an amalgam of Muslim 
parties, expressed its dissatisfaction with the content of the proposed law, particularly with 
the new concept of "real and responsible autonomy". However, the decision to adopt this 
concept had been made by the MPR. In addition, PPP was concerned with the government's 
intention to emphasize deconcentration rather than decentralization (devolution). PPP 
argued that the emphasis on deconcentration might strengthen the centralistic tendency. 
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Our fraction is of the op1n1on that the principle of decentralization ( devolution) 
should be the main guidance in the discussion of this draft law, and that 
decentralization (devolution) should be implemented together with deconcentration, 
not the other way around. 
MPR Decision No. IV/MPRJ1973 was not intended to make deconcentration as 
important as, or more important than, decentralization (devolution). The MPR 
decision was aimed at implementing decentralization together with 
deconcentration .... On the contrary, the government seems to place deconcentration 
above everything in the regions (translated from Suyamto et al. 1985:107-108). 
In response to the PPP' s comments, one government representative argued that, in a unitary 
state, emphasis should be given to deconcentration. Therefore, the government's idea to 
balance the implementation of those two principles should be seen as an acceptable 
compromise (Suyamto 1988:40; 1993:14-15). 
Regarding autonomy, the government proposed that autonomy be given to the first 
(provincial) and second ( district) levels (Dati I and Dati II), with the emphasis on the second 
level. The government feared that giving too much autonomy to Dati I government might 
allow these units to become independent of the center, which might threaten the unity of the 
country. Greater autonomy at Dati II did not pose the same threat to national integration 
because Dati II was considered too small to aspire to independence. However, this 
consideration was never made public. Instead, in its proposal, the government argued that 
autonomy for Dati II regions was more appropriate because government at this level was 
closer to the community and therefore, better understood local needs and aspirations. 
According to Suyamto, the Secretary to the Manihuruk Team, during the preparation 
of the draft law some members proposed three levels of autonomous region: Dati I, Dati II 
and Dati ill, as laid down in Law No. 1 of 1957. Inspired by a concept proposed by Hatta in 
the early 1950s, Suyamto was opposed to this and suggested that autonomy be given only to 
the district (Dati II) level while the provinces (Dati I) would function merely as 
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administrative units. He also restated Hatta' s argument that multiple levels of autonomous 
regions might not effectively democratize the political system because power might be 
concentrated at the highest level and lower levels would be left powerless. Manihuruk, the 
team leader, agreed in principle with Suyamto' s suggestion, but thought abolishing 
autonomy at Dati I might create further political turmoil because Dati I governments would 
certainly oppose this idea. Moreover, Manihuruk argued, the parliament would certainly not 
accept autonomy at only one level because Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution clearly stated 
that the Indonesian territory was divided into large and small autonomous, as well as, 
administrative regions. The words "large and small" here could be interpreted as implying 
more than one level. The team agreed to propose autonomy for Dati I and Dati II, but 
emphasis would be given to Dati II. By emphasizing Dati II, they hoped that it would not be 
difficult to abolish the Dati I's autonomy in the near future. But, as Suyamto admitted later 
in his book, the team never revealed to the parliament its real intention for the future of the 
Dati I (Suyamto 1991:36-37). 
As expected, during the parliamentary session, PPP and the Nationalist-oriented 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) wanted autonomy established at three levels, as in Law 
No.l of 1957. They argued that autonomy should also be given to villages (desa) because 
desa autonomy had been guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution.4 They further argued that 
autonomy at the desa level might provide more benefits to local communities by providing 
government services to all people, even those who lived in remote areas. Although not 
stated, the parties were also motivated by the desire to provide as many opportunities as 
possible for their members to be elected to local legislatures. But the government's 
4 In the elucidation of the 1945 Constitution for Article 18, it was stated that traditional villages were 
considered as special regions and the autonomy of special regions was guaranteed by the Constitution. 
107 
representatives did not agree. They regarded autonomy at the desa level as financially and 
administratively too difficult. The government's argument was supported by the military 
and Golkar, the Government's party, in the parliament. Consensus was achieved that the 
level of autonomy and its scope might change over time, depending upon socio-economic 
and political development but for the time being two levels were seen as more appropriate 
(Gie 1995:82). Political parties may have seen this solution providing an oppo1iunity for 
reviving consideration of the autonomy of desa in the future: to the government, this 
consensus provided an opportunity to abolish the Dati I's autonomy in the future. 
The debate also considered the position of regional heads. The government wanted 
regional heads to function both as head of II autonomous regions II and as the central 
government representative in the regions, as in Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 and Law 
No. 18 of 1965. The government also proposed that regional heads be penguasa tunggal, the 
sole administrator or authority in the regions, as in Law No. 18 of 1965. Under this 
proposal, executive councils were no longer needed because executive decisions would be 
made solely by regional heads. For this reason, regional heads would be selected by the 
central government and be accountable only to the president. 
The PPP and PDI opposed this proposal on the grounds that the strong position of 
the regional head might result in the disappearance of democracy in the regions. As stated 
by their representative, 
Our fractions are concerned about the development which leads to the possible 
disappearance of democracy in the regions through the institution of the regional 
head as proposed in this proposal; but we wish the government had the same opinion 
as ours that the position of the regional head should not be like a parasitic plant that 
clings to a big tree and finally turns out to kill the tree (translated from Suyamto 
1985: 110). 
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These two fractions suggested that to maintain the democratic principle of local 
government, the regional heads should not be the sole administrator in the region, and in 
carrying out their tasks, they should be assisted by an executive board on which the parties 
were represented like the former DPD (Law No. 1 of 1957) or BPH (Law No.18 of 1965) 
(The Liang Gie 1995:83). The government disagreed, believing institutions like the former 
DPD and BPH were no longer needed because regional heads were to be the sole 
administrators in the regions. As Manihuruk argued, 
Because the members of executive council were elected by the members of the 
regional council based on a balanced representation, governance in the regions could 
not be made efficient and effective because any decision had to be made through a 
process of compromise. This is a time-consuming process because the compromise 
had to be reached not only between the executive council and the regional council, 
but also among the members of the executive council itself (translated from 
Manihuruk 1991:5). 
The government's intention not to establish executive councils, according to Manihuruk, 
was supported by the military and Golkar fractions. They also believed this kind of body 
might complicate the process of decision-making in the regions.5 
However, PPP and PDI fractions insisted that a body like the former DPD or BPH 
be established. These two parties believed the absence of an executive council reduced the 
opportunity for regional assemblies to influence the executive arm of government at the 
regional level. Eventually, a compromise was reached with the establishment of the Badan 
Penasehat Daerah (BPD or Regional Advisory Board). But this body had no real power. 
Unlike DPD, this board was not an executive council. BPD also differed from the former 
BPH. Its task was limited to providing suggestions to the regional head, and was not 
involved in government activities handled by the regional head. 
5 Based on Manihuruk's lecture at Lembaga Administrasi Negara, 24 July 1991. 
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The proposal that regional heads be selected by the central government was also 
rejected by the PPP. According to this party, the regional head was supposed to be given a 
mandate by the people in his or her region. For this reason, he or she should be elected by 
the members of the DPRD. The PDI agreed with the PPP's conclusion, but for a different 
reason. The implementation of "real and responsible autonomy", according to PDI, required 
the confidence of the central government and its recognition of the maturity of regions to 
choose their own leaders (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 17, 1974). 
Compromise was reached between the two parties and the government. The DPRD 
would propose a list of candidates for regional head. The list had to be approved by the 
Department of Home Affairs, and then selection would be made from the list by the 
president, for the governor, and Department of Home Affairs for the bupati or walikota. 
(Tambunan 1979:17-18). 
The idea that regional heads were accountable only to the president was also rejected 
by the PPP and PDI fractions. They wanted the regional head to be responsible to the DPRD 
so that he or she could be discharged by this assembly. The government, however, insisted 
on imposing the system as applied at the central level, where the president, as the highest 
authority, was not accountable to the central parliament (DPR) and could not be discharged 
by the parliament. The government argued that in a unitary state, the central pattern should 
be reflected at regional and local levels. Thus, regional heads should be the highest 
authority in the region and should not be responsible to the DPRD (Tambunan 1979: 18-20). 
On July 23, Law No. 5 of 1974 on Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah 
(Principles of government in the regions) was enacted. The PPP and PDI wanted this law to 
be called Undang-Undang tentang Pemerintah Daerah or Undang-Undang tentang 
Pemerintahan Daerah (Law on Regional Government). But the government representatives 
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regarded the title proposed by the two political parties as not reflecting its content. Since the 
Law was concerned not only with the activities of regional government but also with the 
central government's activities conducted in the regions, the government suggested that the 
law to be named Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah (Tambunan 1979: 35). 
Law No. 5 of 1974 
Administratively, regional government was stratified into four levels: the province; 
the district (the municipality or kotamadya for urban areas and the regency or kabupaten for 
elsewhere); the sub-district or kecamatan, and the village (the kelurahan in the urban areas 
and the desa in the rural areas). Each level was headed by a regional head (kepala wilayah): 
the governor for the province, the bupati for the regency and the walikota for the 
municipality, the camat for the kecamatan, and the lurah for the kelurahan and the kepala 
desa for the village.6 These administrative units were made hierarchical and all kepala 
wilayah were responsible to the central government through the hierarchical structure of the 
government. 7 As representatives of the central government in the region, governors were 
responsible for the activities carried out by the central government's offices in their 
province and bupati and walikota were responsible for the activities of the central 
government's offices in their districts. 8 
Law No. 5 of 1974 established two levels of "autonomous regions": Daerah Tingkat 
I (Dati I, the first level) and Daerah Tingkat II (Dati II or the second level). The boundaries 
of Dati I coincided with those of provinces and the boundaries of Dati II with those of 
6 The detailed arrangements for village administration were given in Law No.5/79. 
7 Kepala wilayah refers to the head of an administrative unit, a representative of the central government in the 
region .. 
8 Each central department had its representative in all regions. Central department's office at the provincial 
level was called Kantor Wilayah or Kanwil and its office at the district level was called Kantor Departemen or 
Kandep. 
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districts - kotamadya or municipalities in urban areas and kabupaten or regencies in rural 
areas (Articles 2,3, 72 and 74 of Law No. 5 of 1974). Each level of autonomous region was 
headed by a kepala daerah, who was responsible for functions falling into his or her 
jurisdiction.9 In doing his or her tasks, a kepala daerah established a number of service units 
(Dinas) and offices. 
Governor served both as head of Daerah Tingkat I and Bupati or Walikota as head of 
Daerah Tingkat II. The dual function of the regional head both as representative of the 
central government and as representative of the region would obviously undermine the 
autonomy of the Dati I and Dati II. However, this structure was intentionally designed to 
allow the center to effectively control the regions down to the village level. This tight 
control was seen by leaders of the New Order government as crucial for ensuring continued 
political stability and effective implementation of national development policies (see also 
MacAndrew 1986). This structure was reinforced by the parallel structure of the territorial 
military organization in the region (see figure 5.3), which enabled the military to keep close 
watch over the entire structure of civil government. 
9 As head of autonomous region, regional head was not responsible to the central government, but to regional 
or local council. 
112 
Figure 4.1. The structure of regional government according to Law No. 5 of 1974 
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KOTAMADYA 
KECAMATAN 
KELURAHAN KELURAHAN 
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Figure 5.2. The relations between the organs of "administrative" and "autonomous" units 
according to Law No. 5 of 1974 
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1. A sectoral department is one that deals with a particular activity e.g. Education, Public Works, and 
Agriculture etc. 
2. As representatives of the central government, governors and bupati/walikota were responsible for 
activities performed by the organs pf the central government (Kantor Wilayah and Kantor Departemen). 
3. As the heads of autonomous regions, Kepala Daerah Tingkat I and Kepala Daerah Tingkat II were 
responsible for activities performed by the organs of the autonomous governments (Dinas). 
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Figure 5 .3. Relationships between the Regional Government Structure and Territorial 
Military Structure 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
Province 
District 
·-Sub-district 
Village 
Army Territorial 
Commands 
KODAM 
KOREM 
KODIM 
KORAMIL 
BABINSA 
Source: Salim Said, ''The Political Role of the Indonesian Military: Past, Present, and 
Future". SouthEast Asian Journal of Social Sciences, vol 15, no. 1, 1987, p. 27. 
Note: 
KODAM (military regional commands) cover major provinces or groups of smaller provinces; 
KOREM (military resort coITu--nands) cover more than one districts; 
KODIM or military district commands were established at district level; 
KORAMIL (military rayon commands) were based at sub-district level and 
BABINSA (guidance NCOs) were placed in villages . 
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Law No. 5 of 1974 provided that activities in the regions be carried out according to 
three basic principles: decentralization, deconcentration, and medebewind. Decentralization 
refers to the transfer of responsibilities from the central government to the self-governing 
Dati I and Dati II, and from Dati I to Dati II. Responsibilities or functions transferred to Dati 
I and Dati II were called urusan rumah tangga daerah or "regional household functions". 
These functions were to be performed by dinas (service units) or other units under the 
autonomous governments. Authority to make decisions over these household functions was 
also given to these autonomous Dati I and Dati II. In this sense, the concept of 
decentralization here approximates to political decentralization models. 
Deconcentration is the delegation of responsibilities either from central departments 
to their field offices at provincial and district levels, or from a provincial dinas to their 
branches at district level. Deconcentration here is functional decentralization where the 
central or provincial government delegates part of its functions to be performed by its own 
offices at sub-national or sub-provincial level. The Law made it clear that deconcentration 
was not considered a complement to decentralization, as in Law 18/1965, but to be 
implemented together with decentralization. 10 Deconcentration required the establishment 
of central departments field offices known as Kantor Wilayah (abreviated Kanwil) at 
provincial level and Kantor Departemen ( abreviated Kandep) at district level, parallel to the 
structure of regional government. Deconcentration of provincial government required the 
provinical dinas (Dinas Tingkat I) to establish branch offices at the district level ( Cawang 
Dinas Tingkat II). These units were to be charged with the implementation of 
deconcentrated activities (see figure 5.2). 
10 See point h. in the Elucidation of Law No. 5 of 1974. 
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Medebewind referred to the responsibility of Dati I and Dati II to carry out activities 
on behalf of the center. These activities did not necessarily belong to the central 
government. They could jurisdictionally be the functions of sub-national government. But 
the central government could appoint local authorities to perform these functions and would 
provide them with some resources. For this reason, these local authorities would be 
responsible to the appointing institution. This medebewind did not really correspond to the 
traditional idea of medebewind introduced during the Dutch government, where policies 
were set by the center and the regions were required to prepare local legislation to 
implement the policy. 
Regional autonomy referred to the authority of Dati I and Dati II to manage their 
own household functions. As previously mentioned, the Law described regional autonomy 
as being "real and responsible" (Article 7). Real meant that the degree of autonomy given to 
regions would depend on their capacity to carry out the responsibilities transfered by the 
center. Responsible meant the regions had the obligation to help facilitate development in 
the regions, strengthen unity and political stability, maintain a harmonious relationship with 
the center and safeguard the process of national development. 11 With this new definition, 
the concept of "broadest autonomy", put forward in the 1966 :MFRS decision would no 
longer be referred to because it was feared that a "broadest autonomy" tended to create 
ideas which might jeopardise the unity of the country. As stated in the elucidation of the 
Law, 
... the term "as broadly as possible' will no longer be used because past experience 
had shown that this term could result in tendencies which might jeopardise the unity 
of the Unitary State and this term is not in a harmony with the objective of regional 
autonomy based on principles outlined in the GBHN. The term "real and responsible 
11 See the Elucidation of Law No. 5 of 1974. 
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autonomy" should be made clear 1n further explanations (translated from the 
Elucidation of Law No. 5 of 1974). 
The autonomous regions introduced by Law No.5 of 1974, therefore, did not suggest the 
creation of semi-independent Dati I or Dati II (Morfitt, 1986:59). The Law made it clear that 
regional autonomy was more an obligation than a right: an obligation to help facilitate the 
implementation of the central government's development program. 12 Regions were 
authorised and obliged to organise and manage their own affairs, but in accordance with 
regulations determined by the central government (Article 7 of Law No. 5 of 1974). Local 
legislation as well as the procedures regional councils employ to carry out their tasks were 
prepared based on guidelines provided by the Department of Home Affairs (see Table 1). 
As Ateng Syafrudin (1991:4) points out, the concept of regional autonomy laid down in 
Law No.5 of 1974 differs from the concept found in the literature. 
Law No. 5 of 1974 further stipulated that autonomy did not merely stress its 
democratic aspect but also the need to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of local 
governments, especially in the implementation of national development (point i of the 
elucidation of the Law). This indicates the government was more interested in achieving 
efficiency and effectiveness in regional government in implementing development rather 
than in the democratic aspects of autonomy. As Suyamto, one of law's drafters, admitted 
later, Law No. 5 of 1974 was intentionally designed to be more oriented towards the 
implementation of national development (Suyamto 1991: ). 
As stipulated in Article 13 of Law 5 of 1974, regional government consisted of the 
regional head and the DPRD. While the regional head had executive power, the DPRD had 
legislative power. Neither the regional head nor the DPRD was superior to the other. In 
12 See Elucidation of Law No. 5 of 1974. 
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theory they would work together as partners in governing their region. However, Article 80 
stated that, as a representative of the central government, the regional head was penguasa 
tunggal or sole administrator in his or her region, and therefore given the power to supervise 
all activities in his or her region. This article implies that the regional head was also 
expected to supervise the activities of the DPRD. This made the regional head in practice 
more powerful than the DPRD. The DPRD's position was further reduced by the fact that 
the regional head could not be discharged by the DPRD because the head was selected by 
the president or the Minister of Home Affairs (Articles 15 and 16). Although the rights to 
request explanations of, and to conduct inquiries into, executive decisions were granted to 
the DPRD by the Law, these powers could only be exercised over functions, which had 
been fully surrendered to regional government. Moreover, those rights could only be 
exercised according to procedures to be provided by the Department of Home Affairs 
(Article 29). 
It seems the position of regional head was intentionally strengthened in the structure 
of regional government because the major-concern was with efficiency and effectiveness of 
the regional government in implementing national development. As Bhenyamin Hoessain 
points out, the words "efficiency and effectiveness" were mentioned many times in the Law, 
while the word "democratization" appeared only once. This provides a clear indication that 
the Law was primarily designed for the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in the 
regions, rather than for encouraging democratization. If democratization was the concern, 
Hoessain argued further, the-position of the DPRD should have been made central, as it was 
in Law No. 1/1957.13 If the position of the DPRD had been central, the regional head would 
13 Interview with Professor Bhenyamin Hoessain, a Lecturer at the University of Indonesia, in June 1997. 
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have been responsible to the DPRD. This system, however, would have complicated the 
process of decision making in the regions. As Leemans says, 
efficiency, it is frequently and loudly proclaimed, requires restricting the 
participation of representative bodies (local councils) in the public policy making 
and especially in the execution of policy. This explains the hesitancy to introduce 
proper representative institutions with decision making-power in the region 
(Leemans 1970: 67). 
Law No. 5 of 1974 obviously provided little decentralization because the law was primarily 
designed to establish a system of regional government that ensured political stability and 
efficient implementation of national development. The importance of political stability and 
economic growth to the military leaders of the New Order government, according to 
Pabottingi, was rooted in history. These two government goals were a direct result of the 
inability of parliamentary democracy to create a working political system and strong 
economy and the failure of guided democracy to strengthen the economy and produce a 
durable political system (Pabottingi 1995:247). Their experience made these leaders assume 
that these two objectives could only be achieved through tight control over all aspects of 
life. As Liddle says, 
To sum up: in 1965-1966, the surviving leaders were those who had taken up arms 
against Muslim Guerrilla forces in the early 1950s, fought the regional rebellions led 
by their own junior officers in the late 1950s, and had been engaged in a struggle to 
the death with communists - and again with some of their junior officers - in the 
early 1960s. They had also witnessed the endless bickering of parliamentary 
politicians and the loss of control of the economy by the government - both 
representative democracy and Guided democracy. Put briefly, the lessons they 
learned from those experiences were the primal importance of establishing and 
maintaining, first, unity among themselves and, second, tight control over others, 
including most especially Muslims, regionalists, and communists. Without these 
fundamentals, neither national unity - the goal to which they had been committed 
since the 1945 independence declaration - nor economic stabilization and 
development - the crisis they now faced - could in their view be achieved (Liddle 
1996: 184-185). 
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In addition to the dominance of the military in politics and in policy making, the 
increased role of non-party technocrats in the regime also contributed to the reestablishment 
of a more centralized decision making process. As Kuntjoro-J akti points out, the planning 
model introduced by the technocrats during the 1970s required a system of centralized 
mobilization and allocation of state resources ( Kuntjoro-Jakti 1981). 
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Chapter V 
The Implementation of Law No. 5 of 1974 
The implementation Law No.5 of 1974 provided more evidence that the law was not 
intended for promoting a decentralized system of government, but for the establishment of 
an effective centrally controlled hierarchical structure of government bureaucracy. 
Following the adoption of Law No. 5 of 1974, the Department of Home Affairs issued a 
number of regulations that greatly strengthened the position of the central government vis a 
vis the regions. Regional heads were appointed from those who were loyal to the central 
authority. The village head was made accountable to the district head and village 
administrators were made civil servants. This became a very effective mechanism for 
controlling the regions down to the villages. 
At the same time, restrictions put on political parties had successfully reduced their 
influence in the national parliament and regional legislative councils. Extensive state 
surveillance and the controlled press effectively reduced opposition to central policies. The 
government's co-optation of local elites weakened regional demand for autonomy. Fiscal 
centralization and an integrated planning and budgeting mechanism made the regions 
dependent on the central government for their authority, policies and resources. Under such 
an environment, it was very unlikely that the regions could exercise discretionary power 
over their own affairs. 
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Strengthening Control through Regional Heads 
Following the enactment of Law No.5 of 1974, the Minister of Home Affairs issued 
Regulation No. 10 of 1974 on the nomination of regional heads. In this regulation, it was 
stated that regional councils would conduct meetings to select three to five candidates for 
the regional head. The list of candidates should be sent to the Department of Home Affairs 
in the case of governors, or to the provincial governor in the case of Bupati or Walikota, at 
least three months before the term of the current regional head ended (Article 2 and 3). 
Following the submission of the list of candidates, a technical team, comprising the regional 
secretary and officials from the Department of Home Affairs and led by the chairman of the 
relevant regional council, would be formed to assess the qualifications of the proposed 
candidates based on criteria set by the Department of Home Affairs. This technical team, in 
consultation with the Minister of Home Affairs, would decide which candidates were 
eligible for election (Article 5 of Law No. 5 of 1974). 
In practice, regional councils were instructed by the Minister of Home Affairs to 
propose five candidates. Two or three of them would be rejected by the technical team for 
failing to meet the criteria set by the Department of Home Affairs. In cases of disagreement 
among the members of the team on whether or not a particular candidate was qualified for 
the election, its chairman had the final word. 1 The result of the assessment was submitted to 
the Department of Home Affairs for formal approval. The list of the approved candidates 
was then sent back by the Department of Home Affairs to the relevant regional council. 
After receiving that list, the regional council would conduct a meeting to elect the regional 
head from the candidates who had been approved by the centre (Article 7). 
1 Many of the criteria set by the Department of Home Affairs were vague. For example, it is very difficult to 
assess whether a particular candidate is fully loyal to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. 
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The candidate who obtained the most votes, however, would not necessarily be 
appointed as regional head because Regulation No. 10 of 1974 enabled the central 
government to appoint another candidate. However, this practice was very unpopular and 
tended to be avoided. Instead, the government manipulated the election process to ensure 
that most votes went to the candidate preferred by the centre. 
One example was the election of regional head of Kampar District, in Riau Province. 
A list consisting of five candidates was sent to the Department of Home Affairs in early 
1996. The new Bupati was supposed to take office in April 1996, but the list was sent back 
to the DPRD in February 1996. According to the relevant authority, the rejection was due to 
the poor qualifications of the proposed candidates. However, many believed it was because 
none of the candidates endorsed by the centre was included in the list. To pave the way for 
the central government's favoured candidate, the Minister of Home Affairs then instructed 
Suripto, the Governor of Riau, to temporarily assume the position of Bupati of Kampar to 
allow him to intervene in the process of preparing the second list. 
Between February and September, several informal meetings were held between the 
DPRD of Kampar and Governor Suripto. In November, the DPRD met to prepare a new list 
of candidates. But consensus between the political parties and the representatives of the 
military and Golkar in the council was difficult to reach. Despite opposition from the 
political parties, five candidates, two new and three from the previous list, were chosen by 
the DPRD chairman. The new list of candidates was sent to the Department of Home 
Affairs without bearing the signatures of representatives from the PPP and the PDI. In early 
December, the election took place and the winner was the central-sponsored candidate, 
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Beng Sabli.2 On 12 December, the Minister of Home Affairs officially appointed him as 
Bupati of Kampar for the period of 1996 to 2001. 3 
The way in which the candidates were screened also caused regional councils to 
propose only those who were very likely to be accepted by the central government. In many 
cases, the choice of candidates was manipulated by the central government through the 
military and Golkar factions in the regional council. Sometimes, the criteria used were 
designed to disqualify other candidates. For example, one of the criteria introduced for the 
nomination of candidates for governor of Maluku in 1997 was know ledge and experience in 
regional development. This criterion was intentionally introduced to pave the way for Saleh 
Latuconsina, who had a Ph.D. degree in regional planning. At the same time, this criterion 
enabled the central government to disqualify Freddy Latumahima, preferred by many 
informal leaders in Maluku.4 
Most members of regional councils interviewed by a team from Gajah Mada 
University admitted that the decision on who was going to be appointed had been made 
before the election took place (see Thoha, 1993). This person was popularly referred to as 
calon jadi or real or definitive candidate, while other candidates were only calon 
pendamping or accompanying candidates. During the election, the council had the 
obligation to transform the scenario into reality. In many cases , financial rewards were 
involved to make sure that most votes went to the calon jadi. 5 Thus, the function of the 
regional council was limited to legitimizing the appointment of the centre's candidate. 
2 Beng Sabli was not proposed in the first list. 
3 See Kompas, 27 April, 24 September, 16 November and 2 December 1996). 4 See Suara Pembaharuan and Kompas, November 1997. 
5 Following the transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie in May 1998, several newspapers such as Kompas, 
Media Indonesia, revealed that Zuiyen Rais, the Walikota of Padang, West Sumatra, gave the members of the 
DPRD approximately Rp 400 miilion (US$ 40,000) in order to win the election for his second term. The 
money was actually taken from the municipality fund s. At the same time, the Bupati of Bantul in the Special 
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The election process did not always go smoothly. In September 1983, the incumbent 
governor of Riau (Imam Munandar), who was endorsed by the centre, was defeated by one 
of the accompanying candidates (Ismail Suko ). Many Golkar representatives in the 
provincial council had been disappointed with the way in which their leaders in Jakarta had 
imposed the calon jadi. From the beginning, the provincial councillors had already rejected 
Munandar' s candidacy for two reasons: his lack of leadership during his first term; and the 
local aspiration to have Colonel Syarwan Hamid, a native of Riau with a military 
background, as their governor. 6 However, they were forced to accept Munandar as calon 
jadi. To express their disagreement, they voted for Ismail Suko. 
The election result surprised everyone and made national headlines. While the 
central government was reluctant to appoint Ismail Suko, the governor elect, the provincial 
council of Riau urged the Minister of Home Affairs to accept the election result. Ismail 
Suko was intimidated and asked to withdraw but his supporters encouraged him to hold 
firm. He was then offered a position in the DPR. In addition, the central government also 
promised to appoint a native to the position of vice governor. After meeting with the 
Minister of Home Affairs in Jakarta, Ismail Suko was willing to accept the offer, provided 
those who voted for him were not recalled from the DPRD.7 The Department of Home 
Affairs agreed to the deal and Ismail announced his withdrawal. Imam Munandar was 
immediately made governor of Riau, and Baharudin Yusuf became the first native to 
region of Yo gyakarta, also admitted that he paid approximate! y Rp 1 billion through President Suharto's 
youngest brother to Yayasan Darmais, one of Suharto's foundations, in order to remain in his post for another 
five years. 
6 Since its formation in 1957, the position of Governor in Riau province has always been occupied by army 
officers, almost all coming from other provinces. 
7 Representatives of Golkar and Military in the national parliament and regional councils were supposed to 
support the central government policy. If they failed to do so, they could be recalled from those legislative 
institutions and replaced. The law allowed parties to replace members of legislatures whose performance was 
considered unsatisfactory. 
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assume the position of vice governor. Ismail Suko was later appointed a member of DPR to 
represent the province of Riau 8 
Another incident happened a few years later in Central Kalimantan. This time, the 
provincial council did not want to include Warsito Rasman, a senior official from the 
Department of Home Affairs, on the list of candidates for the governor of the province. This 
time, the central government tried to ensure that a similar incident did not happen. 
Negotiation took place between the provincial council and the central government. The 
DPRD finally agreed to put Warsito's name on the list of candidates. The central 
government managed to persuade the majority in the provincial council to vote for W arsito 
Rasman. 
Concern for security provided justification for the appointment of military officers to 
the positions of regional head. At the beginning of 1966, 12 out of 24 governors were 
military officers, including in important provinces such as Jakarta, West Java, East Java, 
and North Sumatra. Military officers were also appointed as governors in resource rich 
regions like Riau, East Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and South Sumatra. After the 1971 elections, 
the number of military governors increased to 22 out of 26. In 1980, the number of military 
governors dropped slightly to 19 out of 27. The number of military bupati and walikota had 
also risen, from 147 out of 271 in 1969 to 157 out of 292 in 1980 (Crouch, 1978:244; 
Notosusanto, 1984:378-379).9 During the last few years of the New Order administration, 
8 Most of the information used in this section was taken from "Refleksi", a special report in the Riau Pos, 
September 1998, on a seminar, which was conducted on the fifteenth anniversary of the Ismail Suko incident. 
During the seminar Ismail Suko and other participants like Prof. Tabrani Rab, Samad Thaha, Syed Abdullah 
Gazaly, and Thamrin Nasution, who were involved in the plot against the centre, were invited to explain what 
was going on during those days. 
9 Following the coup, all PKI and PKI-linked regents and mayors were quickly replaced by military officers, 
not only in Java but also in the outer islands. 
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the appointment of military officers to the positions of regional head dropped slightly, 
especially at the district level. 
As one of the criteria required that regional heads be chosen from among those who 
had experience in government, many regional heads, particularly at the second level of 
government, were chosen from the bureaucracy. In Riau province, for example, five of six 
regional heads at the second level were former Sekwilda (regional secretaries) in their 
regions. The fact that they were career public servants meant that regional heads often 
reflected bureaucratic interests. 
Law No. 5 of 1979 on village administration, which abolished traditional village 
structures, also strengthened central control over the countryside. The law introduced a 
standardized structure for village administration. The boundaries of villages were also 
restructured. This reduced the influence of traditional leaders. Law No. 5 of 1979 also 
provided that village heads be appointed by the district head after a popular election. In 
addition, the village head was responsible to, and could be discharged by the district head. 
Moreover, the village administrators were made civil servants. As the civil servants were 
centrally managed, Law No. 5 of 1979 made the central government's chain of authority 
stretch down to the lowest level of administration (see Kahin, 1994). 
Reducing the Power of Regional Councils 
As previously discussed, Article Law No.5 of 1974 implied that the position of the 
DPRD was equal to that of regional head. In reality, more power was allocated to the 
regional head. As the central government's representative, the regional head was charged 
with general supervision over all activities taking place in his or her region, including the 
activities of the DPRD. The fact that he or she could not be discharged by the DPRD 
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enhanced the regional head's authority. Although the DPRD was given the right to question 
the regional head, request explanations and initiate inquiries on the way the regional head 
carried out his or her tasks, those rights could only be exercised in regard to the 
implementations of local tasks. Since local tasks made up only a small part of the regional 
head's activities, the room available to the DPRD for exercising its control over the regional 
head was also limited. Moreover, procedures for exercising those rights were to be drafted 
by the Department of Home Affairs. It was not until 1990 that these were made available. 
While the DPRD had limited influence over the choice of regional head, the regional 
head in practice played a significant role in the selection of the DPRD chairman because the 
chairman was chosen from among those who could work "hand-in-hand" with the regional 
head. In addition, one fifth of DPRD's members were appointed by the regional head, while 
candidates from political parties for the local legislative body - like the national DPR - were 
screened before elections by bureaucrats and military intelligence officers and could be 
removed from the list of candidates by the regional head. This arrangement made the 
position of DPRD even weaker. 
Article 38 of Law 5 of 1974 stated that the DPRD, together with the regional head, 
prepared the local legislation, including the annual budget. Theoretically, the bill could 
originate from either the executive or the legislative. In reality, the executive initiated most 
bills. In fact, an instruction from the Minister of Home Affairs in 1984 stipulated that the 
legal division in the governor's office prepare legislation. Even though the DPRD was still 
allowed to initiate bills, this instruction discouraged the DPRD from doing so. Moreover, 
the DPRD had fewer resources (financial, expertise and information) compared to the 
executive. In addition, the procedures outlined by the Department of Home Affairs made it 
difficult, especially for representatives from political parties, to exercise their right of 
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initiative. According to the Department of Home Affairs' policy, bills should be proposed 
through the chairman of the DPRD by at least five members from at least two fractions.
10 
The DPRD chairman should then send the bill to a special committee for screening. Only if 
the committee felt that the bill deserved attention would further discussion with the 
executive be scheduled. Knowing that the probability of passage was small, many members 
of the DPRD did not want to waste their time writing bills, but waited instead for proposals 
initiated by the executive. 
Following the submission of a bill, the DPRD would usually call a senes of 
meetings. The first session was a general meeting attended by all members. In this session, 
the initiator (regional head or his or her representatives) would explain in detail the 
background, objectives and content of the bill. The explanation was followed by a brief 
discussion where everybody was allowed to raise questions on general matters. A special 
meeting then followed the general meeting with members of related commission(s). 11 For 
example, members of the annual budget committee discussed a bill on the annual budget. 
Other members were allowed to attend, but were not allowed to raise questions. If these 
members wanted to request modification to the proposed bill, their request had to be made 
in writing, signed by at least three DPRD members, and handed through the chairman. The 
chairman then read their request in the following session. 
During this meeting, amendments to the bill were common! y proposed by each 
fraction in the DPRD and the executive often made some accommodation. If the meeting 
ended in deadlock, the issues would be brought to the consultative team (panitia 
10 The members of the DPRD were divided into 'fractions' or political groups - Golkar, the two other parties 
and the military/police group. 
11 DPRD members also sat on smaller commissions concerned with various policy areas. 
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musyawarah). 12 This team, which consisted of the chairman of the regional council and 
representatives of each political group, was empowered to look for compromise and make 
decisions on the final form of the bill. Its decision was then presented in the last plenary 
session. Since the consultative team had actually made the decision, this last session was 
intended only to formalize the DPRD's approval of the bill. 
The executive always managed to get support from the DPRD for whatever bills 
they proposed. This was because the bill had been discussed with the military and Golkar 
fractions prior to the bill's submission to the DPRD. This meant that majority support for 
the bill in the DPRD had been guaranteed before the bill was proposed. It was not surprising 
that during the meeting the two dominant fractions argued for the bill. This practice ( called 
pembahasan setengah kamar, discussion by half the house) had been effective in making 
the political parties, apart from Golkar, in the regional council powerless. Therefore, many 
analysts considered the DPRD only "a rubber stamp" established to legitimize policy 
introduced by the executive. 
Moreover, the format of local legislation had also been standardized by the 
Department of Home Affairs through Government Regulation No. 14/1974, later replaced 
by Government Regulation No. 8/1983. This made legislation on the same subject but from 
different regions similar. As a result, local bureaucrats played only a limited role in the 
formulation of local legislation. This practice obviously undermined the autonomy of the 
regions. 
Article 22 of Law No.5 of 1974 required regional heads to present a statement of 
accountability to the DPRD on the implementation of the regional budget. In response to the 
12 Several consultative teams were formed, such as for budget preparation, for assessing regional head's 
performance and for consultation on other issues. The members of each team represent the four fractions. 
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statement, members of the DPRD were given the right to put written questions to the 
regional head. Their questions were forwarded through the chairman and screened by a 
special team (Panitia Khusus or Pansus) prior to submission to the regional head. As a 
result, questions that might possibly offend the regional head were often deleted. Therefore, 
this right could not be effectively exercised. The DPRD could also request explanations 
from the regional head regarding his or her policies. But again, the procedures were quite 
complicated and members of regional council tended not to go through them. Instead, they 
simply invited officials to discuss matters with them. 13 
The DPRD was also empowered to conduct inquiries if it felt the policy of regional 
head conflicted with the interest of the people. However, the Department of Home Affairs 
had never issued procedures for such inquiries. DPRDs themselves did not dare demand that 
the central government make such procedures available or to initiate the formulation of such 
procedures. 
As the above discussion makes clear, the DPRD was never able to function as a 
channel for the people's aspirations, or act as a check-and-balance to the regional head. Its 
inability to perform its functions was not due to the poor quality of the legislators, as argued 
by many bureaucrats, including General Rudini when he was the Minister of Home Affairs. 
In fact, Law No. 5 of 1974 made the legislative body subordinate to the regional head. 
Concern about the need to empower DPRD only came up later, a few years before the end 
of the New Order administration. 
13 According to an official from Kabupaten Bandung, they often bribed the members of DPRD so that during 
the meeting they were not too critical of what the bureaucrats were doing. 
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Fiscal Centralization and Regional Dependency 
In 1968, the government started centralizing the fiscal system. The centre collected 
most revenues, and redistributed part of its revenues to the regions through a system of 
intergovernmental transfers. These transfers were aimed at helping the regions to meet their 
expenditure responsibility. Since more than 90 percent of government domestic revenues 
were raised by the central government, there had been a mismatch between revenue means 
and expenditure needs at different levels of government (see table 5.1). At the same time, 
the central transfers were also aimed at eliminating the problem of horizontal fiscal 
imbalance. Differences in resource endowments and economic opportunities across the 
regions had also caused disparities in regional generation of revenues relative to regional 
expenditure needs. Per capita 'own' revenues ranged from a low of Rp. 2,250 in Central 
Kalimantan to a high of Rp. 75,179 in the Special Territory of Jakarta in 1990/1991 (see 
table 5.2.). 
The central transfers to the regions took two forms: the Inpres (Instruksi Presiden, 
Presidential Instruction) programs for development activities and the SDO (Subsidi Daerah 
Otononi, subsidies for autonomous regions) for routine expenditures. The Inpres funds were 
divided into two categories: the General Inpres funds and the Specific Inpres funds. 14 
The first general Inpres program was introduced in 1969/70 for the villages. Grants 
to villages (Inpres Desa) were lump-sum allocations to each village-level unit in the 
country. These grants were small but relatively unconstrained and could be used by local 
authorities on infrastructure projects they chose. But the grants were intended only for 
purchasing constructions materials, and the local population should provide the labour. The 
14 Inpres is abbreviation of Instruksi Presiden (Presidential instruction). This word is used because the central 
transfer for development programmes was made through a presidential instruction. 
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total amount of the Inpres Desa increased from Rp 24.9 billion in Repelita I (1069-:74) to Rp 
869 billion in Repelita V (1989-94). In Repelita V, these grants accounted for 7.6 % of the 
total grants to the regions. 
In 1970/71, the general Inpres program was expanded to all districts (called Inpres 
Dati II). These grants were aimed at providing employment opportunities and badly needed 
infrastructure facilities in the rural areas, and allocated on a per capita basis. But during the 
1980s, some small and isolated areas outside Java were given an extra amount to 
compensate for their high construction costs. These funds were divided into fixed 
(ditetapkan) and discretionary (diarahkan) elements. The fixed element comprised 
obligatory expenditure on roads, bridges and irrigation, and the discretionary element could 
be spent on development projects chosen by the local authorities, subject to some general 
guidelines (Booth, 1995:188-189; Ranis and Stewart 1994:46; Davey, 1979:80). The 
amount of the central funds allocated for Inpres Dati II increased from Rp 46.4 billion in 
Repelita I to Rp 2,077 billion in Repelita V. In Repelita V, Inpres Dati II accounted for 
18.2% of the total central grants to the regions. 
In 197 4, the general Inpres grants were also expanded to all provinces ( called In pres 
Dati I). These grants were intended to replace the old system where the provinces had 
received a share of their export-tax revenues, which had favoured the Outer Islands. The 
Inpres Dati I allocations were based on the number of population, size of cultivated area and 
length of roads. But, having been criticized for favouring the populated provinces in Java 
and Sumatra, in the mid-1980s, a minimum lump sum grant was granted to every province, 
which caused the per capita allocation to be higher in small provinces in the eastern islands. 
Similar to Inpres Dati II, Inpres Dati I was also divided into two parts. About one third of 
the total was spent on projects specified by the central government, mainly for maintaining 
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roads, bridges and irrigation networks, which were falling under the responsibility of 
provincial government. The rest was discretionary spending, though the central authorities 
should approve the projects. The total amount of In pres Dati I increased from Rp 83 .1 % in 
Repelita I to Rp 2,119.5 billion in Repelita V. This accounted for 48.4% of the total central 
grants to the region in Repelita I and 18.5% in Repelita V. 
The Specific In pres funds were introduced since 1969. These funds were earmarked 
by the central government for specific uses, such as building roads and bridges, primary 
school, health centers, markets, or reforestation programme. The purpose was strictly 
specified. For example, local authorities can decide on the location of a primary school 
financed by the specific grant, but not on whether to spend the money on a school or other 
educational needs. The specific grants increased from Rp 17 .2 billion in Repelita I to 
6,376.4 billion in Repelita V. 
The SDO (Subsidi Daerah Otonom, Subsidies to the Autonomous Regions), which 
were first initiated in 1968, were meant to finance salaries and other recurrent expenditures 
of local government officials, and for operating costs of some public facilities such as 
elementary schools and health care centers built under the Inpres Programs. These grants 
were paid through the Department of Home Affairs to the provincial governments. 
Payments in respect of kabupaten and kotamadya staff were then passed on to the lower 
level through the routine expenditure budget. 
The size of the grant was determined annually by the actual salaries and allowances 
paid for the officials in post and the estimated budget needed for newly recruited teachers 
and medical staff for the new schools and health centers built under the Inpres programs. 
The proposals were submitted by the provinces to the Department of Home Affairs before 
the budgetary process and the Department of Home Affairs negotiated other increases in 
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total establishment with the Directorate General of Budget in the Department of Finance. 
From 1968 to 1994, the SDO had been increasing at 26% per annum in real terms, mainly 
due to the expansion in education and medical personnel. The total amount of SDO 
increased continually from Rp 25.5 billion in 1968 to 6,796.1 billion in 1993/94 (see table). 
In 1995/96, it represented ( 46%) of total regional government revenue and 17 .8% of the 
total national routine expenditures. In 1968, approximately 82% of the total SDO funds 
were spent for operational routine expenditures and the remainder 18% for the costs of the 
personnel. In 1993/94, the proportions were reversed. About 86% of the total amount of 
SDO was allocated for personnel. 
The SDO scheme clearly had many advantages for regional government. It enabled 
staff to be employed all over Indonesia on equal conditions and without regard to variation 
in local fiscal capacity. It provided a regular and secure source of income to meet regional 
government's commitments to their employees (Davey, 1979: 63). A great problem, 
however, was the lack of objective criteria for allocating posts to provinces. Allocations 
were basically based upon the additional funds available in the budget of the Department of 
Home Affairs for the SDO. There was no overall manpower plan. There was abundant 
evidence that many of the local dinas were actually overstaffing, especially with 
administrative staff. Another problem related to equity. Despite the fact that its own revenue 
was so high, salaries and allowances for all civil servants working for the Special Province 
of Jakarta were fully subsidized by the centre. Such a policy had encouraged regional 
governments to recruit more and more staff. 
In addition to Inpres funds, the central government also allocated funds from the 
national budget through its technical departments for expenditures falling within regional 
government responsibilities. These subsidies did not pass through the regional government 
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budgets or accounts; the provincial dinas drew the funds directly from the bank accounts of 
the Department of Finance. The main departments concerned were Public Works and 
Agriculture. Public Works spent on roads, water supply and irrigation through the 
provincial dinas. Proposals came from the dinas and were appraised by relevant ministries. 
The final decision, of course, rested with the Central Government. Sometimes, sectoral 
projects also required contributions from provincial budgets. These activities represented 
the implementation of the medebewind principle. 
Local authorities had little discretionary power over the use of the central grants. In 
the case of SDO, the Department of Home Affairs made detailed allocations. For the 
Specific Inpres funds, the projects were jointly prepared by the Department of Home 
Affairs, the National Development Planning Board and related sectoral ministries based on 
information provided by the regions. The General Inpres funds, which were given in the 
form of block grants, were still subject to central guidelines and/or quotas in terms of type 
of projects (Ranis and Stewart, 1994:51). Village-level General Inpres funds may have been 
the only unconstrained funds available to local authorities. However, these funds accounted 
for a small portion of central transfers to the regions. 
Subsidies allocated through sectoral departments (sectoral budget) were usually 
spent in the regions for financing responsibilities falling within the central jurisdiction. The 
projects were usually developed and implemented by ministerial field offices based on 
guidelines or targets set by the centre. These activities were supposed to be coordinated with 
activities carried out by units under local government. However, as MacAndrew points out, 
local planning bodies were frequently not informed about nationally funded projects in their 
province or district (MacAndrew, 1986: 61). 
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In addition to central grants, regional governments also raised their own revenue 
(Pendapatan Asli Daerah, PAD) from a variety of local taxes, local charges for services 
(retribusi), receipts from local Dinas, net profits from local enterprises, and other sources. 
Law No. 11 of 1957 on local taxes enabled regions to introduce local taxes, as long as the 
objects were not being taxed by the Central Government. Moreover, Law No. 12 of 1967 on 
local charges also made it possible for regions to levy a wide range of local charges or fees 
for services provided by regional authorities. 
At the provincial level, there were about seven taxes which had been effectively 
collected, but the most important was a tax on transferring the ownership of motor vehicles. 
In addition, the provincial governments collected more than 50 charges. Their contribution 
to PAD was quite important. In 1990/91, provincial PAD accounted for 25.05% of the total 
. . 1 15 prov1nc1a revenues. 
Kabupaten and kotamadya collected a wide range of taxes, but the most significant 
levies were those on entertainment (Pajak Hiburan), hotels and restaurants (Pajak 
Pembangunan I, Development Tax No. 1), advertisements and slaughtering. At kabupaten 
or kotamadya level, charges were also levied for a large number of services and permits, 
such as fees for shops and market stalls, building permits, medical services, parking, refuse 
collection, and the use of bus stations and taxi stands. For kotamadya, a small part of their 
revenues was also coming from the profits of local enterprises, such as hotels, cinemas, and 
water supply authorities. In 1990/91, local taxes and charges accounted for 13.8% of the 
total spending at the second level of government. 
In addition, the provincial and local governments also received some revenues from 
shared taxes administered by the central government (property tax, fees from the 
15 Data were taken from the Ministry of Finance, 1997. 
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exploitation of the forest). In 1990/91, the total receipts from shared taxes made up 6.73% 
of the total provincial revenues, and 12.41 % of the total revenues of all Dati II. In fact, the 
biggest part of local revenues at Dati II came from shared taxes. 
Locally generated revenue and shared taxes represented the most unconstrained 
funding at all levels of regional government. These funds could be spent without much 
interference from the central government. However, own revenue made up only a small 
portion of regional budgets. This was because many local taxes yielded very small amounts 
and some, like that on non-motorized vehicles, were declining in value. Moreover, the 
expansion of central receipts from the corporate tax on oil during the oil boom period 
brought a significant increase in the amount of grants to regions because the central 
government continuously transferred a fairly constant proportion of its revenue to regional 
governments. 16 The increase in the amount of the central grants eventually caused the 
proportion of PAD to total regional spending to drop from 44% in 1975/76 to 27.4% in 
1983/84. These figures show how dependent the regions were on grants from the centre. 
During the period of the oil boom (1974-1984), central grants to the regions 
increased significantly because the central government transferred a fairly constant 
proportion of its rising revenue to regional governments. In 1975/76, central grants 
accounted for approximately 56 percent of the total regional government spending. In 
1983/84, the proportion increased to 72.6 percent (Ranis and Stewart, 1994:49). 
The continuing growth in central government subsidies to the regions, according to 
Booth (1986: 79), undoubtedly had many benefits. It had allowed provincial and district 
levels of government to implement much needed infrastructure projects. It had created 
16 Receipts from the corporate tax on oil, which accounted for 14.3% of central government revenue in 1969, 
rose to over 50% of revenue between 1975 and the mid-1980s, with a decline in recent years. The central 
grants increase from 14.5 in 1969/70 to 18.2% in 1988/89 out of the total central government revenues. 
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employment for unskilled and semi-skilled construction workers, and led to a rapid growth 
in the construction industry in the country. However, the expansion of central government 
aid to the regions had raised concern about the heavy reliance of the regions on the central 
government subsidies and also decisions from the centre. In fact, the In pres programs had 
enabled the central government to intervene directly in such regional matters as village, 
kabupaten, kotamadya and provincial infrastructure development, development of 
community health centers, primary schools and markets. 
Recentralization of Government Functions 
As previously discussed, a clear division of power and responsibility between 
different levels of government is necessary for successful decentralization. Unfortunately, 
Law No. 5 of 1974 did not provide a clear indication of what functions were to be 
decentralized and to which levels. But it implied that as many responsibilities were to be 
transferred as possible to Dati II, and that the number and types of functions to be devolved 
would differ from one Dati II to another, depending upon their capacities to carry out those 
responsibilities. 
Assessments of Dati II capacities were not initiated until the late 1980s. Even when 
the criteria were introduced through the Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992, they still 
did not help the government indicate what responsibilities were to be transferred to each 
Dati II. The issuance of such criteria 18 years after the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1974 
provided central ministries with a strong reason for not devolving their power and 
responsibilities to regional authorities. 
Moreover, a clear policy on how the transferred responsibilities were to be financed 
by regional authorities was never issued. Law No. 5 of 1974 implied a new policy on 
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central-regional fiscal relations would be introduced to allow self-governing units to finance 
activities under their responsibility. The Law also stipulated that this policy would be 
regulated by another law. But the Law on fiscal relations was only enacted after the fall of 
the New Order government. This made regional government unenthusiastic to demand 
additional responsibilities for fear that those responsibilities would have to be financed 
through their own revenue. It was not surprising if 20 years after the enactment of Law No. 
5 of 1974 only a few additional responsibilities had ever been transferred from the centre to 
the regions. · 
Actually, when the autonomous governments were established in the 1950s, these 
units were granted 10 to 14 types of responsibilities over which they could exercise 
autonomy. During the early years of the New Order administration, most of these functions 
were informally recentralized. Central ministries through their field offices at the provincial 
and district levels performed most local services. Law No. 5 of 1974 permitted the central 
ministers to establish their field offices at regional levels. The expansion of the central 
ministries' organizations reduced the role of local governments in the provision of local 
services. Local authorities were only given the opportunity to develop projects to be funded 
through local budgets. Decisions on what could be proposed and how projects should be 
carried out were still made within the guidelines provided by the centre. In many cases, 
local projects were designed to support the implementation of central programs. 
Centralization of Planning and Budgeting Mechanism 
As previously mentioned, the system of government in the New Order Indonesia 
was characterized by concentration of authority to make decisions in the central 
bureaucracy. The GBHN, which was supposed to be prepared by the MPR every five years, 
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was actually drafted by the Secretary General of the Defence and Security Council (Dewan 
Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional) for the President. This draft was discussed between 
high-ranking officials before it was proposed by the President to the newly formed MPR 
resulting from general elections. After discussion in the MPR, the GBHN was then - always 
unanimously - enacted. The dominance of presidential appointees and Golkar in this 
institution secured the central government's interests. 
Based on GBHN, the government prepared its Five-Year Development Program 
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita). This program was formally introduced 
through a presidential decree. The Repelita was further elaborated in the national annual 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN), which had to be approved by 
the DPR. Based on the allocations in APBN, each central agency designed its programs and 
projects (LAN, 1998). 
The National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) played a key role in the 
process of planning and budgeting in Indonesia. This agency coordinated all central 
agencies in formulating Repelita. While the Department of Finance determined the amount 
of budget available each year, the National Development Planning Board made the 
allocations to all · central agencies and regional governments. Staff of this Board was 
involved in the detailed budget preparations at ministerial level. The Board also set policy 
on foreign aid and determined which projects were qualified to be included in the "blue 
book", a document that described projects proposed for foreign aid. With this authority, the 
National Development Planning Board became a very powerful agency vis-a-vis other 
central agencies and regional governments. Its authority to allocate funds had been a source 
of corruption because most agencies often bribed the National Development Planning 
Board's staff in order to maximize public funds allocated to their office. 
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At regional level, provincial and district development planning units (Bappeda) 
played a leading role in the preparation of Regional Five Year Development Plan (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun Daerah, Repelitada) and provincial and district annual budgets. 
Provincial and district annual budgets were proposed to provincial and district councils 
respectively for approval. In addition, provincial governments sought approval for their 
budgets from the Directorate General of Government and Regional Autonomy 
(Pemerintahan Umum dan Otonomi Daerah, PUOD), in the Department of Home Affairs. 
District budgets had to be approved by the governor. Through its approval, the central 
government was able to control all government activities taking place at the local level. This 
approval process also created room for collusion and corruption. It was quite common that 
provincial governments bribed appropriate officers in order to speed-up the approval 
process. 17 
The process of formulating Repelita was characterized as top-down. As Rohdewohld 
(1995:48) notes, the process took place within the bureaucracy with minimum participation 
from the public and few inputs from the lower levels of Government. The planning process 
was duplicated at provincial and district levels of administration with the formulation of 
Repelitada. In addition, the format of Repelitada was standardized by the Department of 
Home Affairs. Therefore, they tended to be the same everywhere, regardless of the 
differences in characteristics and needs in the regions. In fact, the existence of Repelitada 
was just for the sake of formality. 18 
17Based on interview with an official of the Department of Home Affairs involved in this process. 18 In addition to Repelitada, each province or district had its Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah, a physical 
plan for regional development. Unfortunately, this document was rarely up-dated. As a consequence, its 
contents did not seem to be an accurate to guide to the development activities in the region. 
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On the contrary, the process of annual budget preparation was designed to be 
bottom-up. 19 According to the Minister of Home Affair's regulation No. 9/1982, the process 
had to begin with villages. In March or April, a village meeting was held to discuss village 
proposals for development projects. These proposals were then reviewed at kecamatan level 
by related staff, under the guidance of the district officials. In May or June, a development-
coordinating meeting (Rapat Coordination Pembangunan, Rakorbang II) took place under 
the chairmanship of the district Bappeda. This meeting made important decisions about 
which projects were rejected, which were to be funded through local budgets and which 
were to be proposed to the higher levels of government. This meeting was usually 
. supervised by the provincial Bappeda and attended by staff from Kanwils. In July/ August, a 
similar coordinating meeting (Rakorbang I) was held at the provincial level. In this meeting, 
decisions were made about projects to be funded by the provincial budget and those to be 
proposed for the national budget -- both Inpres and sectoral allocations. This meeting was 
attended not only by provincial and local officials, but also by officials from the National 
Development Planning Board, the Department of Home Affairs, and some technical 
departments. Proposals for central funds were proposed through the Department of Home 
Affairs to the National Development Planning Board and related sectoral departments for 
the next year's annual budget. 
The results of the bottom-up planning process did not necessary reflect the needs of 
local people. One reason \,vas because local authorities had little discretion over the central 
grants. Even the general Inpres funds, \:vhich \Vere given in the form of block grants, were 
1.
9 This approach was developed based on the experience of a number of area development projects initiated in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s by a number of donor agencies, such as AUSAlD sponsored projects in East 
Java, UNICEF sponsored projects in East Java and South East Sulawesi, GTZ sponsored projects in West 
Sumatra and East Kalimantan. Those projects aimed to promote local participation and strengthen the capacity 
of local governments in planning and implementation of development projects 
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subject to central guidelines. There \Vas only a smalJ room for local initiatives as an project 
proposals \,vere prepared based on very detailed guidance provided by the central 
govcm1nent. Non-compliance with central guidance would lead to a reduction in the central 
transfers. Another reason was the tendency of lower levels of government to propose small-
scale projects, which were sometimes seen as unimportant by the central governments. 
Consequently, only a few were accepted. The rejection often disappointed local officials. 
But their dependency on the central transfers made them accept whatever decisions were 
made by the ·centre. 20 
The role of representative bodies at national and sub-national level in the 
formulation of development programs was very limited. The DPR was not involved in the 
decision .on Repelita, and nor were the DPRD I and DPRD II in Repelitada. Even though 
annual budgets had to be approved by legislative bodies, these institutions, in fact, did not 
have much room to play significant roles. Their dependency on resources from the 
executive caused them to agree with what had been proposed by the executive.21 
Decentralization Following the 1984 Financial Crisis 
Concern about decentralization was growing when world oil pnces decreased 
significantly in 1984. Reduction of central revenues forced the central government to make 
cuts in budgetary expenditures. But this budget cuts primarily affected the development 
budget. While the central development budget fell by 7 .2 percent, regional development 
grants were reduced by only 3.4%. The drastic decrease in the central development budget 
20 Local governments could still i1nplernent locally initiated projects from their own revenues. But revenues 
raised by local goverrunents were usually very small. 
21 Based on my own experience dealing with budget preparation in the Ministry of Public Works (1983-1990). 
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prompted the idea of transferring part of the responsibility for financing public services to 
the regions. 
In response to the significant decrease in budget allocations to central ministries, 
some of them tried to share the financial burden of financing public services with local 
authorities. In 1985, the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP) was 
introduced on the initiative of the Department of Public Works in some provinces. This 
program aimed at shifting some responsibilities for financing urban infrastructure to 
regional authorities. At the same time, the Department of Health also drafted a plan to 
transfer responsibility for primary health care to the regions. This program, later called the 
Health Project III (HP III), was launched in 1987 in two provinces, East Kalimantan and 
West Nusa Tenggara. Both programs were financially supported by donor agencies. 
Unfortunately, the programs were mainly concerned to increase local capacity to operate 
and finance capital investment for public services. Nevertheless, they were successful in 
improving the capacity of local staff in planning and implementing projects in related 
sectors and to some extent allowing the regions to develop their own approaches to their 
specific problems (these two programs are discussed in detail in chapter 7). 
At the same time, concern about decentralization had also increased 1n the 
Department of Home Affairs. In fiscal year 1984/85, the Centre for Research and 
Development (Bali bang) of the Department of Home Affairs, with the assistance of Gajah 
Mada University, initiated a study to prepare a concrete plan for the implementation of 
Article 11 of Law No.5 of ·1974, which required the transfer of authority for providing 
. 
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public services to the Dati II level. The result of the study, presented in the following year, 
suggested that more responsibilities should be gradually transferred from both the centre 
and Dati I, based on the capacity of each Dati II to handle additional responsibilities. The 
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study also recommended a set of criteria to be used to measure the capacity of Dati II. In the 
following year, nine universities, including Gajah Mada University, were hired to assess the 
capacity of all Dati II in Indonesia. The result, however, was not available until 1991. 
Despite the fact that the assessment was still being conducted, the Centre for Research and 
Development of the Department of Home Affairs drafted a government regulation on 
implementing decentralization at the second level of government. This draft was submitted 
to the office of the State Secretary for presidential approval in 1989. But the draft was 
rejected as inadequate and sent back to the Department of Home Affairs. 22 
Following the drop in the central revenues from oil, several measures were 
introduced to provide incentives for revenue efforts at the provincial and local levels. As 
Anne Booth points out, 
Regional fiscal reliance on the centre might not have appeared to matter while the 
centre had large amounts of funds to disburse, but it clearly matters in times of 
increased budgetary stringency. With the fall in oil revenues, in money terms, in 
1984/85 and the decline expected to continue in the balance of the Repelita IV 
period, there is a pressing need, already widely recognized by the government 
planners, both to increase non-oil government revenues, and to reduce the degree of 
regional fiscal dependency on the centre. These objectives can only be achieved by 
encouraging both provinces and sub-provincial levels of government to increase 
their revenue effort (Booth, 1986:96). 
In 1985, a new property tax (Law No. 12 of 1985) was introduced by the Department of 
Finance for the purpose of improving the efficiency of its collection and its revenue 
potential. This is a shared tax between the three different levels of government. Even though 
the setting of rates, assessment of liability, and collection of this tax are the responsibility of 
the central government, most of the revenue from property tax accrued at the second level 
could be spent freely by local authorities. Up to 2000, this tax was the largest source of local 
22 The concept of regional autonomy proposed in the draft law was too general. 
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revenue for the Dati II, even though it actually accounted for only 6 percent of local 
government resources. 
In 1987, the Department of Finance introduced a World Bank-sponsored program 
called Municipal Planning and Management System (SPMKD). Its objectives were to 
introduce medium-term financial planning at local government level; to improve the 
financial management and budgeting system; and to install a proper revenue reporting and 
control system. At the same time, the Department of Home Affairs (Director General of 
PUOD) also initiated a program called Manual Administration Pendapatan Daerah or 
Mahatma (Guide for the Administration of Regional Revenues). This program was intended 
to help regional governments to identify local taxpayers and to determine their tax liability. 
This program was first introduced on a pilot basis in five sites, and has now been installed 
in more than 100 Dati II. This program was financed through regional budgets. It was clear 
that SPMKD and Mapatda were duplicating each other. Therefore, since 1994, SPKM was 
integrated into Mapatda. 
To maintain the level of development in the regions, regional authorities and 
regional enterprises were also encouraged to borrow money from international institutions 
such as the Asian Development Bank, IBRD, and OECF. For this purpose, in 1987/1988, a 
facility known as the Regional Development Account or RDA, located in the Department of 
Finance, began operations. Although it started making loans to regional governments and 
their enterprises in 1989, this institution was not formally established through a decree of 
the Minister of Finance until September 1991. 
In 1988, a draft law on fiscal relations to replace Law No. 32 of 1956 was also 
discussed in an inter-ministerial meeting in the National Development Planning Board. This 
draft originated from the Department of Finance. This draft proposed that the existing fiscal 
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system be maintained, but greater discretion over the central grants be given to the 
regions.23 It was proposed that the central grants be given the form of block grant. This 
proposal eventually met with strong resistance from other parties. To those who argued for 
fiscal decentralization, the idea of centralizing major taxes was seen as inconsistent with 
their vision of decentralization. But to those who were involved in the allocation of regional 
" development funds, there was fear that greater regional discretion over the use of central 
grants might reduce their power over fiscal flows to the regions. It was not surprising that 
they tried to maintain the existing subsidy scheme, which they regarded as already well-
established (Gafar 1995:55; Smoke and Lewis 1996: 1287).24 The draft law was finally 
discarded. 
At the same time, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, the State Minister of the Utilization of 
the State Apparatus (Men. PAN), launched a program called Otonomi Daerah or Regional 
Autonomy, as part of a package to improve the performance of the civil service (Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara 1997b: 278).25 To implement this program, an inter-departmental team 
was formed, consisting of senior officials from the State Ministry for the Utilization of the 
State Apparatus, office of the State Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, National 
Institute of Public Administration (Lembaga Administrasi Negara or LAN), and National 
Board for the Administration of Civil Servants (Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara 
or BAKN). However, due to limited funds its activity was limited to conducting 
Forkompanda (Forum Komunikasi Pendayagunaan Aparatur Daerah or Communication 
23 Main source of revenues were centrally managed and revenues were redistributed through a system of inter-
governmental transfer. 
24 Information was also obtained from Mr. Pakpahan of the Ministry of Finance in an interview in 1997. 25 Eight programmes for improving the performance of the Utilization of the State Apparatus were: 1) 
implementing self supervision (Pengawasan Melekat); 2) Job Analysis; 3) increasing the number of functional 
positions; 4) improving the quality of leadership; 5) streamlining the procedures for administering government 
staff; 6) improving the quality of public services; 7) improving the information system for government 
administration; and 8) implementing autonomy at Dati II. 
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Forum for Improving the Performance of Local Government Apparatus) in every province, 
to discuss the idea of decentralization at the second level of government. 
Despite the tendency of each central agency to allocate part of its budget for 
decentralization projects, coordination among the initiating agencies was lacking. Each 
party tended to go its own way to maximize the achievement of its own goals. The National 
Development Planning Board was more concerned to take better account of different 
regional needs in formulating central projects, than in handing over the projects to sub-
national governments. The Department of Finance was more concerned with strengthening 
local revenue sources, increasing the importance of loans relative to grants for capital 
financing, and restructuring the grants system to give autonomous regions more discretion 
over the use of funds. The Department of Home Affairs seemed interested to have as many 
responsibilities as possible and to have funds transferred from the sectoral ministries to 
regional authorities, without any intention of reducing its control over decentralized 
activities. Sectoral departments were more interested in strengthening the capacity of their 
field offices to assume responsibilities falling into their jurisdictions, rather that 
decentralizing those responsibilities to local authorities (Smoke and Lewis, 1996). The 
fragmentation of power and responsibilities became the major hindrance for coordination. 
The DPOD, which was supposed to steer the process of decentralization, did little to 
bring the initiating agencies together to form a consensus on how decentralization should be 
pursued.26 It seemed that this body was not really designed to be a forum for discussing 
central-regional issues on a broader basis. Neither representative from sectoral ministries 
26 Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah or DPOD (Advisory Council for Regional Autonomy) was set up in 
1975 through Presidential Decision No. 23/1975. This body was entrusted with: a) establishing autonomous 
regions; b) dissolving autonomous regions; c) transferring additional functions from central to regional 
governments; d) withdrawing functions previously transferred to the regions; e) adding to regional financial 
resources including the transfer or sharing of central taxes; f) changing the structure of financial balance; and 
g) other issues related to regional autonomy (Article 2 of the Presidential Decree No. 27 /1975). 
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nor from regional governments was included in its membership. 27 Up to 1990, no effort was 
ever made to bring together sectoral ministries and regional governments to exchange ideas 
on how decentralization policy should be pursued. Instead of the DPOD, it was the State 
Ministry of the Utilization of the State Apparatus that initiated the pilot project in 1995 and 
led the negotiations with sectoral departments (see chapter 6). 
The involvement of donor agencies also made it difficult to introduce genuine 
decentralization, which required gradual institutional building and reduced central 
government control over the use of the funds in the regions. Most donors seemed to be more 
interested in the physical progress and financial disbursement of the projects than in the 
impact of projects on strengthening regional autonomy. To ensure that aid was properly and 
timely spent, donors tended to demand greater involvement from central ministries in 
planning and implementing projects. Moreover, some donors tended to establish client 
relationships with specific ministries or divisions within ministries who shared similar 
objectives (see chapter 7). These relationships reinforced the tendency of departments to 
specialize and compete with each other (Smoke and Lewis, 1996: 1286-7). In an 
environment in which different parties independently initiated key projects, compliance 
with decentralization objectives was difficult to expect. 
Decentralization at the Second Level 
The implementation of a number of decentralization projects finally attracted the 
attention of the DPR. In late 1989 the DPR raised a question with the president on the 
27 This body, led by the Minister of Home Affairs, included the Coordinating Minister for Economy and 
Industry (Menko Ekuin), the Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs (Menko Kesra), the State Minister for 
The Utilization of the State Apparatus (Menpan), the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Finance, and the 
State Secretary. 
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progress of decentralization. In response to DPR, 1n his speech of 17 August 1990, 
President Suharto stated that, 
To increase people's capacity, creativity and initiatives, to face the era of take-off, 
from now on we have to give a larger role to Dati II. 
Dati Ils are those who know the needs and aspirations of the people. Efforts to 
increase deconcentration and decentralization should be in conformity with the spirit 
of the 1945 Constitution and the progress of development we have achieved 
(Kompas, 10 August 1990). 
Suharto's speech was seen by some analysts as showing his intention to implement the 
decentralization policy more seriously. Suharto's statement encouraged General Rudini, 
who had just been appointed as the Minister of Home Affairs in 1988, to begin seriously 
implementing decentralization at the second level of government. 
Rudini found out that most of the responsibilities, which had been transferred to the 
regions in the fifties and sixties, were actually held at the provincial level. Rudini believed 
that to enhance the autonomy of second-level government, provincial assemblies should be 
abolished and provinces should be transformed into administrative units. To discuss the 
possibility of implementing his idea, Rudini asked the Centre for Research and 
Development of the Department of Home Affairs to organize a seminar. 
The seminar was conducted on 8 and 9 October 1990 and attended by most high-
ranking officials in his ministry. A number of experts on local government from nine state 
universities were also invited. In his key-note speech, Rudini argued that his idea to abolish 
Dati I was not in conflict with the 1945 Constitution, because in Article 18 it was stipulated 
that the Indonesian territory was to be divided into provinces, and each province to be 
divided into smaller units. But it did not say provinces should be autonomous units. 
(Syafrudin, 1991: 108). 
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In response to Radii's argument, many participants doubted whether the abolition of 
Dati I would promote autonomy at the second level. Professor Sri Soemantri from 
Padjadjaran University, for example, was very concerned about the political consequences 
of the disappearance of provincial councils (DPRD Tk. I), which he considered as 
important political arenas for channelling the people's aspirations. S. Pamudji from the 
military think- tank, Lemhannas (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional), also doubted that 
Rudini's idea could be easily implemented. The abolition of Dati I, according to Pamudji, 
would require fundamental changes in the current laws and regulations. Instead of 
abolishing Dati I, he urged the government to clarify the following issues: types of 
responsibilities to be transferred; procedures for transferring; timetable; transfer of staff; and 
detailed arrangements for local revenues. In addition, he proposed that the government 
conduct a pilot project so that its policy could be evaluated and corrected prior to its real 
implementation. 
Dr. Ichlasul Amal from Gajahmada University supported Pamudji's idea. Amal also 
reminded the government not to introduce a uniform policy for the regions because 
uniformity was one of the characteristics of bureaucratization that strengthened central 
control over regions. Thirty years under an authoritarian regime created the tendency to 
standardize all administrative procedures in local as well as central bureaucracy. 
Many participants also opposed the idea of autonomy at the Dati II level for they 
saw Dati II as too small to become an effective autonomous unit. 28 With regard to this issue, 
Suyamto, one of the drafters of Law 5 of 1974, suggested that existing Dati II be regrouped 
so that their sizes would be more or less equal to the former residencies. He also proposed 
28 As discussed in the chapter III , during the 1950s, to gain support, the Central Government made small 
principalities Dati II. Many of them were too small in terms of area, population and natural resources to 
support their activities. 
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that in the future autonomous units should be based on the former self-governing units that 
existed under indirect rule during the colonial period (Syafrudin, 1991:109). Rudini, 
however, did not see amalgamation as politically feasible. 
The seminar ended with the conclusion that further study was needed to define at 
what level the autonomous units should be established. While Dati I was too large and 
remote from the community, Dati II was too weak financially and managerially to be the 
sole level of autonomy. Rudini' s idea to grant autonomy to one level of regional 
government appeared to be politically difficult. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, to provide a framework for defining what 
responsibilities could be given to a particular second level of government, the Centre for 
Research and Development of the Department of Home Affairs, with the assistance of nine 
universities, including Gajah Mada University, conducted a study on the capacity of second-
level government in Indonesia. An assessment was made of 292 Dati II based on criteria 
developed earlier by Gajahmada University. However, when the results of the study were 
presented to related ministries in 1991, the Department of Home Affairs was overwhelmed 
with criticism. 29 One criticism related to the method and criteria used to assess local 
capacity. Many indicators used in the study were not really relevant to measuring local 
managerial capacity.30 As later admitted by Dr. Warsito of Gajah Mada University, who 
helped design the study, the choice of criteria was quite arbitrary. 
29 Dr. Susiati Hirawan from the Ministry of Finance and Dr. Paul Smoke from HUD-Jakarta, were among 
those who strongly criticised the method and criteria used in the study. 
3
°For example, Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD, locally generated revenues) could not be expected to reflect 
local financial capacity or local effort in mobilizing resources because a larger portion of PAD comes from 
property tax and other shared taxes, which were administered by the central government. Also, the ratio 
between the number of local staff and total population produced a misleading result if used for measuring the 
administrative capacity of the local authority. The use of GRDP (gross domestic regional product) and 
demographic characteristics such as population density and rate of growth was also regarded as irrelevant by 
some experts for assessing the capacity of local government to assume more responsibilities. 
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Another criticism related to the categorization of Dati II, which did not provide 
guidance for the allocation of responsibilities. Based on the study, second-level 
governments were grouped into four categories: Ml (the least capable) to M4 (the most 
capable). But of 292 local authorities assessed, more than half fell into category M3 (see 
table 5.2) that included both kotamadya and kabupaten. But these two forms of local 
government were different in their characteristics. Even kotamadya differed in terms of size 
and geography. The question was whether or not the same responsibilities should be given 
to all Dati II, which fell into the same category (see Table 5.1.). 
Indeed, some officials involved in the rating process were quite aware of problems 
associated with their results. Therefore, in the final report of the study it was suggested that 
categorization be used only in defining the number of functions to be transferred. Types of 
functions to be transferred to a particular Dati II, according to this report, should be 
determined in a further study (Departemen Dalam Negeri 1991:79). 
In 1992, an inter-ministerial task force was formed and charged with developing an 
instrument for measuring the capacity of local governments. This task force consisted of 
officials from the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus, Department of 
Finance, Department of Home Affairs, Ministry of PublicWorks, National Development 
Planning Board, and the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN). Other sectoral 
ministries involved in local service provision also participated in the task force whenever 
their input was required. 
The idea to base the evaluation effort at LAN emerged in discussions among some 
members of DPOD, whose deliberations exposed the reasons why other ministerial 
coordination efforts had failed. LAN was selected to chair the task force because of its 
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perceived neutrality. Unlike all ministries, LAN had not been directly involved in planning 
and implementing regional development programs (Smoke and Lewis, 1996: 1289). 
The method developed for the study was based on a simple numerical index. Local 
government capacity was assessed based on their performance in the following functions: 
development planning and programming; resources mobilization; budgeting and 
management; and project design. The assessment was done using quantitative indicators as 
well as qualitative appraisals. The procedures were implemented on a trial basis in the 
provinces of West Nusa Tenggara, North Sulawesi and East Java. The result of the exercise 
seemed promising, even though the methodology still needed refinement. In the following 
years, the assessment was expanded to include other provinces. The result was reported by 
Dr. Kristiadi, the Chairman of LAN to DPOD. However, he failed to have the method 
officially endorsed by this Council. 
Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992 
Despite the fact that methods to assess local government capacity were still being 
debated, the Centre for Research and Development of the Department of Home Affairs 
insisted on introducing a regulation on decentralization at the second level. The draft was 
sent to the Office of the State Secretary in early 1992. This draft proposed that as many 
responsibilities as possible be decentralized to Dati II. The number and types of 
responsibilities decentralized to each Dati II would be based on their individual capacities, 
as determined by the Department of Home Affairs. To allow Dati II to carry out those 
responsibilities, the central and provincial governments would also decentralize the budget, 
staff and facilities associated with the responsibilities being transferred. Those 
responsibilities could be withdrawn if local governments were later seen to be incapable of 
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managing them. Despite opposition from a number of central agencies, the proposal was 
enacted as Regulation No. 45/1992 a few weeks after its submission to the President's 
office. 31 
This Regulation required that sectoral departments define which functions they 
would transfer to Dati II, based on the stipulated certain criteria.32 This regulation also 
provided that the determination of functions to be devolved to specific Dati I or Dati II to be 
based on the 'capacity' of the region. This capacity would be evaluated according to 
procedures to be provided by the Department of Home Affairs. But the procedures, as 
mentioned above, had yet to be designed. The regulation also stipulated that functions to be 
assigned to Dati II could be transferred directly <Jr indirectly through Dati I. However, the 
mechanism for transferring the functions was still to be prepared by the Department of 
Home Affairs. 
Following the issuance of Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992, the Department 
of Home Affairs, in cooperation with the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State 
Apparatus, initiated a series of two-day seminars on regional autonomy at LAN Campus in 
Jakarta. These seminars were intended to allow high-ranking officials from different 
ministries and lecturers from universities to exchange ideas on the newly introduced 
concept of autonomy at the second level of government. Some vice governors and 
31 Following submission of the draft regulation, a meeting between officials from the Office of the State 
Secretary and those from the State Ministry of Government Apparatus, Ministry of Finance, the National 
Development Planning Board, LAN, and BAKN was held at LAN. During the meeting, some officials 
expressed their disagreement with the content of the proposed regulation. Many considered the concept of 
autonomy at the second level, as outlined in the proposal , as unclear and difficult to translate into action. 32 Criteria for defining the transferred functions were as follows : 1) functions which have been undertaken by 
a region; 2) functions relating to immediate direct public interests which are heavily influenced by regional 
environmental conditions: 3) functions that generate public participation or are characterized as a public 
responsibility: 4) functions that need capital intensive in their implementation; 5) functions that add to regional 
income and have potential to generate local revenues for the region ; and 6) functions that require 
implementation decisions and actions to be undertaken immediately. 
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provincial secretaries were also invited to the senunars. From these senunars it was 
recommended that if the government wanted to see decentralization policy effectively 
implemented, it had to do the following: 1) conduct more dialogue to allow all government 
officials from the central as well as local level to have the same perception about what 
decentralization and local autonomy were; 2) formulate a clear division of responsibilities 
between different levels of government; 3) prepare a procedure for devolving the 
responsibilities to regional governments; 4) prepare a policy on inter-governmental fiscal 
transfer that could allow the second level of government to finance responsibilities 
transferred to them; and 5) help the second level of governments improve the capacity of 
their staff (Lembaga Administrdsi Negara, 1997). 
In the mean time, Rudini also sought broad support for the implementation of 
Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992. To encourage their involvement, he expanded the 
membership of DPOD and transformed this body into a forum, which allowed all related 
parties to exchange ideas and experiences on decentralization. By doing so, he expected that 
consensus could be formed on how this regulation was to be implemented. Unfortunately, 
the enactment of Regulation No. 45 of 1992 coincided with the end of Rudini ' s term as 
Minister of Home Affairs. Rudini's successor, Major General Yogi S. Memet, did not seem 
interested in continuing the implementation of Rudini's agenda. Under Yogi's leadership, 
DPOD met infrequently.33 As a consequence, consensus on how these key actors were to 
play their role was never really made. It was not surprising that other related parties finally 
showed "wait-and-see" attitudes towards the implementation of the new regulation. 
In early 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed its intention to provide a 
five-year technical support program to the government of Indonesia to develop a more 
33 Interview with Dr. Sondiamar, a former assistant to Rudini. 
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comprehensive approach to decentralization. In the MOU between the two governments , it 
was stated that a technical team from GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Technische 
Zusammenarbeit) would be placed under the National Institute of Administration (Lembaga 
Administrasi Negara, LAN) because LAN, according to President Decree No 20 of 1991, 
was responsible for the formulation and dissemination of policy on public administration in 
Indonesia. 34 In relation to this, LAN, in cooperation with DSE, another German agency, 
initiated a series of three-week visits by groups comprised of high-ranking officials from 
different ministries and different levels of government to Germany. These visits were 
intended not only to broaden their knowledge of decentralization issues, but also to pave the 
way for future consensus among related parties on how decentralization should be carried 
out in Indonesia. 35 
While LAN continued organizing the visits, senior officers from the Department of 
Home Affairs demanded that the German technical team be attached to the Department of 
Home Affairs . They argued that their ministry had been given the mandate to coordinate the 
implementation of decentralization through Presidential Decision No. 23 of 1975 on DPOD. 
This kind of competition was common among different units in the government because 
having control over such a team meant also increasing their power over others. Even 
divisions within the Department of Home Affairs itself competed with each other for control 
over the German technical team. In 1993, the National Development Planning Board 
decided the technical team would be attached to the office of the Secretary General of the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
34 LAN is a non-departmental agency. Its chairman is directly responsible to the president but its activities are 
under the coordination of the State Minister for The Utilization of the State Apparatus . 35 I accompanied the first group to Germany. 
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In mid 1993, with the cooperation of the Department of Home Affairs, the GTZ 
team organized a three-day workshop at Carita, West Java, to formulate an action plan for 
helping Indonesia to implement its decentralization policy. All key actors were invited to 
the workshop and their commitment was expected to be easily obtained. Unfortunately, 
most left for Jakarta right after the opening ceremony. Their staff who remained was not 
given any authority to make commitments to any decisions made during the workshop. 
Therefore, GTZ's intention to produce an action plan with support from key parties had to 
be forgotten. Moreover, staff from the Department of Home Affairs dominated the 
workshop. As a consequence, most activities proposed were for the sake of this ministry. 
Following the workshop, Dr. May, the GTZ team leader, realized that most of the activities 
proposed would strengthen centralization. But he also appreciated there may be political 
consequences if he refused to implement what had been formulated. He finally allowed the 
DPOD steering committee to veto the proposal. 36 
Following the workshop, other attempts were made by the team to help the 
government develop and implement a more integrated program of decentralization. 
However, its position under the Department of Home Affairs and the Carita experience 
made other related parties reluctant to get involved in GTZ technical assistance activity. In 
the end, this team only served in an advisory capacity to divisions within the Department of 
Home Affairs. 
When Major General Silalahi was appointed as State Minister for Government 
Apparatus in 1993, he decided to push ahead with the decentralization program. In 1995 he 
initiated a pilot project on decentralization in 26 Dati II. In addition to improving local 
36 I represented Dr. Kristiadi of LAN in the Carita workshop. From the beginning I warned Dr. May of the 
possibility that the proposed action plan might conflict with the decentralization objectives. He, however, 
appreciated the problem a few weeks later when he discussed the issue with Dr. Kristiadi. 
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autonomy, the project aimed to improve the quality, and expand the coverage, of public 
services at the local level. Unfortunately, Silalahi's concept of decentralization 
corresponded more with the concept of administrative decentralization. Instead of 
enhancing local autonomy, his project strengthened central intervention through its 
decentralized administration. Moreover, this project also resulted in a rapid increase in the 
number of units under the Dati II. Expansion in the structure of Dati II had caused the 
bureaucracy involved in the delivery of public services to become even more complicated. 
(see chapter 6). 
Despite its failure from the point of view of decentralization, the pilot project was 
expanded to 68 districts in 1998. However, the effort was abandoned when General Suharto 
was toppled from the presidency. Hartarto, a bureaucrat who replace Silalahi, saw that the 
concept of autonomy introduced by the project was not in line with the new Habibie 
government's policy on regional autonomy. 
Why Did Implementation Fail to Achieve Autonomy? 
From the previous chapter, it was clear that the government never really intended to 
promote regional autonomy, and therefore; the framework laid down in Law No. 5 of 1974 
was not designed for the establishment of semi-independent regional governments. 
Nevertheless, this Law required that the responsibilities for public services be transferred to 
the district authorities. But the New Order government never made real efforts to implement 
such a policy. Regulation that clarified what functions were to be decentralized was only 
made 20 years later. It was not surprising that the transfer of authority to regional levels 
never took place during the New Order government. 
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In the mean time, the government issued a number of regulations aimed at 
establishing an effective central control over the regions. The positions of regional heads 
were strengthened, and regional heads were made the sole administrator, accountable to the 
centre. Fiscal system was centralized and regional governments were made financially 
dependent on the central transfer. All of those policies finally turned regional 
administrations into an integral part of the central bureaucracy, responsible for 
implementing policies set by the centre. 
To pave the way for centralization, the government also tried to weaken demand for 
regional autonomy. The activities of political parties were restricted and their influence in 
the national as well as regional legislative bodies was reduced. Extensive state surveillance 
and the controlled press effectively reduced opposition to central policies. The government's 
co-optation of local elites weakened regional demand for autonomy. 
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Table 5 .1. Distribution of Dati II according to Capacity 
Capacity No. of Dati II Percentage 
M-1 1 0.34% 
M-2 89 30.48% 
M-3 182 62.33% 
M-4 20 6.85% 
Total 292 100.00% 
Source: Departemen Dalam Negeri, 1991, p.23a. 
Note: 
M-1 : the least capable local government 
M-4: the most capable local government 
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Table 5 .2. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in 1990/91 
(Percentage) 
Own Source Revenues Revenue sharej' 
National 96.1 
Sub national 3.9 
Provincial 2.8 
District 1.1 
All Levels 100.00 
Own Source and Shared 
Revenues 
National 94.3 
Sub national 5.7 
Provincial 3.5 
District 2.2 
All Levels 100.00 
Own Source, Shared 
Revenues and Transfers 
National 82.2 
Sub national 17.8 
Provincial 9.9 
District 7.9 
All Levels 100.00 
Expenditure share Surplus/deficit 
83.1 13.0 
16.9 -13.0 
9.3 - 6.5 
7.6 - 6.5 
100.00 0.0 
83.1 11.2 
16.9 11.2 
9.3 - 5.8 
7.6 - 5.4 
100.00 0.0 
83.1 -0.9 
16.9 0.9 
9.3 0.6 
7.6 0.3 
100.00 0.0 
Source: Shah et al..,1994. Intergovernmental Fiscal relations in Indonesia: issues and 
reform options, World Bank Discussion Report, p. 50. 
37 Including development receipts (programme and project aid) 
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Table 5.3. The Central Government Transfer by Types from 1989/90 to 1993/94 
(in billion Rupiahs) 
1989/9 1990/9 1 1991 /92 1992/93 1993/94 Average annual 
0 Growth Rate 
General Purpose INPRES: 706.0 1,058.4 1,434.7 1,867 .1 2,202.8 21.6 
INPRES Villages 112.0 190.6 249 .9 326 .5 390.2 23 .3 
INPRES Dati II 270.0 391 .8 590.8 825 .1 1,029.6 26 
INPRES Dati I 324.0 486.0 594.0 715 .5 783 .0 16.8 
Specific Purpose INPRES: 535 .9 1,262.8 1,842.1 1,282.2 2 ,623 .8 32.8 
Primary School 100.0 369.5 521.7 669 .1 747 ,9 39.5 
Health 122.2 177.8 268 .9 339.5 747 .9 27.2 
Reforestation 16.2 33.1 74.6 97 .3 104.3 29.7 
Local roads 225.0 472.5 685 .1 825 .6 1,373 .3 41.5 
Provincial roads 69.5 206 .9 289.7 347 .6 85 .9 
Market Development 3 .0 3.0 2.1 3.0 5.0 0.8 
SDO 3,551.2 4,102.4 4,554.0 5,269 .3 6,028 .9 
Total Transfer 4 ,793 6,424 7 ,831 9,419 10,855 16.9 
DIPs 7,368 4,067 6,160 7 ,640 8,720 15,9 
Total Transfer and DIPS 12,161 10,491 13,991 17,059 19,575 14.4 
Population (in 000s) 175,39 179,194 183,159 187,113 191 ,194 2.1 
6 
Transfer per capita (in 27 ,327 35,847 42,754 50,331 56,777 14.4 
Rupiahs) 
Transfer and DIPs per capita 69,335 58,544 76,386 91 ,159 102,383 12.0 (in Rupiahs) 
Source: Department of Finance, 1997. 
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Chapter VI 
The Pilot Project: Decentralization initiated by the State Minister 
for the Utilization of the State Apparatus (Men. PAN) 
Up to 1995, the process of decentralization had at best been very slow. The legal 
framework for implementing decentralization at the second level of government, 
Government Regulation No. 45, was issued in 1992 but was still insufficient for steering the 
implementation of such a policy. Interested in seeing the concept implemented, the State 
Minister for the Utilization of the State Apparatus (Men. PAN) Major General T. B. Silalahi 
decided to initiate a breakthrough. In 1995 he introduced a two-year pilot project, which 
aimed to enhance the autonomy of the Dati II by transferring authority to implement more 
functions to the district level. At the same time, he expected this transfer to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services by district authorities. 
This chapter discusses the concept of autonomy introduced by the pilot project, its 
implementation, and its impact on the autonomy of the 26 participating districts. Most 
information used in this chapter was obtained from interviews with key actors who had been 
involved in the development and/or implementation of the pilot project, at the central , 
provincial and district levels. I also interviewed scholars who · had contributed to the 
decentralization debate in Indonesia. Field observation of the implementation of the project 
was also made in two districts - Kabupaten Bandung in West Java, and Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 
in East Java. 
Based on the information obtained during fieldwork, it was clear that the project 
failed to reach its objectives. Despite the transfer of responsibility to carry out a number of 
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government tasks to the district level, this measure did not increase the autonomy of Dati II. 
This failure was particularly due to the concept of decentralization introduced by the 
project. This concept was based on the framework put forward in Law No. 5 of 1974. Under 
this law, decentralization was limited to the transfer of administrative responsibility from a 
higher level to a lower level of government. Therefore, responsibility to perform certain 
functions was transferred to the district authorities, but their autonomy in decision-making 
was still constrained by guidelines from both the Department of Home Affairs (Depdagri) 
and technical/sectoral departments, such as the Department of Agriculture (Deptan), the 
Department of Health (Depkes), and the Department of Public Work (Dep. PU)). The 
perception that decentralization was only the transfer of administrative responsibility within 
the bureaucracy also made the government ignore the importance of strengthening the 
political role of local councils. Therefore, instead of promoting local autonomy, the project 
simply made district authorities the extensions of the central bureaucracy and only 
instruments for the implementation of national development programs. 
The project was also unsuccessful in improving the efficiency of the provision of 
public services by local government. The expansion of local government organization made 
bureaucracy in the provision of local services even more complicated, and increased the 
cost for services. In addition, the failure of the project to provide district authorities with 
enough funds to finance the transferred tasks encouraged the district heads to raise a variety 
of local taxes and charges. This tendency had been strengthened by the fact that the 
performance of participating districts was assessed based on growth in their own revenues. 
As a result, the project was blamed for aggravating the problem of the 'high-cost economy' 
that had long plagued the country. 
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Background and Objectives 
In response to growing concern about decentralization, the Government finally 
addressed this issue in the 1993 GBHN (Garis Besar Haluan Negara or the Broad 
Guidelines of the State Policy). Under the chapter on regional development, it was stated 
that 
"Initiatives and active participation of the community, together with the regional 
planning boards, in regional development need to be encouraged, development 
control and coordination intensified, and the functions of regional legislative bodies 
improved as the manifestation of increased participation of the community in the 
development drive. The managerial ability of the regional administration apparatus 
should be improved to achieve more efficient utilization of regional potentials, and 
to implement real, responsible and dynamic regional autonomy"(GOI 1993:78). 
When Major General Silalahi was appointed Men. PAN in 1993, he perceived that 
his mandate to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the state bureaucracy was to 
include ensuring the effective implementation of decentralization. He was, however, quite 
disappointed to find that his office had neither the mandate nor resources needed to 
coordinate the implementation of this agenda. 1 But as a member of DPOD, he could 
influence the implementation of the decentralization effort. Moreover, as Men. PAN, his 
position vis a vis sectoral ministers was more influential than that of the Minister of Home 
Affairs. With his authority to determine the size and structure of all government agencies at 
all levels of government and set policies and issue approval on recruitment, promotion, 
remuneration and retirement for civil servants, he believed he could easily mobilize support 
from all agencies at the central as well as regional levels. 
To implement the idea of autonomy at the second level of government, Silalahi 
proposed that all field of offices of central government departments (Kandep) and branch 
1 The State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus (Men.PAN) is responsible for assisting the 
President in preparing policies on civil service. This office had few staff and no development budget. 
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offices of provincial governments (Cabang Dinas Tingkat I) be abolished and their activities 
be transferred to relevant dinas or other units under the autonomous Dati II. To enable these 
units to perform additional tasks, he also proposed that all personnel, facilities and budgets 
associated with transferred responsibilities be decentralized to those units. Silalahi also 
expected that the abolition of Kandep and Cabang Dinas Tingkat I would reduce the 
bureaucratic chains in the provision of public services and make them more efficient and 
effective. 2 
To test his concept, he proposed that a two-year pilot project be conducted in five 
districts. To ensure compliance with his plan, he chose five districts headed by military 
officers for the pilot project. As a major general, he believed none of those military bupati 
and walikota, whose ranks were below his, would ever reject his orders. To follow-up his 
idea, he also appointed Ir. Gustav Pandjaitan, the former Director of the Jakarta Water 
Enterprise (PAM J aya), as his special assistant for regional autonomy. 3 
His intention to implement a pilot project on decentralization was also expressed in 
the DPOD meeting. Even though the detailed features of the project were still to be worked 
out, most members expressed their support for the idea. Following the meeting, a 
supervisory team for autonomy, consisting of Men. PAN, the Minister of Home Affairs, 
Minister of Finance, and Head of Bappenas (the National Development Planning Board), 
was established at the central level within the framework of DPOD. In addition, a technical 
team, consisting of high-ranking officials from related agencies, was also set up at the 
central level to prepare the concept in detail. Silalahi wanted implementation of the project 
to be formally led by DPOD. 
2 Information was obtained from, among others, Mr. Silalahi, in March 1995, and Gustav Pandjaitan, one of 
Silalahi' s assistants, in April 1997. 
3 The appointment of Gustav Panjaitan to the position of special assistant on Regional Autonomy made some 
officials sceptical because he had neither relevant education nor related experience. 
170 
Silalahi reported his proposal to the president in mid-1994. To his surprise, President 
Suharto instructed him to introduce the project not in five, but in 26 districts, one in every 
province except in the Special Territory of Jakarta. Dr. Dono Iskandar from the Department 
of Finance suggested in one meeting that the pilot districts be chosen from those Dati II 
with demonstrated proper managerial capacity. For this purpose, he urged that the State 
Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus (Kantor Men. PAN) use the rating results 
made by LAN in determining where pilot project should be conducted. For practical 
reasons, however, Silalahi's Deputy Wirawan chose districts located near provincial 
. 1 4 capita s. 
The plan to conduct a pilot project in decentralization was later presented to the 
1994 governors' conference. Silalahi requested each governor, except the Governor of the 
Special Capital Territory of Jakarta, to nominate one district in his province to participate in 
the pilot project on decentralization. The Minister of Home Affairs through his decision No. 
105 of 1994 made the formal identification of those pilot districts not long after the 
conference ( see table 6 .1). 
As usual, the decision was centrally made without consulting with the concerned 
district authorities. The district officials, however, felt obliged to implement the central 
government's program and make it successful. Some district chiefs even said they were 
proud of being selected to participate and ready to carry out the project. They seemed happy 
to be trusted to perform activities previously performed by Kandep and Cabang Dinas, and 
to be given control over resources previously allocated to those units. With more resources , 
4 Dr. Iskandar was a member of the technical team for regional autonomy. He made his suggestion in a 
meeting held to discuss the central grant system with a team from the University of Birmingham. Since the 
meeting was attended by most of the members of central technical team on regional autonomy, such an 
opportunity was also used to discuss the preparation of the pilot project on decentralization. I attended the 
meeting to represent Dr. Kristiadi of LAN. 
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they said, they were sure they could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local 
service provision in their regions. 5 
As part of the preparations for the implementation of the pilot project, the 
Department of Home Affairs also issued Instruction No. 45 of 1994 on the establishment of 
Technical Teams for Autonomy (Tim Teknis Otonomi) in the 26 provinces and in their pilot 
districts. These teams were expected to coordinate negotiations between the central and 
regional governments, prepare governors decisions related to the implementation of the 
pilot project, and report to the regional head as well as the central government on progress 
of the implementation of the pilot project. In addition, a technical meeting was held in 
Jakarta from 5 to 7 January 1995, between the Department of Home Affairs and the heads 
of the 26 pilot districts. This meeting was fallowed by another meeting with the district 
secretaries (Sekwilda Tingkat II) from 19 to 21 January 1995. 
Meanwhile, a government regulation, which would serve as the legal foundation for 
the implementation of the pilot project, was also being drafted at Silalahi' s office. Silalahi 
expected this regulation could be issued prior to the formal launching of the project, which 
was planned for 17 April 1995. All departments were informed about the plan. Most 
promised to support the implementation of the project with some conditions. Some 
departments, such as Education and Culture, Trade, Transmigration, Information, and 
Religion, however, openly opposed the project, particularly the proposal to abolish Kandep. 
The launching of the project was postponed to allow negotiations to take place between 
Silalahi's office and each department. While other departments finally agreed, after calling 
5 See interviews with some Bupati in Prisma April 1995:49-59. 
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for some revisions, the Minister of Information and the Minister of Religion refused to take 
part in the project.6 Despite their refusal, Silalahi proceeded with his plan. 
To obtain support from outside the bureaucracy, Silalahi also organized a meeting 
with scholars in related areas from several prominent universities. The meeting took place 
in his office in the first week of April 1995. Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and Dr. Amir 
Santoso from the University of Indonesia, and Dr. Amin Rais, Dr. Affan Gafar, and Dr. 
Sofyan Effendi from Gajah Mada University were among those who attended the meeting. 
As he expected, all scholars welcomed Silalahi's initiative, though some expressed concern 
about the lack of control over district heads. Affan Gafar saw decentralization as part of the 
effort to introduce good governance in Indonesia but was concerned about the possibility 
that additional power to the regions would make regional heads behave even more like 
"little kings" in their regions. Similarly, Dr. Amir Santoso worried about the possible abuse 
of power by regional heads due to the absence of an effective system of checks and balances 
at the local level. Dr. Amin Rais, who argued that the current system of regional 
government provided regional heads with both the opportunities and incentives for 
corruption, suggested that regional councils be empowered to control regional heads. Under 
the current system, he continued, only those with the quality of a Nabi (Prophet) could resist 
the temptation of corruption. He, therefore, argued the country should rely on a good system 
rather than good men. 7 
In response, Silalahi said he shared these concerns and agreed that controls over 
regional government bureauc-racy should be strengthened. But when the regulation was 
6 These two departments had unique role during the New Order period. While the Department of Information 
through its field offices aimed to building and maintaining support for the regime from the grass-root level, the 
Department of Religion through its field offices claimed that it prevented communism from spreading in rural 
areas. 
7 I attended the meeting to represent Dr. Kristiadi of LAN. 
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introduced a few days later, the need to empower the DPRD was not addressed at all. The 
government, unlike the scholars, did not seem to consider the empowerment of local 
councils as important. The reason was that decentralization had been long perceived by 
most bureaucrats as merely administrative. As Sumitro Maskun, Director General of 
Regional Autonomy (PUOD) of the Department of Home Affairs at that time, emphasized 
again and again, the concept of decentralization in Indonesia was limited only to the transfer 
of administrative responsibilities from the central to local bureaucracies. 8 
At the same time, Kompas daily, a leading national newspaper organized a 
discussion to welcome the implementation of the pilot project. Some scholars, bureaucrats 
and district chiefs were invited to the discussion.9 One of the issues raised during the 
discussion concerned the type of decentralization to be pursued. On this issue, the scholars 
tended to advocate the creation of semi-independent units that could manage their own 
affairs with minimal intervention from the centre. In contrast, the bureaucrats tended to 
focus only on the transfer of administrative responsibilities to local bureaucracy. 10 
Another important issue raised was about the dependency of local revenue on 
transfers from the central and provincial government. It was argued that such dependency 
be reduced in order to make the transfer of authority more effective in enhancing local 
autonomy. For this purpose, it was also suggested that the government reform fiscal 
relations to provide Dati II with sufficient revenue to finance their activities, and restructure 
the boundaries of Dati II by amalgamating small districts to give them enough natural 
wealth to support their activities. Rudini, who participated in the discussion, argued that the 
8 See Kompas, 11 April 1995 and Prisma, April 1995:60. 
9 The participants included Professor Hendra Esmara of Andalas University, Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti of 
the University of Indonesia, General Rudini (former Minister of Home Affairs), Sumitro Maskun of the 
Department of Home Affairs, Djabanten Damanik, the bupati of Simalungun, and Edhi Sanyoto , the bupati 
of Sidoarjo. 
10 See Kompas, 11 April 1995. 
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amalgamation of small districts would not be feasible in the short run because it could have 
political as well as financial implications, such as reducing the amount of grant money per 
capita received by the new combined districts. 
As discussed in Chapter V, the Central Government provided small regions with 
higher grants per capita because Inpres grants were given as a lump sum (fixed amount) to 
small regions. If those small districts were merged, the new combined districts would 
receive smaller grants per capita from the centre because the grants would no longer be 
given as a lump sum, but calculated based on population. District authorities could be 
expected to reject this policy. In addition, amalgamation would also result 1n many 
government positions being abolished. Reducing the number of eselon positions in local 
governments could be expected to weaken local bureaucrats' political support for the central 
government. 11 During the New Order government, appointments to the positions of head of 
dinas or divisions in local government had been an effective means for ensuring 
bureaucratic loyalty to the New Order leaders. Moreover, any reduction in the number of 
districts would also result in a reduction in the number of seats available for Golkar cadres 
in the local councils. Seats in local councils had been another type of reward to the loyalists. 
As Sumitro Maskun later admitted, the fear of losing local political support was, in fact, the 
real reason behind the government's objection to the amalgamation of small districts. 12 
On 24 April 1995 Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 on the transfer of part of 
the central and provincial responsibilities to 26 Dati II pilot was issued. The following day, 
President Suharto formally launched the pilot project. At the same time, the president also 
11 Eselon positions are position such as heads of directorates, divisions, or sub-divisions. The holders of eselon 
positions have the authority to make decisions. 
12 Republika, 15 January 1999. 
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declared 25 April as "regional autonomy day". In his speech during the ceremony, Suharto 
stated that, 
In implementing regional autonomy, the goal we wish to achieve is not uniformity. 
Uniformity regarding all aspects of our national character is already assured by the 
unitary nature of our nation. In regional autonomy, the focus of our attention is on 
the effectiveness, efficiency and harmony of governance in relation to the socio-
economic and cultural conditions of the regions. This means that in its 
implementation opportunities must be given to variation and differences, for 
example between agricultural districts in Java and Sumatra and maritime districts of 
Maluku. This can be seen as a realization of our nation's motto "unity in diversity". 
(taken from GTZ 1997:4). 
A few weeks later, in a speech to a leadership course organized by Lemhannas (Lembaga 
Pertahanan Nasional, or the National Resilience Institute), the think-thank of the 
Department of Defence and Security, Suharto also stressed that Indonesia must reassess the 
role the central government played in the country. As he said, "in an increasingly fast 
changing and interdependent world, there will be no place for a centralistic government, 
where all decisions are made by the central administration" .13 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 
Suharto's speech of 25 April 1995 implied that the intention of decentralization was 
not uniformity, but the ability to respond to local preferences in serving the public. This 
idea, however, was not really reflected in Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995. In fact this 
regulation introduced standard policies, programmes and procedures to the 26 pilot districts. 
This made some scholars consider the project an exercise in rhetoric. Professor Muhammad 
Ali of Hasanudin University, in a seminar conducted in Jakarta a few days later, even 
accused the central government of trying to buy time by introducing the project because he 
believed the government did not intend to make those districts autonomous. 
13 Jakarta Post, 11 May 1995. 
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Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 provided that all Kandep and Cabang Dinas 
located within the 26 pilot districts be abolished and their activities transferred to related 
. 
Dinas Tingkat II (service units under the district authorities). It also stated that activities, 
which could not be devolved, should be conducted in the form of medebewind (Article 5) . 
The regulation, however, did not stipulate how the transfer should be made. Neither did it 
indicate how the devolved functions were to be distinguished from those of medebewind. 
The regulation also stipulated that the concerned authority could withdraw the transferred 
tasks if the regions did not properly perform them. Again, no criteria were set on how those 
agencies would assess the performance of the district government in carrying out transferred 
tasks. 
To enable them to carry out the transferred tasks, district authorities were allowed to 
form new service units (dinas). But the formation of those new dinas should be in 
accordance with guidelines prepared by the Department of Home Affairs. These guidelines 
could be expected to limit the room for local initiative in designing the organizational 
structure. Moreover, in establishing new dinas, district authorities were to seek approval 
from Men. PAN. 
To strengthen the capacity of district authorities, the regulation also required that the 
personnel of Kandep and Cabang Dinas be transferred to the pilot district authorities. Their 
ministers, in the case of staff from Kandep, and governors in the case of staff from Cabang 
Dinas, should make the necessary secondments. In making the secondments , ministers and 
governors were required to consider the concerns of the Department of Home Affairs and 
the National Board for the Administration of Civil Servants (Badan Administrasi 
Kepegawaian Negara or BAKN). This implied that these two agencies would have some 
influence over the choice of who would be seconded. The regulation also stated that the 
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concerned minister or governor could terminate the secondment, provided that approval was 
obtained from the district chief prior to the termination. 
Staff seconded to the district level, according to Article 8 of the regulation, should 
be granted at least the same level position as they previously had in their former offices. 
This stipulation was intended to encourage staff from the central and provincial staff to 
work for the district government. Theoretically, this policy meant that most of the new 
eselon positions created, as a result of the formation of new dinas, would be filled by 
seconded staff, as they were generally more experienced, especially in technical matters. 
However, authority for appointing lower-level eselon IV and eselon V positions was given 
to the district chiefs, who tended to appoint local staff rather than the transferred staff. 
The governor would make the appointment of the dinas chief from candidates 
proposed by the district chief. In nominating candidates, the district chief was to seek 
approval from related technical departments. This was because the technical or sectoral 
departments were responsible for the training and education of provincial and district staff 
in technical matters. 
It was also stipulated in the regulation that the transferred functions be financed by 
the local budget. To allow local budgets to cover these additional expenditures, Regulation 
No. 8/1995 provided that funds previously allocated to Kandep and Cabang Dinas be shifted 
to the district level. The reallocation, according to the regulation, should start in fiscal year 
1995/1996. The amount reallocated would be at least the same as the budget allocated to 
Kandep and Cabang Dinas in fiscal year 1994/1995. To implement this provision, the 
National Development Planning Board, together with the Department of Finance and the 
Department of Home Affairs were instructed to prepare details. 
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In addition to the budget, sectoral departments and provincial governments were 
also obliged to transfer their assets, such as office buildings, furniture and machinery, which 
had previously belonged to the Kandep and Cabang Dinas. These transfers , according to 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995, should be done in accordance with regulations in 
force. 
Government regulation No. 8 of 1995 also empowered central departments to guide 
and supervise the implementation of the transferred tasks by the district authorities. Sectoral 
departments were charged with responsibility to guide and supervise the dinas in technical 
matters while the Department of Home Affairs was responsible in administrative affairs. In 
addition, the regulation also stipulated that the progress of the pilot project was to be 
evaluated by the central government after two years of implementation. Indicators and 
procedures for evaluation were to be defined by the central government. 
It was clear from the stipulations in Regulation No. 8 of 1995 that the main concern 
of the central government was to transfer responsibility for providing local services from the 
Kandep and Cabang Dinas to units under the district government and to ensure that those 
units were able to perform the transferred functions according to the central government's 
wishes. Functions that were not performed according to the central standard would be 
recentralized. Thus, the focus was on strengthening the capacity of local bureaucrats. The 
issue of local participation in decision-making did not seem to be important and the role of 
local councils in channelling local aspirations tended to be ignored. Therefore, no effort was 
introduced to empower the DPRD. 
Affan Gafar from Gajahmada University, for example, felt sceptical that the project 
would bring greater regional autonomy. He was concern·ed about the absence of any attempt 
to empower local councils in the project. He implied that regional autonomy would not 
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work without strong DPRDs. He regretted the use of Law No. 5 of 1974 as the basis for 
developing the project because the concept of regional autonomy put forward in this law 
was quite misleading. In Law No. 5 of 1974, the DPRD was in effect made part of the local 
bureaucracy. This law, he argued, should have been long replaced (Prisma, April 1995). 
Similarly, Rudini, the former Minister of Home Affairs and now chairman of a private 
think-tank, the Institute for Strategic Studies, also criticized the project's emphasis on 
strengthening of local bureaucracy. He was also concerned about the government's 
tendency to undermine the importance of local participation in decision-making. He argued, 
"The quest for regional autonomy cannot be separated from that of democracy, which 
requires greater public participation in all decision-making processes" .14 
Actually, the need to encourage public participation had always been emphasized by 
central officials. They, however, tended to perceive participation as the material 
contributions populations make toward projects initiated by the government, in the form of 
labour, money or land for physical infrastructure. The idea of having the DPRD play a 
leading role in making decisions over the transferred functions was seen as a strange 
practice by many bureaucrats. 15 
The Transfer of Responsibilities 
To implement Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995, each province issued its own 
regulations, stating the types of tasks transferred to its pilot district. As an example, in the 
Province of West Java, five urusan16 were surrendered through the Provincial Regulation 
(Peraturan Daerah or Perda Tingkat I) No. 13 of 1995. In the Province of East Java, seven 
14 See Jakarta Post, 11 August 1995. 
15 See discussion about Public Policy in Indonesia in Chapter 1. 16 The word urusan is sometimes used to refer to sub-sector, function, or task. Therefore, responsibilities 
surrendered by those two provinces were more or less the same. 
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urusan were decentralized through Perda Tingkat I No. 1 of 1995. On 4 May 1995, a 
ceremony was held in all participating districts to mark the formal transfer of 
responsibilities from the central and provincial governments to the 26 districts that 
participated in the project. Nevertheless, the real transfer did not take place until 1996. The 
obstacles were both technical and political. 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 provided a list of activities to be transferred 
to the Dati II. But the mechanism through which the transfer would be made was still not 
clear. In Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992, it was mentioned that the central 
departments could surrender part of their functions directly to the district authorities or 
indirectly through the provincial government. But detailed procedures were still to be 
written. In fact, the procedures were never issued. The draft proposed by the Department of 
Home Affairs was seen as too general and rejected by the Office of the State Secretary. 17 
In addition, the State prepared the list of the transferred functions for the State 
Apparatus with inadequate consultation with related parties, such as the sectoral 
departments and regional governments. It was not surprising that some technical problems 
arose during implementation. Moreover, sectoral departments as well as provincial 
governments believed many of the activities listed in the regulation could not be assigned to 
the district level. Officials from the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus, 
they said, should have considered the technical nature of each task in deciding what was 
best performed at the district level. They further argued that differences among the 26 
districts should have been taken into account, and that pilot districts should not have been 
. h ff . 18 given t e same type o unctions. 
17 Based on interview to Mr. Widodo Yusuf from the Department of Home Affairs. 
18 Based on interview to officials from both the Department of Home Affairs and the technical Departments. 
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Gustav Panjaitan, Special Assistant to Men. PAN on regional autonomy, however, 
denied the accusation that the list was arbitrarily made by his office. He argued that all 
activities performed at district level were related to the provision of local needs, and 
therefore would be better carried out by local authorities. He agreed that ideally, different 
sets of activities should have been assigned to different districts. But he found that criteria 
for assessing the appropriate functions for a particular district could not be easily defined . 
. Therefore, he proposed that the same set of responsibilities be given to all districts. If 
districts later proved to be incapable of carrying out some of the assigned tasks, the 
concerned departments or provinces could withdraw those tasks. He believed that only 
through such trial and error would the government be able to define what a particular 
district best performed. 19 
Many ministers and governors, however, refused to adopt this approach. They 
believed once the authority over a function was transferred to another party, it would not be 
easy to regain control. Moreover, mechanisms for withdrawing transferred tasks were not 
clear in the regulation. It was not surprising that they refused to surrender all the tasks listed 
in Regulation No. 8/1995. On the contrary, they insisted on determining for themselves 
what they would assign to the district level. 
To see the project implemented, Silalahi finally agreed to negotiate with each 
Department and provincial government. 20 Unfortunately, district authorities were not 
included in the negotiations. Even though the project was implemented within the 
framework of DPOD, it was not its chairman, the Minister of Home Affairs, but Silalahi, 
who negotiated with sectoral departments. As an official of the Department of Home Affairs 
19 Based on interview with Mr. Pandjaitan in April 199. 
20 The district authorities were not involved in the negotiation. 
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admitted, this was intentional. As the State Minister for the Utilization of the State 
Apparatus, Silalahi had a better bargaining position with all departments than Rudini. 
As previously mentioned, Men. PAN was empowered to decide the size of every 
government agency at the central as well as local level. This ministry also decided the scope 
of the mandate to be performed by each agency, its organizational structure, the number of 
staff to be employed by this agency, and the number of managerial positions in this agency. 
With his position, it was not difficult for Silalahi to make all technical departments and 
provincial governments agree to abolish their Kandep and Cabang Dinas. On the other hand, 
most departments managed to maintain some control over decentralized functions by 
keeping some authority over those functions at their Kanwil. The Department of Trade, for 
example, agreed to surrender the function to regulate small business to its district trade 
office (Dinas Perdagangan). But its Kanwil retained the authority to issue regulations and 
permits for the establishment of small enterprises. District authorities were only given 
responsibility to disseminate the central government's policy to shop owners and street 
vendors and to ensure their compliance with regulations. Similarly, the Department of 
Health agreed to transfer responsibility to provide primary health care to the district health 
office (Dinas Kesehatan Tingkat II). The authority to regulate medical practice and drug 
selling was, however, retained by its Kanwil. It needs to be borne in mind, of course, that 
the central agencies wanted to retain the authority to issue permits for this would allow them 
to control the fees collected. 
This tendency made the division of power and responsibility between the centre and 
the regions more intricate. The distribution of functions tended to follow a marble cake 
model, where responsibility for performing some functions was shared by the three different 
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levels of government. 21 As responsibility was shared, the three levels became highly 
interrelated and dependent on each other. Under such a situation, it was difficult to expect 
local authorities to exercise discretion over functions that had been devolved to them. In this 
sense, local autonomy did not really exist. 
During negotiations, Silalahi tended to max1rmze the number of tasks to be 
transferred rather than emphasizing functions, which could enhance local autonomy. As a 
result, many of the transferred tasks did not need substantive decision-making by local 
authorities. One example was the authority to maintain national roads. This activity was the 
responsibility of the central government, in this case, the Department of Public Works. 
However, implementation had been long delegated to provincial Public Works Offices 
(Dinas PU Tingkat I). Since the field offices of Dinas PU Tingkat I that were located at the 
district level were responsible for implementation, Silalahi wanted this activity to be 
delegated to the District Public Works Office (Dinas PU Tingkat II). Officials in the 
Department of Public Works saw this policy as conceptually misleading because delegating 
maintenance of major highways would add nothing to the autonomy of the regions. 
Moreover, they also wondered whether those districts had the technical capacity to properly 
maintain national roads and bridges. But the Minister of Public Works was forced to give 
the district authorities a chance to prove they were capable of doing such a job. Realizing 
that rejection of the transfer would have some impact on the future existence of his 
ministry, he finally agreed with such arrangement.22 District officials who expected the 
delegation of this task would bring more projects-and more central funds--to the district 
level welcomed the decision. Two years later, however, the quality of national roads proved 
21 See Wright ' s inclusive authority model (Wright, 1992:23-25) 
22 Since the early 1990s, there had been rumours that the Department of Public Works was to be abolished. 
This Department was finally merged with the Department of Housing in 1999. 
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to be deteriorating; the officials of the Department of Public Works blamed Men. PAN for 
the problem. 
Another example was the registration of the population, which is done in exactly the 
same way all over the country, and therefore, adds nothing to district autonomy. Dr. Beier 
from GTZ argued that medebewind would be more appropriate than devolution for such an 
activity. But an official from the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
urged that this activity be decentralized to Dati II. He argued that this activity needed to be 
carried out near the people. The real reason behind his argument was that a certain fee was 
imposed for the registration of births, deaths, and marriages and this activity would certainly 
become a source of revenue to local authorities. Men. PAN was desperate to give more 
functions that generated funds to local authorities.23 
The dominant role of Silalahi in the negotiations sometimes compelled departments 
and governors to accept his decision. But at the stage of implementation, some tried to avoid 
what had been agreed. One example related to the abolition of the field office of the 
Provincial Taxation Office (Cabang Dinas Pendapatan Tingkat I), which collected 
provincial taxes at the local level. The Provincial Government of East Java refused to 
abolish this unit on the grounds that authority to collect provincial tax could not be devolved 
to the district authorities. But Men. PAN insisted that no cabang dinas be allowed to remain 
at the district level. The provincial government finally accepted this decision and agreed to 
delegate the collection of provincial taxes to the Dinas Pendapatan Tingkat. II (the District 
Taxation Office) of Sidoarjo. But soon after the provincial cabang dinas was abolished by 
Men. PAN, the provincial government transferred the task to the Provincial Taxation Office. 
To implement this task, a field office was re-established but under a different name (Kantor 
23 Based on interview with Dr. Beier, in April 1997. 
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Pelayanan Pendapatan Daerah Tingkat I). Meanwhile, an additional unit was set up under 
the District Taxation Office to collect provincial taxes. 24 
The Department of Education and Culture (Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan) used the same strategy to maintain its control at lower levels . This Department 
agreed to abolish its field office at the district level (Kandep Dikbud), but transferred 
responsibility to supervise the implementation of the national curriculum for elementary 
education to its Kanwil at the provincial level. Following the abolition of its Kandep, this 
Department also established an Inspection Unit (Kantor Inspeksi or Kanin) at sub-district 
level, to carry out the former task of the Kandep Dikbud. In the end, the District Dinas of 
Education and Culture was left with few things to do. 
In some cases, Silalahi had to go along with the demands of the provincial 
authorities and sectoral departments. One example related to the authority over water 
resources. The provincial government of East Java openly refused to surrender this authority 
to Kabupaten Sidoarjo. They argued decisions made over the management of water 
resources affected more than one district. In Regulation No. 45 of 1992, it was stated that a 
higher level of government should manage such an activity. Another argument was that 
transferring responsibility to Sidoarjo could create conflict between this district and 
neighbouring districts, especially over the maintenance and exploitation of water resources. 
Such conflict might threaten sustainability of the water resources. For these reasons, the 
Governor of East Java withdrew this authority from Kabupaten Sidoarjo. Men. PAN 
apparently realized the importance of externalities and decided to accept these arguments. 
24 Based on interview with Mr. Aspiyak, the Head of Division for Social Economic Affairs, at the District 
Planning and Development Unit, Kabupaten Sidoarjo, in May 1997. 
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The provincial government of East Java was allowed to keep authority over the 
management of water resources and other provinces adopted the same policy.25 
In the end, the central and provincial governments retained many responsibilities 
that were supposed to devolve to the district level. This development disappointed district 
officials. The officials of Kabupaten Sidoarjo, for example, regretted Silalahi's 
inconsistency in implementing decentralization policy.26 They argued that the reluctance of 
central and provincial officials to surrender powers to the district level was mainly 
motivated by fear of losing the best sources of revenue. They gave as an example the 
authority over the use of water resources. They believed that the transfer of such an 
authority to the district level would not harm the quality of those resources because a 
consensus on how those resources should be managed could be reached between their 
district and neighbouring districts, which also benefited from those water resources. 
However, as a local official said, revenue collected from the fees for the use of ground 
water was so much that the provincial government was not willing to lose its control over 
such a lucrative income source. And, for the same reason, the district wanted to control it. 
When interviewed, the local official also questioned the legality of the governor' s / 
decision to overrule Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995. In the Indonesian legal system, 
a governor's decision ranks lower than a government regulation. Therefore, he considered 
the governor's decision to retain authority over water resources as illegal. This problem, he 
said, had been reported to the Central Supervision Team. But no action was taken by the 
central government. This exacerbated the conflict between district and provincial 
authorities. This conflict was further aggravated by the fact that compensation for sand and 
25 Based on interview with Mrs. Sutimah, chief of the Legal Bureau of the province of East Java. 
26 Based on interview with Mr. Nur Tojib, Head of Division for Organization and Procedures, and Mr. 
Asfiyak, Head of Division for Social and Cultural, the District of Sidoarjo, East Java. 
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gravel extraction (tambang galian C) was still collected by the provincial government, even 
though this power had been decentralized through Regulation No. 8/1995 to the district 
level. The kabupaten only received a percentage of the revenue. 
When an evaluation was conducted in 1997, all the pilot districts complained about 
the tendency of the central and provincial governments to retain their authority to issue 
permits. This practice, they said, left district authorities with the burden to finance all the 
transferred functions without producing revenue for the district government. But when 
district authorities were later given the opportunity to propose functions they considered as 
better assigned to them, they tended to include all activities that could generate revenue. 
j They did not seem concerned that those tasks would not provide room for local initiatives. 
This showed that the main intention of local authorities was to gain control over sources of 
revenue rather than to have more autonomy in planning and decision making over local 
ff · 27 a airs. 
Tran sf er of Personnel 
To allow the pilot districts to carry out the transferred tasks, Government Regulation 
No. 8/95 required that the personnel of Kandep and Cabang Dinas be transferred to the 
district level. 28 In practice, the central and provincial authorities released lower-level 
administrative staff from their Kandep and Cabang Dinas, but retained most senior and 
well-trained staff, especially those with technical expertise. They argued that this was due to 
their concern about the future careers of those staff. They would rather retain their senior 
staff if the district chief could not guarantee appropriate eselon positions to them. 
27 Self-assessments were done by regional authorities in 1997, but sponsored by the GTZ. 28 The central civil servants working at Kandep and Cabang Dinas apparently had better qualification, 
especially in technical matters. 
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Actually, the establishment of a number of new dinas had doubled the number of 
eselon positions available at the district level. In Kabupaten Bandung, for example, the 
number of eselon positions increased by 250 in 1996.29 Most district chiefs, however, 
tended to appoint local staff to such positions. As previously mentioned, Government 
Regulation No. 8 of 1995 gave the district head the authority to appoint officials to eselon 
IV and V positions, and the nomination of officials to eselon III. In Kabupaten Bandung, for 
example, Bupati Hatta Djatipermana allowed a maximum of fifty percent of newly created 
positions to be taken by staff transferred from higher levels of government. As a 
consequence, many of the former staff of Kandep and Cabang Dinas was withdrawn to 
provincial or even to central levels by their superiors. 
Another reason for withdrawing staff was due to the complexity of the process itself. 
The transfers of senior staff (rank III/ a and above) usually took a long time because, 
according to the government's policy, transfer had to be processed through several agencies 
in Jakarta.30 Moreover, approval of the list of staff to be transferred had, in practice, to be 
obtained from the district chief prior to submission to BAKN.31 This approval process 
became the main source of delays.32 The chief of Kanwil PU in the province of West Java, 
for example, said he had been waiting for almost two years for the Bupati' s approval of the 
list of staff he proposed to be transferred to Kabupaten Bandung. One of his staff speculated 
that the delay was intentional in order to provide more opportunity for local staff to be 
appointed as managers for the implementation of some infrastructure projects, which were 
29 See Info PAN, July 1996. 
30 The Indonesian civil service is divided into four service ranks (golongan), and each rank is further divided 
into four to five grades. Altogether there are 17 service levels: Ia to Id, Ila to Ild, Illa to Illd, IVa to IVe. For 
each service level, there is a minimum educational requirement. The minimum requirement for rank Illa is a 
university degree. The central level, even for regional staff, does the recruitment for university graduates. The 
authority of regional government is limited to the recruitment and management of those with diploma 
qualifications and below. 
31 Government Regulation No. 8/1995 did not mention at all about this kind of approval. 
32 In the case of lower ranking staff, the transfer could be made directly to the district level. 
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being delegated to the districts. Since status as a local official became one of the 
requirements imposed by the district chief for the appointment as a local project manager, 
those who formally still belonged to the central government would not be eligible for such a 
position. This speculation later proved to be true. In fiscal year of 1997 /1998, most project 
managers for public works projects were appointed from local staff who mostly had neither 
relevant educational background nor appropriate experience in related business. This made 
the officials of the Department of Public Works and the National Development Planning 
Board worry about the deterioration in the quality of services, which were now managed at 
the district level.33 
In East Java, a different mechanism was initiated. The lists of staff to be transferred 
were proposed by Kanwil heads through the governor. Interestingly, the approval of the lists 
submitted by the Bupati of Sidoarjo was immediately issued because the governor, his 
superior, had endorsed the lists.34 But again, transfer of staff with technical backgrounds 
could not be fully implemented because only a few relevant positions were made available 
for them at the district level. As a consequence, from 197 staff with university degrees 
proposed to be seconded, only 116 were finally accepted by the Kabupaten Sidoarjo 
(Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 1997:6). 
Actually, many of the local staff also held university degrees, but mostly in the field 
of administration and government. 35 Those who had technical or engineering backgrounds 
tended to work for the central government because the central government provided more 
33 Interview with some staff and the head of the regional office of the Department of Public Works in West Java province. 
34 Interview with I Djaelani, head of Dinas PU Tingkat I in East Java province, and his assistants , May 1997. 35 In Kabupaten Bandung, before the project, only 13 out of 213 university graduates had technical backgrounds (engineering, agriculture). After the project the number increased to 44. 
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opportunities for career advancement.36 Therefore, many officials saw the idea of staff 
secondment as an effective solution to the problem of lack of professional staff at local 
level, especially in poor and remote districts, which could not provide financial incentives to 
attract fresh graduates from prominent universities. Moreover, staff secondment was also 
regarded as part of the effort to streamline central and provincial bureaucracies. 
Unfortunately, local officials were quite reluctant to accept those seconded staff for they 
saw them as potential competitors. Concentration of professional staff at the central level 
had made it difficult for the central government to reduce its role in the business of local 
government. This situation also contributed to the slow progress of decentralization in 
Indonesia. 
Transfer of Equipment 
Regulation 8 of 1995 also required that all equipment that previously belonged to 
Kandep and Cabang Dinas, including those controlled by their projects, be to be given to 
related units under the Dati II. This policy was expected to enable newly established dinas 
to effectively carry out the transferred tasks. In making this decision, however, the State 
Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus did not realize that, in practice, some 
Kandep and Cabang Din as provided services for more than one district. This made the 
transfer of equipment difficult. 
One example was the experience of the Cabang Dinas Bina Marga ( a field office of the 
provincial Dinas of Public -W:orks), located in the City of Bandung. This unit had been 
charged with maintaining national and regional roads and bridges within the territories of 
Kabupaten Bandung and Kotamadya Bandung. When its responsibility for Kabupaten 
36 As staff members of a district government, the highest position they could reach was eselon III. 
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Bandung was transferred to the district dinas of public works, the chief of Cabang Dinas 
refused to surrender its equipment. He argued that his office had responsibility to maintain 
roads and bridges in Kotamadya Bandung, and to perform this responsibility his office still 
needed the equipment. Since Kotamadya Bandung was not participating in the pilot project, 
its Cabang Dinas Bina Marga, which served this territory, was retained. But part of its tasks 
was transferred to Kabupaten Bandung. He further argued that, considering the workload of 
the Dinas of Public Works in Kabupaten Bandung, it would not be efficient if the equipment 
were given to the district dinas. If the Cabang Dinas retained the equipment, other districts 
in West Java province could still share its use. A similar problem was faced by the Cabang 
Dinas Bina Marga in the City of J ambi, which not only served Kotamadya J ambi but also 
Kabupaten Batanghari, one of the participating districts. 
The Cabang Dinas LLAJR (Lalu Lintas Angkutan Jalan Raya or Land 
Transportation and Traffic Control) also experienced the same problem. This unit was 
responsible for conducting engine-safety examinations of motor vehicles. For efficiency 
reasons, it served more than one district. When one of those districts participated in the 
decentralization project, the same issue arose of whether the equipment should be retained 
by the Cabang Dinas or surrendered to the local authority. The governor of East Java, for 
example, decided that not only the equipment, but also the responsibility for conducting 
motor-vehicle examinations be withdrawn to the Dinas LLAJR at provincial level. But the 
Kabupaten Sidoarjo challenged this decision and appealed to the central government. Their 
argument was that trus task had been transferred to their kabupaten through Perda Tingkat I 
No. 1 of 1995 and based on trus legislation, the district council has also issued a district 
regulation (Perda Tingkat II) to assign trus task to one of the units under the district 
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government. Like in the case of revenue for sand and gravel extraction, Sidoarjo's appeal 
did not receive a response from the central government (Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 1997: 12). 
The case above shows that in deciding which tasks were to be assigned to the district 
authorities, the central government ignored such factors as economies of scale. Actually in 
Government Regulation No. 45 of 1992, it was stated that functions, which would be 
handled more efficiently at the provincial or even national level, should not be assigned to 
the district level. But the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus did not 
intend to strictly use the criteria defined in Regulation No. 45 of 1992. As noted by the GTZ 
team, there were indications that other considerations were more important in many cases 
(1997:15). 
The process of transferring equipment to the district authorities was hampered by the 
fact that the existing mechanism was so complex. Approval was needed not only from the 
Department of Finance, but also from the DPR for the transfer of central assets or from the 
DPRD Tingkat I for the transfer of provincial assets. The process was particularly difficult 
if the equipment was purchased through foreign aid. As a consequence, district governments 
usually only received office buildings, furniture and simple office equipment such as 
manual typewriters. 
The Expansion of Local Government Organization 
As previously mentioned, the pilot districts were allowed to form new dinas to allow 
them to properly carry out the newly transferred functions. To accommodate variations 
among those districts, no maximum number of new dinas to be added was set in Regulation 
No. 8/1995. Such a policy enabled those districts, including Kabupaten Bandung and 
Kabupaten Sidoarjo, to create as many dinas as possible in order to maximize the number of 
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eselon positions available at the district level. 37 District authorities had more incentives 
because any increase in the number of dinas would automatically bring an increase in the 
amount of SDO received from the central government (see chapter 5). It was not surprising 
if the number of dinas, which ranged from 10 or 11 in early 1995, increased to 25 and even 
27 in some districts by the end of 1997 (see Table 6.3). 
Rapid expansion in the organization of local government brought the consequence 
that many of the newly created dinas had too few tasks to do. The District Trade Office 
(Dinas Perdagangan), for example, only had the responsibility to supervise street vendors, 
and small shops. But, its size was quite big, with five divisions and more than twenty sub-
divisions, following the structure for the largest dinas permitted by the Department of Home 
Affairs.38 The organizational structure of the District Transmigration Office (Dinas 
Transmigrasi Tingkat II), which had responsibility to disseminate information about the 
Transmigration Program, also followed this structure. The tendency to adopt the structure 
for the largest dinas caused not only a rapid increase in the number of eselon positions, but 
also increased the number of staff employed by the pilot districts. This was because the 
formation of new dinas also gave local authorities an opportunity to recruit new staff. As 
discussed above, there were more incentives than disincentives for local government to 
create as many positions as they could. This tendency was especially evident in Kabupaten 
Bandung. The number of local staff in this kabupaten increased from 4,175 in 1995 to 9,534 
in 1997 .39 This increase was mainly a result of new recruitment. This situation had caused 
37 In Indonesia, eselon positions were often used to reward obedient staff or to ensure staff's loyalty to their 
superior. Having an eselon position meant receiving additional income and having better facilities. 
38 The Department of Home Affairs introduced a maximum type and a minimum type of organizational 
structure of local government. It was expected that small districts would adopt the minimum type, but most 
districts insisted on the maximum type. 
39 Approval from Men.PAN for recruiting new staff was not always easy to get, and therefore, part of the new 
staff were non-permanent and paid through the local budget. 
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local expenditures for routine activities, particularly for salaries, in the pilot districts to 
increase dramatically. 
The expansion of local government organizations also created a need to review the 
division of tasks and functions among all units under the local government. This was due to 
the fact that, before the project, some central departments had already delegated part of their 
tasks to district authorities. If an appropriate dinas did not exist, the Bupati was free to 
assign these tasks to any of the existing units under his or her authority. To avoid 
overlapping, new arrangements needed to be made. The need to rearrange the assignment of 
tasks and functions, however, was not always recognized by district authorities. This often 
created tension between newly established dinas and units that had existed before the 
project. 
One example was the authority to issue permits for the use of land for industrial or 
medium-scale housing complexes. This authority had been delegated by the Directorate 
General of Human Settlements (Direktorat General Cipta Karya) in the Department of 
Public Works to the district level in the late 1980s. Since Dinas Cipta Karya did not exist at 
that time, in most districts this task was assigned to Bappeda Tingkat II (Local Development 
and Planning Office). But when Dinas Cipta Karya was formed under the pilot project, there 
was an issue whether these responsibilities would be better assigned to the newly 
established dinas or kept by Bappeda. 
In Kabupaten Bandung, the head of Dinas Cipta Karya demanded that the authority 
be transferred from Bappeda to her office. Her argument was that all tasks, which formerly 
fell into the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Human Settlements, should be 
assigned to Dinas Cipta Karya. But the official of Bappeda rejected to surrender the 
authority for issuing permit for the use of land. He argued that Dinas Cipta Karya had been 
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given the authority to issue building permits, and therefore, it was fair if the authority to 
issue land-use permits was retained by the Bappeda for it did not have any other source of 
income. The Bupati seemed to agree with this arrangement. Thus, instead of dealing only 
with one unit, investors who wanted to build housing estates had to seek approval from both 
Bappeda for a land-use permit and Dinas Cipta Karya for a building permit. 
This example suggests why the project's objective to increase the efficiency of the 
provision of services was difficult to achieve. Even though the establishment of pelayanan 
satu atap (one-stop service) to customers had been advised under the project in order to 
shorten the bureaucratic chain in the provision of public services, the tendency of each unit 
to want to have its own source of revenue hindered this effort. 
Financing the Transferred Tasks 
Regulation No. 8 of 1995 stated that transferred tasks should be financed through 
local budgets. To increase the local budget, this regulation required that all budgets 
associated with . the transferred tasks be shifted to the district level. To implement this 
policy, the Department of Finance and the National Development Planning Board were 
instructed to work on the details. Soon after the launching of the project, the Department of 
Finance reallocated the budget for routine activities previously given to Kandep and Cabang 
Dinas to the district level through SDO (the central subsidy for routine expenditures).40 The 
sectoral budget for development activities, however, could not easily be shifted to the 
district level as its allocations were calculated based on a very complex formula. According 
to Dr. Deddi Supriyadi from the National Development Planning Board, the right formula 
40 This was quite simple because the allocations of the routine budget were basically calculated based on the 
number of staff working in each district. 
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for defining how much should be reallocated was not easy to define. Different formulae 
needed to be applied for different sectors. The National Development Planning Board tried 
to find a solution by assessing the needs in each district based on proposals submitted by 
district authorities. But this idea was abandoned because district proposals looked more like 
shopping lists. 
There was also a problem in choosing the right mechanism for channelling funds. So 
far, the allocation of development budgets through sectoral departments had been seen as an 
effective strategy for ensuring continued economic growth. Therefore, many officials from 
this agency preferred funds be given to district authorities in the form of specific grants. 
They feared that giving the funds in the form of block grants to the district authorities would 
have a negative impact on the future progress of national development in the country. One 
official at the National Development Planning Board admitted that his colleagues still did 
not trust district chiefs. It made sense that they wanted to have some control over the use of 
these funds. They realized that specific grants would undermine district autonomy, but 
because a system of checks and balances was not in place, they felt central control was still 
necessary. 41 
Officials of the Department of Home Affairs were divided over this issue. While 
those from Directorate General of Regional Development (Pembangunan Daerah or 
Bangda) tended to prefer that funds be channelled as specific grants, many in the 
Directorate General of Regional Autonomy (PUOD) wanted funds to be given in the form 
of block grants. Again, their preferences were very much influenced by the position of their 
organization. While the former Directorate General controlled the allocation of specific 
grants through its guidelines, the latter had authority to ratify local budgets. This again 
41 Based on interview to Max Pohan of Bappenas in July 1997. 
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demonstrated the accusation that each party was only concerned about how to maximize the 
amount of funds under its control.42 
In Fiscal year 1997 /1998, the National Development Planning Board failed to 
transfer funds from sectoral budget allocations to the 26 pilot districts. This delay 
disappointed district officials. They complained that the central government gave them only 
the responsibilities, but not the resources needed to carry out those responsibilities. They 
also felt betrayed. Instead of increasing local autonomy, they said, the pilot project only 
increased the financial burdens on local government. In response, Dr. Ginanjar 
Kartasasmita, chairman of the National Development Planning Board, tried to convince 
each technical Department to shift a portion of its budget to the district authorities. In 
March 1997, he managed to convince Radinal Mochtar, Minister of Public Works, to 
convert half of the budget for developing urban infrastructure into an Inpres fund for the 
district level. Public Works retained the other half of the budget for the purpose of preparing 
technical guidelines for district authorities in managing local infrastructure. 43 In addition, 
Radinal also agreed to give funds in the form of block grants. But a few months later, the 
Directorate General of Regional Development of the Department of Home Affairs issued 
guidelines for the use of the newly introduced Inpres fund. These guidelines disappointed 
not only the officials of the Department of Public Works but also district authorities. To 
some officials, this incident provided evidence that the real intention of the Department of 
42 From several sources, including Widodo Yusuf and Dr. Susongko· of the Department of Home Affairs. 43 One officer saw such a deal as an exchange for Ginanjar's decision to give the Department of Public Works 
the authority to coordinate the implementation of a bigger project, the opening of 1 million hectares of wet land in Central Kalimantan. Such a rumour was, however, dismissed by Mr. Sidabutar, one of Radinal's 
special assistants. He argued that Radinal had long been a strong advocate of decentralization. He was actually 
the important figure behind the introduction of Regulation No. 14 of 1987 on the transfer of part of the 
responsibilities in the field of public works to the regional level. By doing so, Radinal expected that his Department would focus its activities on the development of large-scale infrastructure and on the improvement 
of the quality of human resources in the field of public works. 
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Home Affairs was not to strengthen regional autonomy, but to gain control over resources 
transferred from other departments to the district level. This incident also made it more 
difficult for the National Development Planning Board to encourage other departments to 
follow Radinal 's move. 
Basically, the sectoral budget could not serve as a reliable source of funds for the 
districts. This was because continuity of this source could not be guaranteed. The types and 
sizes of sectoral projects implemented in a particular district might differ from time to time, 
depending on the priority set by sectoral departments. Moreover, such uncertainty could be 
expected to encourage each district to negotiate with each . This would create room for 
collusion between the central officials and local bureaucrats. Therefore, total reform in the 
existing fiscal system was necessary to give authorities a more stable and sufficient source 
of revenue. But any effort to draft such a law always confronted the problem of whether to 
introduce a revenue-sharing system or to centralize collection of main taxes but redistribute 
the revenue according to the specific needs of each region. Proponents and opponents for 
the two options were more or less balanced. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the system of Inpres funds was still preferred by many in the central bureaucracy as it 
allowed the centre to have some control over the use of the central transfers. 
The long delay in reforming fiscal relations also caused regional governments to 
introduce a variety of taxes and user charges (retribusi), In 1996, approximately 50 different 
categories of taxes and 5 8 types of fees were collected by provincial governments and 
another 50 types of taxes and 134 types of charges were collected by district authorities. 
Many of those taxes and charges overlapped with each other. Tax on restaurants and hotels, 
for example, overlapped with value-added tax. Tax on entertainment, another example, 
overlapped with sales tax. Most of these taxes and charges were introduced by regional 
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heads without the approval of local councils. This practice was motivated by the fact that 
local revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or PAD) was the only source that could be used 
freely by district authorities for locally initiated projects. This practice, according to Fajrul 
Falaak from Gajahmada University, was also strengthened by the tendency of each unit 
under local government to have its own sources of off-budget funds. 44 
The need to finance the newly transferred tasks provided local authorities with 
another justification to extend and intensify their collection of local taxes and charges. Each 
district, for example, built its own bus terminal, and a small fee was imposed on all buses 
going through the terminal. In addition, passengers were charged with uang peron, a small 
fee for entering the terminal area.45 Tax on the use of street lamps, another example, was 
imposed on all villages, even some that had yet to be connected to the electricity supply. 
Fees were also imposed on those who parked their cars not only on the street but also in the 
front yards of factories or private office buildings. The fact that private companies, which 
were often owned by the Bupati 's relatives, collected these taxes and fees also raised the 
issue of KKN (Kolusi, Korupsi dan Nepotisme or Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism). 
Over time, the situation became unbearable for many business people. In early 1996, 
the Association of Real Estates of East Kalimantan, for example, complained to Governor 
Ardans about the number of local fees they paid. They argued that one seventh of the total 
cost for building a very simple social housing unit (rumah sangat sederhana, RSS) was 
spent on local taxes and fees. At the same time, the Association of Real Estates in Ujung 
Pandang, South Sulawesi, also claimed that 25% of the total cost for social housing went to 
44 Kompas, 14 March 1996. 
45 Prof. Ichlasul Amal from Gajahmada University once told a story in a seminar about his student's 
experience travelling from Yogyakarta to Wonosobo (approximately 200 kilometres). This student had to pay 
uang peron at three different terminals, in Yogyakarta, Magelang, in Temanggung. I also went through a 
similar experience in West Java, when travelling from Cimahi to Soreang through Bandung. 
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the local taxation office. In fact, the amount of money paid to this office was much higher 
than the profit gained by the developers . Cattle farmers in West Nusa Tenggara also 
complained about different types of charges they had to pay. 46 
The Indonesian Textile Association also blamed a variety of charges imposed by 
central and local government as a factor hindering their effort to become more competitive 
in the world market. As part of deregulation packages, 17 types of fees levied by the central 
government on textile industries were removed in early 1996. But, Aburizal Bakri, the 
chairman of the Indonesian Trade and Commerce Chamber (Kamar Dagang Indonesia or 
Katlin), demanded that charges collected by provincial and district levels also be abolished. 
Hamzah Has, a member of the DPR from the PPP fraction, suggested that the Minister of 
Finance review the necessity for these collections (Kompas, 8 February 1996). In addition, 
the DPR invited the Minister of Home Affairs to a meeting in late February 1996, during 
which Sumitro Maskun, the Director General of PUOD, represented the Minister of Home 
Affairs. According to Sumitro, his office had been planning to abolish unnecessary 
collections. But the assessment was still being conducted47 . A few days later, he announced 
his 's intention to abolish 23 types of fees at the local level and another six at the provincial 
level. In the governors' conference, which was held in March, Yogi S. Memet, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, suggested that all taxes and fees that were introduced by regional heads' 
decrees be abolished.48 
46 The farmers had to get their cattle registered at the village office for which a small fee was paid. They also 
had to have their cattle checked by a veterinary before they could sell them, and paid another fee to the Dinas 
LLAJR when the cattle were transported to another district, and yet another fee to the quarantine office at the 
seaport when they brought the cattle to another island. 
47 Kompas, 29 February 1996. 
48 Kompas, 27 March 1996. 
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In response to the Minister of Home Affairs' suggestion, I Bagus Oka, the governor 
of Bali, said that in principle he agreed with Yogi's proposal. But he was concerned about 
the impact of this policy on local revenue and local ability to develop their own regions. 
Similarly, Nuriana, the governor of West Java, was also wondering whether this policy 
would result in a significant decrease in locally generated revenue and reduce the capacity 
to finance locally initiated projects. Nevertheless, he promised to support the effort to 
rationalize local taxes and charges. In contrast, T. Syaifudin, the Secretary of Golkar in the 
Province of North Sumatra, strongly rejected the idea. He argued that the centre could not 
simply abolish taxes and charges that were guaranteed by law. As long as those collections 
were introduced through local legislation, the central government could not abolish them. 49 
Efforts to rationalize local taxes created a dilemma in Indonesia. On the one hand, 
rationalization would reduce the problem of the 'high cost economy'. On the other hand, 
abolishing a number of local taxes would significantly decrease locally generated revenue 
and the opportunity for local government to implement locally initiated projects. As 
previously discussed, local revenue was the only source over which local authorities had 
discretion. Therefore, many scholars believed abolishing local taxes would not be effective. 
Instead, they believed fiscal policy needed to be totally reformed in order to provide local 
authorities with a broader tax base. 50 
While the Department of Home Affairs was busy contemplating which taxes and 
fees were to be abolished, the Department of Finance finished drafting a bill to replace the 
emergency laws No. 1 and No. 12 of 1957, which had given local authority the power to 
impose local taxes and user charges. This bill was sent to the DPR in November 1996 and 
49 Kompas 26-29 February 1996. 
5° Kompas, 26 to 29 February 1996. 
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received overwhelming support. A few months later, the bill was enacted as Law No. 18 of 
1997 on Local Taxes and Fees. 
Law No. 18 of 1997 granted provincial governments the authority to levy taxes in 
three areas, and gave district authorities the power to levy taxes in six areas. The law only 
defined the maximum rate that regional governments could impose for each tax. Thus, the 
actual rate in each province or district could be based on real conditions in the region. The 
law also allowed provincial governments to charge fees on nine types of services they 
provided, while district authorities could earn revenue from 30 types of services they 
provided to communities. The law still enabled regional governments to introduce other 
taxes, provided they were economically feasible and approved by the central government. 
The law, according to Dr. Fuad Bawazier, the Director General of Taxation in the 
Department of Finance at that time, was aimed at eliminating the problem of high cost 
economy by simplifying the tax structure, and avoiding overlapping between taxes levied by 
different levels of government. By reducing the number of taxable objects , he expected that 
collection could be made efficient and tax leakage minimized. In addition, Bawazier said, 
the proposed law would also correct local misconceptions about fees (retribusi). He argued 
that a fee differed from tax. A fee, he said, vvas a user charge. It could only be charged to 
those who benefited from services provided by local authorities.51 
The law was, however, was strongly criticized by some officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs. They argued that the content of the law did not conform to the spirit of 
decentralization. Central restrictions on types of taxes and charges that regional government 
could impose obviously undermined the autonomy of the regions.52 Moreover, this 
51 · See Kornpas , 2 December 1996. 
52 Dr. Koswata from the Centre for Research and Development of the Department of Horne Affairs was one 
among those who openly criticised Law No. 18 of 1997. 
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Department believed that this new law would significantly reduce local revenue. In response 
to this criticism, Arlen Pakpahan from the Department of Finance argued that the central 
government should increase its grants to local governments rather than allow local taxes and 
charges to jeopardize the national economy. He also argued that the degree of autonomy had 
nothing to do with the amount of local revenue raised. Regional governments could have 
discretion over the central grants as long as they were given in the form of block grant. The 
problem was, he said, the Department of Home Affairs' tendency to regulate block grants 
given to the regions.53 
Impact of the Project on Local Autonomy 
From the discussion above it was clear that the pilot project initiated by Kantor Men. 
PAN (the State for the Utilization of the State Apparatus) failed to achieve a meaningful 
increase in local autonomy. Under the project, a number of government tasks were assigned 
to the district level. Many of them, however, did not need substantive decisions by local 
authorities, and therefore did not have much impact on local autonomy. The absence of any 
attempts to empower local councils also contributed to the failure to promote local decision 
making. The project's failure to grant sufficient funds to finance the transferred tasks 
increased the financial burden on local budgets. 
The assignment of functions to the district level was the result of bargaining between 
the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus, the central technical 
departments and the provincial governments. In the absence of criteria on how power and 
responsibility should be divided between different levels of government, decisions on which 
functions to assign and what authority should be surrendered to local government were 
53 Interviewed with Arlen Pakpahan, who was involved in the preparation of Law No. 18 of 1997. 
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primarily shaped by the interests, strategies and power positions of the agencies involved. 
With his authority to regulate the civil service, Major General Silalahi successfully forced 
central departments and provincial governments to transfer as many tasks as possible to 
district authorities. However, his tendency to focus on the number of tasks assigned to 
district level (as it was used to measure success), rather than on the nature of the assigned 
tasks enabled technical departments and provincial governments to retain activities that 
allowed them to control the implementation of transferred functions. As a result, local 
authorities performed more functions, but authority to make decisions over those functions 
remained at the central and provincial levels. 
The lack of effort to strengthen the DPRDs was rooted in the perception of the 
government about decentralization. For Men. PAN, the Minister of Home Affairs, and many 
high-ranking officials, decentralization was simply the transfer of administrative authority 
from the central to the local bureaucracy. Therefore, many of the stipulations in 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 were concerned with strengthening the capacity of 
local bureaucracies to implement the transferred tasks. To ensure that district authorities 
properly performed the transferred tasks, the regulation also required central agencies to 
guide and supervise the district government in implementing their tasks. In this case, the 
need to strengthen the political role of the DPRD to provide checks and balances to the local 
executive, as advocated by many scholars, became unimportant. The perception that public 
policies were to be made within the bureaucracy was very dominant during the Suharto era 
( see chapter I). 
The inability of the project to shift part of the central sectoral budget to district 
governments also contributed to failure to promote local decision making and make local 
authorities more independent of the centre. Opposition to this idea came not only from 
205 
sectoral departments but also from the National Development Planning Board, the agency 
empowered to make budget allocations. To most sectoral departments, shifting part of their 
budget to district authorities might reduce the amount of resources under their control and 
their power position. To officials of the National Development Planning Board, allocating 
more of the development budget through local government jeopardized the achievement of 
national developn1ent targets because local authorities could be expected to prefer small-
scale projects that would only produce local benefits. Thus, there was a dilemma in 
choosing between supporting regional autonomy and maintaining the speed of economic 
development in the country. In addition, there was also fear among central agencies that J transferring resources to regional governments would not increase regional autonomy, but 
strengthen the power position of the Department of Home Affairs vis-a-vis other agencies. 
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Table 6.1. List of Districts participating in the Pilot Project on Decentralization 
No. Province Dati II 
1. Special Region Aceh Kabupaten North Aceh 
2. North Sumatra Kabupaten Simalungun 
3. West Sumatra Kabupaten Tanah Datar 
4. Riau Kabupaten Kampar 
5. Jambi Kabupaten B atanghari 
6. South Sumatra Kabupaten Muara Enim 
7. Bengk:ulu Kabupaten South Bengk:ulu 
8. Lampung Kabupaten Lampung Tengah 
9. West Java Kabupaten Bandung 
10. Central Java Kabupaten Banyumas 
11. Special Region Yogyakarta Kabupaten Sleman 
12. East Java Kabupaten Sidoarjo 
13. West Kalimantan Kabupaten Sambas 
14. Central Kalimantan Kabupaten East Kotawaringin 
15. South Kalimantan Kabupaten Tanah Pasir 
16. East Kalimantan Kabupaten Kutai 
17. North Sulawesi Kabupaten Minahasa 
18. Central Sulawesi Kabupaten Donggala 
19. South Sulawesi Kabupaten Gowa 
20. Southeast Sulawesi Kabupaten Kendari 
21. Bali Kabupaten Badung 
22. West Nusa Tenggara Kabupaten Central Lombok 
23. East Nusa Tenggara Kabupaten Timor Tengah Selatan 
24. East Timor Kabupaten Aliue 
25. Maluk:u Kabupaten Central Maluk:u 
26. Irian Jaya Kabupaten Sorong 
Source: the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
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Table. 6.2. List of Field of Responsibility Transferred from the Centre to Dati II based on 
PP 8 of 1995 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
I Fields of Responsibility 
Agriculture 
Husbandry 
Fishery 
Plantations 
Transmigration and resettlement 
General government 
Social affairs 
Cooperatives and promotion of small enterprises 
Tourism 
Public Works 
Traffic Management 
Mining 
Trade 
Health 
Labour 
Industry 
Education 
Source: Government Regulation No. 8 of 1995 
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Table 6.3. Number of Dinas, Cabang Dinas Tingkat I and Dinas Tingkat II before and 
after the Pilot Project (Status, April 1997) 
Before the project After 
No. District Kandep Cabang Dinas Dinas Tingkat II Total Dinas 
Tingkat I Tingkat II 
1. Aceh Utara 9 7 10 26 21 
2. Simalungun 8 11 12 31 24 
3. Tanah Datar 9 8 8 25 20 
4. Kam.par 10 2 14 26 23 
5. Batanghari 9 4 12 25 21 
6. MuaraEnim 8 6 15 29 23 
7. Lampung Tengah 8 7 13 28 23 
8. Bengkulu Selatan 9 5 10 24 20 
9. Bandung 9 9 11 29 23 
10. Banyumas 9 9 19 28 23 
11. Sleman 9 5 10 24 22 
12. Sidoarjo 9 8 10 27 22 
13. Sambas 9 9 5 23 21 
14. Kotawaringin 10 9 5 24 20 
Timur 
15. Tanah Laut 8 3 12 23 21 
16. Kutai 9 5 9 23 21 
17. Minahasa 8 5 11 24 20 
18. Donggala 10 3 11 24 22 
19. Gowa 8 5 12 25 22 
20. Kendari 10 2 9 21 21 
21. Badung 9 2 12 23 _22 
22. Lombok Tengah 10 2 10 22 20 
23. TTS 8 2 10 20 20 
24. Aileu 5 1 10 16 19 
25. Malul.'1.1 Tengah 10 4 8 22 20 
26. Sarong 8 2 12 22 21 
Total 228 135 271 634 555 
Source: The State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
Note: 
After the project, the office of the Department of Religion (Kandep Agama) and the Regional Office 
of the Department of Information (Kandep Penerangan) still existed in every district. 
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Chapter VII 
Decentralization initiated by Technical Departments 
This chapter discusses the expenences of the Department of Public Works 
(Departemen Pekerjaan Umum or Dep. PU) and the Department of Health (Departemen 
Kesehatan or Depkes) with implementing decentralization. As previously discussed, in 1986 
the Department of Public Works introduced the Integrated Urban Infrastructure 
Development Program (IUIDP), aiming at decentralizing responsibility for provision of 
urban services to the regional governments. In the following year, the Department of Health 
launched the Third Health Program (HP III) through which the responsibility to provide 
basic health care was transferred to district authorities. 
In both cases, the decision to decentralize was primarily motivated by the need to 
maintain infrastructure and facilities that were previously built by the centre and expand the 
capacity of the central government to take over the responsibility to finance basic services 
in the face of significant decreases in central budget allocations. Consequently, the focus 
was on the shifting of financial and administrative burdens to the regions. The need to 
promote local decisions tended to be ignored. 
Decentralization of Urban Infrastructure Provision 
Urban infrastructure here refers to water supply, solid-waste management, urban 
roads and bridges, sewerage and drainage. During the Dutch colonial administration, as part 
of the effort to implement the Decentralization Law of 1903, the responsibility to maintain 
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and operate these facilities was given to municipal governments through the enactment of 
the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1926 (Kosasih and Sutmuller, 1995:29). After 
independence, responsibility over those facilities was assigned to municipalities when they 
were formally established by the republic in the early 1950s (see Chapter III). Following 
independence, local capacity to build, operate and maintain urban infrastructure was, 
however, very weak. As a consequence, in the 1960s there was a tremendous backlog of 
unmet needs (World Bank, 1983: 3). 
Since the early years of the New Order period, the establishment of services to meet 
basic needs, especially in urban areas, had been one of the government's priorities. In 1969, 
in cooperation with the World Bank, the central government introduced the first Kampung 
Improvement Program (KIP) to provide basic micro-level infrastructure to low-income 
urban communities (kampung) in the national capital city of Jakarta. 1 This program 
concentrated on upgrading and/or providing new walkways and roads, drainage, clean water 
supply, communal latrines/washing facilities and other community facilities. Realizing that 
KIP only focused on micro-projects, during the second five-year development period (1974-
1979) the central government introduce the First Urban Development Project, which was 
aimed at establishing citywide urban services and systems in Jakarta. This project was then 
followed by the Second Urban Development Project, which covered not only Jakarta but 
also Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia. During the third five-year development 
period (1979-1984), the government introduced the Third Urban project, which covered 
large cities such as Semarang, Surakarta, Surabaya, and Ujung Pandang, and the Fourth 
Urban project for middle-sized cities such as Padang, Palembang, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, 
Samarinda and Denpasar. At the same time, in cooperation with the Asian Development 
1 The Dutch Colonial government first initiated KIP. 
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Bank (ADB), a similar project was also introduced in Medan, Bandung, and a number of 
small towns in Central Java (Suselo, 1995:12-13). 
Despite the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1974, which emphasized that responsibilities 
for public services provision to the largest extent possible should be given to local 
authorities, most infrastructure projects were not only prepared and financed but also 
implemented by the central government through the Department of Public Works. To carry 
out this task, this Department established regional offices in every province (Kantor 
Wilayah or Kanwil PU), charged with coordinating and supervising the execution of 
projects by public works project offices at the local level. The role of the district public 
works office (Dinas PU Tingkat II), a technical unit under the district government, was 
consequently reduced to only helping the central department to identify the needs for 
infrastructure development and implementing small-scale and locally funded infrastructure 
projects.2 
The Need for Decentralization 
The New Order Government seemed to consider investment in urban infrastructure 
as essential. During the first four five-year development periods, the largest part 
(approximately 40 percent) of the central expenditures went toward building and 
maintaining urban infrastructure. In the Fourth Five Year Development period (1984/85-
1988/89) alone, Rp 2,094 billion was spent for water supply, road, drainage and flood 
control, sewer and waste disposal services.3 A 1984 study by the government of Indonesia 
estimated that in the Fifth Five Year Development period the government would provide Rp 
2 Unlike other departments, the Department of Public Works did not have offices (Kandep) at the district level, 
but project offices at the project sites. 
3 In the early 1980s, US$1 was equal to Rp 800,-
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4,500 billion to meet reasonable growth needs and overcome service backlogs. These cost 
estimates had led to heightened concern about the financing of urban infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, the decline in the world oil price in 1984 had severely limited the central 
government's ability to maintain its previous level of development expenditure, because 
approximately 60 percent of the central government's budgetary revenue had been collected 
from oil and natural gas taxes. As a consequence, the central government was forced to cut 
its grants in every sector, including urban infrastructure (IBRD, 1987:3). 
Officials of the Directorate General of Human Settlements (Direktorat Jenderal 
Cipta Karya or DJCK), who were responsible for urban infrastructure development under 
the Department of Public Works, recognized that limited funds from the central government 
meant that: a) responsibility for financing infrastructure development should be shifted as 
much as possible to the local level; b) local governments must mobilize additional revenue 
in order to sustain the present level of urban services; and (c) the existing grant and loan 
financing mechanism should be modified to provide incentives for local revenue generation 
and borrowing (the World Bank, 1987:3). Inspired by the decentralization programs being 
implemented in other Asian countries, these officials developed the concept of the 
Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP). Under IUIDP, it was 
proposed that responsibility to plan, build, operate and maintain urban infrastructure be 
given to the district authorities. The role of the central government would be limited to 
providing guidelines, technical assistance and fiscal incentives to encourage local 
authorities to mobilize local resources and to use domestic or foreign borrowing for 
financing investment in urban services.4 
4 Interview with Mr. Hendropranoto Susela, a senior urban planner, and also the Director of Programme development in the Directorate General of Humans Settlements. He was actually the main actor behind the development of IUIDP concept. Unfortunately, he was transferred to another position not long after his idea 
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Realizing that the scope of IUIDP was far beyond its authority, the Department of 
Public Works tried to seek support from related agencies such as the National Development 
Planning Board, the Department of Finance and the Department of Home Affairs. For this 
purpose, a conference was held in Puncak, West Java, in mid-1994. Besides high-ranking 
officials from the central government, mayors from big cities and representatives of donor 
agencies and countries also attended the conference. The conference ended with 
overwhelming support for the introduction of the new approach. 5 
In developing the IUIDP concept further, the Directorate General of Human 
Settlements received technical assistance from the United Nation Development Program 
(UNDP).6 Meanwhile, some donor agencies, such as the World Bank and ADB also 
expressed their willingness to support IUIDP implementation. In addition, the development 
of IUIDP coincided with the enactment of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1984 on the 
transfer of part of the responsibility for providing infrastructure to regional governments. 
This regulation provided a legal basis for IUIDP implementation. 
Government Regulation No. 14 of 1984 
The Secretariat General of the Department of Public Works had initiated 
government Regulation No. 14 of 1984 not long before the Directorate General of Human 
Settlements proposed the IUIDP concept. This regulation was intended to provide a 
framework for decentralizing some of the government tasks in public works . As previously 
mentioned, the central government's intensive involvement in building infrastructure during 
was made known. Further development of the concept, therefore, did not necessarily conform to his original 
idea. 
5 I was involved in the conference 
6 Since the early 1980s, the Directorate General of Human Settlements had received some assistance from 
UNDP/UNCHS for the preparation of National Urban Development Strategy. 
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the 1970s meant functions, which formally fell under the responsibility of regional 
governments, were now being performed by the central department. Mr. Radinal Mochtar, 
Secretary General of the Department of Public Works, felt his Department should 
concentrate on its central mission to introduce innovations in infrastructure development. 
He believed the central government should limit its role to the development of major 
infrastructure and the introduction of newly invented technology on infrastructure. He also 
argued that regional governments were capable of building and operating local facilities.7 
To implement this idea, he initiated preparation of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1984, 
which defined the division of responsibilities between the three levels of government in 
infrastructure development. Thus, the Department of Public Works was the first technical 
Department to implement Law No. 5 of 1974. 
The division of responsibilities stipulated in this regulation is shown in table 7 .1. 
These divisions were based on several criteria, such as the extent of externalities, the level 
of technology needed to carry out the functions and the cost for building, operating and 
maintaining the facilities. Under this regulation, the responsibility of each level of 
government was quite clear. The centre would be responsible for establishing national 
policies and standards and providing maJor infrastructure. Provincial government was 
charged with the provision of infrastructure that had a regional impact, and the district 
governments were given the responsibility to provide local services such as water supply, 
solid waste management, urban roads, drainage and sewerage (see also Shah et al., 
1998: 181). 
Regulation No. 14 of 1984 also made it clear that regional governments were fully 
responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance and financing of transferred 
7 Based on his address during a staff meeting in 1989. 
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facilities. The role of the Department was to be limited to formulating national policies and 
standards, and providing regional governments with technical assistance and training. Thus, 
this regulation gave district authorities more freedom in carrying out their tasks , provided 
that their actions were not in conflict with policies and standards set by the central 
government. 
Table. 7 .1. The Di vision of Responsibilities in Public Works Sector 
Function Center Province District 
Irrigation National policy and Provision of primary Provision of tertiary 
standards on water and secondary irrigation networks 
resources irrigation networks 
management 
The management of 
river basins 
Training and 
Technical Assistance 
Roads and Bridges National policy and Provision of Provision of local 
standards for road and provincial roads and roads and bridges 
bridges construction, bridges 
operation and 
maintenance 
Provision of national 
roads and bridges 
Training and technical 
assistance 
Urban services: urban National policies and Oversight Provision of urban 
roads, bridges, standards of urban services 
footpaths, drinking .. services provision 
water, drainage, solid 
waste collection and Training and technical 
disposal, parks, assistance 
recreation areas and 
markets. 
Source: summarized from Government Regulation No. 14 of 1984. 
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Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP) 
IUIDP was formally introduced not long after the enactment of Government 
Regulation No. 14 of 1984. This program was aimed at enhancing efficiency and 
effectiveness in the provision of urban services. It was initiated to overcome the following 
problems (see also van der Hoof and Steinberg, 1992: 1-2): 
• centralized provision of infrastructure which tended not to reflect local needs and ignore 
local authorities and communities in the operation and maintenance of projects, 
• inefficiency in the use of limited resources due to duplication of efforts made by central, 
provincial and local levels of government due to unintegrated planning programming 
and budgeting system for infrastructure development. 
• high dependency of local authorities on central government grants in financing capital 
cost, operation and maintenance of infrastructure. 
To counter the above problems, the following strategies were introduced (Sidabutar, 
1992:24): 
• providing greater opportunities to local authorities to design and build infrastructure 
programs in order to meet local needs; 
• integrating the process of preparing infrastructure programs which previously had been 
performed separately by central, provincial and local authorities through preparation of 
an integrated multi-year program (programjangka menengah,PJM); 
• providing technical support to local authorities in order to improve their capacity to 
prepare infrastructure programs by assigning a technical consulting team to every 
province to assist a particular group of municipalities or regencies; 
• encouraging local authorities to mobilize local resources and to use foreign sources in 
financing infrastructure development by establishing a cost system, which specifically 
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describes the percentages of central grant for components that have been devolved to 
local authorities but considered important by the central government for meeting a 
national minimum standard. 
The main innovation under IUIDP was the preparation of the multi-year investment 
program (PJM) for infrastructure development by district governments. This document 
consisted of a series of action plans, aimed at improving not only the performance of 
infrastructure services but also enhancing local institutional and financial capacity. This 
action plan would also be accompanied by a multi-year budget, which showed the amount 
of shares from all agencies over the five-year implementation period. 
To enable the district authorities to prepare their PIM, in mid 1986 the Department 
of Public Works assigned a team of domestic and foreign consultants to a number of local 
governments in Sumatera and West Java. A few months later, another consulting team was 
appointed for East Java and Bali provinces. In the following year, some other firms were 
hired to prepare IUIDP implementation in other provinces. In addition to providing 
technical support, the Department of Public Works provided participating districts with 
funds for conducting the studies. Following the assignment of the consultant, a technical 
team comprising all related district officials was formed in each participating district by its 
district head. This team was given formal responsibility for preparing the PIM for its 
district. 
The provincial authorities, which previously were not involved in the provision of 
urban services, were now given the task of steering implementation of the studies made at 
the district level. For this purpose, in 1987 the provincial government established a steering 
committee, consisting of officials from the Office of the Regional Secretary, the Provincial 
Development Planning Board (Bappeda Tingkat I), the regional office of the Department of 
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Public Works (Kanwil PU), the Provincial Public Works Office (Dinas PU Tingkat I), and 
the Provincial Taxation Office (Dispenda Tingkat I). This team was later charged with 
appraising the multi-year program proposed by local governments. 
At the same time, an interdepartmental team called the National Coordinating Team 
for Urban Development (Team Koordinasi Pengembangan Perkotaan or TKPP), consisting 
of high-ranking officials from the National Development Planning Board, the Department 
of Finance, the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Public Works, was also 
established through the National Development Planning Board's decision. This team was 
expected to formulate national policy and guidelines with regard to national targets for 
infrastructure development for the next five years, technical standards for the construction 
of infrastructure, and cost-sharing arrangements between central and local levels for 
infrastructure development. These policy guidelines were very important, especially due to 
the absence of detailed policies on decentralization. As previously discussed, legislation 
required to implement Law No. 5 of 1974 was not issued until the mid-1990s. 
Unfortunately, TKKP tended to act as a coordinating board for project preparation 
rather than an urban policy deliberation institution. In 1990, there was a feeling in the 
National Development Planning Board that TKPP was increasingly taking on the role of the 
National Development Planning Board. This team was finally abolished and a new 
institution called IUIDP Management Group (IMG) was formed under the National 
Development Planning Board to take over TKPP' s tasks. Unfortunately, the weaknesses of 
TKPP persisted in the sense that IMG also become preoccupied with programme and 
project coordination matters rather than with the policy aspect of urban development 
(Suselo, 1995:27). 
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Parallel to the above efforts, a series of training programs was provided to related 
central, provincial and local staff. Its framework was prepared by the Department of Public 
Works with the assistance of the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank, 
but the detailed training materials were written by consulting firms hired by the Department 
of Public Works. The training itself was organized by the Training Center of the 
Department of Public Works, in cooperation with provincial training centres. In addition to 
organizing training in the country, the Department of Public Works also sent a number of 
central staff from the National Development Planning Board, the Department of Finance, 
the Department of Home Affairs and provincial governments to urban management courses 
held by the Institute for Housing Studies (the IHS) in Rotterdam to study urban 
management. In cooperation with the IHS and the Department of Home Affairs, the 
Department of Public Works also organized trips to European cities for mayors, district 
secretaries, and heads of local development planning units. 8 
IUIDP also generated other related projects (Bastin and Smoke, 1992:10-12). In 
1987, the Department of Finance established a facility known as the Regional Development 
Account (RDA), which provided a revolving fund for financing infrastructure development. 
This institution, however, only started making loans to local governments and regional 
enterprises two years later. Disagreements between the Department of Finance and the 
Department of Home Affairs over the details took some time to reconcile. 
At the same time, with financial support from the World Bank, the Department of 
Home Affairs instituted reform of local revenue collection and administration, from a 
source-based to a function-based focus. In addition, a unique numbering system for firms 
and individuals was developed to ·help identify local taxpayers while procedures were 
8 I accompanied the second group to the Netherlands in 1990. 
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designed to help determine tax liability. The system was first introduced on a pilot basis in 
five sites and it has now been installed in over 100 local governments. In 1987, another 
World Bank financed project was undertaken by the Department of Home Affairs to 
develop a management system for local governments to plan, finance and implement 
infrastructure operation and maintenance activities. 
IUIDP proved to be problem ridden. Many felt this approach created a cumbersome 
process because it required the involvement of more agencies in the decision-n1aking 
process. At the central level, the Department of Public Works was responsible for 
formulating national policies and standards for infrastructure development, the National 
Development Planning Board was empowered to determine budget allocation for 
infrastructure development, the Department of Finance was charged with the administration 
of local borrowing, and the Department of Home Affairs was responsible for local 
institutional development. At the provincial level, there were the governor, the provincial 
secretary (Sekwilda Tingkat I), the provincial development planning unit (Bappeda Tingkat 
I), the provincial public works office (Dinas PU Tingkat I), the provincial revenue office 
(Dispenda Tingkat I) and the provincial office of the Department of Public Works (Kanwil 
Dep. PU), who were responsible for providing direction to local authorities. At the district 
level, the bupati or mayor, the district secretary (Sekwilda Tingkat II), the district 
development planning office (Bappeda Tingkat II), the district revenue office (Dispenda 
Tingkat II), the district public works office (Dinas PU Tingkat II), the water enterprise 
(PDAM), and in some municipalities the solid-waste management office (Dinas 
Kebersihan), were all involved in the preparation of the PJM document. With the 
involvement of so many institutions, the decision-making became a long and laborious 
222 
process, characterized by conflicts of interest and actions to defend vested interests (see also 
Kosasih and Sutmuller, 1995:51). 
At the central level, disagreements about IUIDP objectives and strategies prevented 
TKPP from issuing the necessary policy guidelines for the preparation of the PJM by local 
authorities. Policy on cost-sharing arrangements, for example, was not worked out until 
1989. Accord1ng to Regulation No. 14 of 1984, district governments were fully responsible 
for financing the provision of urban infrastructure. To encourage local participation in the 
program, however, the Department of Public Works indicated that financial support would 
be made available. Unfortunately, the working group, which was established within TKPP 
and responsible for making policy in this area, failed to meet. 9 In the absence of a clear 
funding policy, local governments tended to propose very ambitious programs for their 
districts, in an attempt to attract more funds from the centre. When they later realized there 
would be no additional grant for IUIDP financing, most local officials became very 
disappointed. 
In response to local disappointment, the National Development Planning Board 
promised that central grants would still constitute an important share of IUIDP funding, but 
suggested that the central share should only be seen as an incentive to achieving the IUIDP 
goal to increase self-reliance of local governments. The Department of Public Works 
proposed that all expenditures for cost recovery investment be funded by local own revenue 
and local borrowing and expenditures for non-recovery projects such as the Kampung 
Improvement Program would still be subsidized by the centre. The officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs, however, were quite reluctant to endorse local borrowing 
9 Under the TKPP umbrella, four working groups were formed on the following subjects: Urban Policy, Urban 
Programme, Municipal finance, and Urban Institutional Development. In practice, only the Urban Programme 
working group led by the Department of Public Works was particularly active (see Suselo, 1995). 
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because they believed that it would only create burdens for local authorities. They were not 
optimistic that investment in local infrastructure would generate enough revenue to allow 
district authorities to pay back their loans. Compromise was finally achieved between the 
centre and the regions: project scope was reduced, the central government agreed to bear 
part of the costs, and local governments were required to make loans to finance the gap. 10 
Conflict of interest was also found at the local level. While most members of the 
IUIDP technical team tended to fight for more funds from local budgets for IUIDP 
activities, other officials tried to persuade district heads not to spend more on infrastructure 
because it would jeopardize the district performance in other sectors such as education and 
health. Decisions on how much should be allocated to which sector could not be rationally 
made because needs assessments were only available for urban services. Information for the 
needs for other sectors was not available. This situation had obviously created bias in the 
budgeting process. The tendency of district heads to prefer infrastructure projects had also 
been motivated by their need to generate more revenue for their off-budget funds_ I I 
Lack of reasonably accurate data, coupled with inexperienced local staff, also 
hampered PJM preparation. The absence of sufficient and coherent directions from the 
provincial steering committee had disappointed local employees. Uncertainty about the 
status of central on-going projects, which were prepared and implemented based on the 
traditional sectoral approach by divisions of the Department of Public Works, also slowed 
d h · 12 own t e preparation process. 
10 Information was primarily obtained from my participation in the appraisal meetings conducted for East Java, West Java, and Sumatra IUIDP packages in 1989-1990. 11 Off-budget funds are collected mostly from illegal sources and used for financing unauthorised 
expenditures, including addi tional allowances for government officials. Physical projects have become the 
main source of off-budget funds. 
12 As Mr. Hendropranoto Suselo noted, many engineers in his Department found it difficult to accept a more integrated and decentralized approach to infrastructure planning and implementation. 
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Donor agencies demanded a higher standard of project documentation, again making 
the preparation process difficult and lengthy. The preparation of the IUIDP for East Java 
and Bali, for example, began in 1986, but the loan for financing the project was not signed 
until March 1991. The World Bank wanted to clarify everything at the beginning, including 
the organizational arrangements for implementation. Meanwhile, neither district authorities 
nor the consulting team had enough experience in preparing the required documents. 
Moreover, conditions for borrowing were only made clear later (van der Pol, 1995: 88). To 
speed up the process, the central government finally provided local authorities with 
additional assistance to help them prepare project documents, which complied with the 
World Bank's standards. 
The Asian Development Bank-sponsored IUIDP for West Java and Sumatera, in 
contrast, was able to conclude a loan agreement in September 1989 after a rapid appraisal 
and negotiation process. But not a single project had been started two years later. The bank 
demanded that its headquarters in Manila approve all the detailed project documents prior to 
implementation. While no loan disbursement could be made, the Government of Indonesia 
had to pay substantial commitment fees after the loans were signed. These problems 
fostered criticism from some quarters regarding the IUIDP approach, leading some to 
advocate a return to the previously top-down sectoral approach to urban development 
(Suselo, 1995: 21; Bastin and Smoke, 1992: 14). 
The first year of the implementation period was a disaster in almost every district. 
Local staff was completely unaware of the administrative procedures imposed by the banks. 
The project management units (PMUs), which were supposed to advise and coordinate 
district governments, were only established at the provincial level a year after the loans 
became effective. The delay was primarily due to the disagreement between the Department 
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of Public Works and the provincial governments on who should control the PMUs. As an 
executing agency for IUIDP, the Director General of Human Settlements insisted the PMUs 
should be formed under his organization because he would be responsible to the donor 
agencies for the overall implementation of the program. The provincial governments argued 
that establishing PMUs under the DJCK would be in conflict with the IUIDP objective to 
empower regional governments. The banks preferred central government staff to chair the 
PMUs because they had more experience with foreign aid administration and procedures. 
The banks' attitude was criticized by some decentralization advocates (see also Smoke and 
Lewis, 1995). In the end, PMUs were formed by the DJCK and chaired by its staff, except 
in East Java. In this province, due to the insistence of the Bappeda' s chairman, the 
provincial government was allowed to set up the PMU under the Provincial Development 
Planning Board (Bappeda) and appoint a provincial official as its chairman. 13 
During the implementation period, ensuring that each participating party allocated 
the funds annually according to the agreed multi-year financing plan had become a major 
challenge for the PMUs. Even though this multi-year budget had been prepared based on a 
program approach and approved by the National Development Planning Board and all 
related central agencies, budget allocations for IUIDP still had to be processed through the 
traditional sectoral budgeting procedures. Provincial and local shares were still to be 
proposed through the bottom-up mechanism (see Chapter IV). In addition, the funds from a 
specific source were still to be administered individually. Funds from the central 
development budget were managed by the Department of Public Works, while those from 
provincial and district development budgets were administered by provincial and district 
13 The provincial government of East Java provided a significant amount of funds for the PMU. Unfortunately, 
based on my interviews with a number of Bappeda staff and consultants, most of the money was spent for 
local consultants who happened to be relatives of the PMU chairman. It was widely known that half of the 
budget for those consultants was actually used for other purposes. 
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officials respectively. This fragmentation created coordination problem, and consequently, 
reduced the efficiency in the use of resources. 
Local governments had actually long demanded that funds from the centre be given 
to local authorities in the form of block grants. The officials of the National Development 
Planning Board were, however, quite conservative and tended to remain tied to the sectoral 
budgetary structure and allocation. A similar attitude was also found among the engineers in 
the Department of Public Works itself. The new planning and budgeting system would 
obviously reduce their control over the national budget for infrastructure. The Department 
of Finance, in contrast, was very supportive and willing to experiment with the new 
approach to infrastructure planning and programming. The Department of Home Affairs 
sent mixed signals. On the one hand, its officials strongly supported the idea of block grants 
on the grounds that it would strengthen local autonomy. On the other hand, most of their 
policies indicated their intention to resume control over local budgets. Inpres funds for 
infrastructure, which were given by the Department of Public Works in the forms of block 
grants to district authorities, were immediately regulated by this Department without even 
consulting the Minister of Public Works (see Chapter VI). This contradiction had made 
other agencies suspicious about their motives (Suselo, 1995: 17). 
Despite all the difficulties, most governors decided to expand IUIDP to all districts 
1n their provinces. To most governors and district heads, IUIDP would help build 
infrastructure 1n their regions. As their performance was often assessed based on their 
ability to build physical infrastructure, it was not surprising that they preferred IUIDP to 
other programs. Moreover, infrastructure projects usually generated more contributions to 
their off-budget funds. These funds were particularly important to their political activities, 
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including mobilizing support for Golkar, the government party, during the general 
1 · 14 e ect1ons. 
The Impact of IUIDP on Regional Autonomy 
IUIDP obviously increased the involvement of local governments in planning and 
budgeting urban infrastructure projects. Their intensive involvement, however, did not 
necessarily reflect greater local autonomy. Under IUIDP the responsibility to build, operate 
and maintain urban facilities was devolved to local authorities. Local discretion or ability to 
make decisions about the type of and level of services to be delivered and about how those 
services were to be provided and financed was, however, constrained by technical guidance 
and circulars issued by central agencies. Non-compliance was discouraged through financial 
penalties. Since local governments were financially reliant on central transfers, compliance 
became necessary. 
Local discretion was also hampered by a lack of trained staff at local levels. Their 
inability to prepare the PJM and to manage its implementation caused them to rely heavily 
on consultants hired by the central government. As a result, local influence on the content of 
programs became less significant. In the end, the program reflected central interests rather 
than local preferences and needs. Nevertheless, the IUIDP training program \vhich was later 
conducted extensively for local staff had contributed to the improvement of local capacity in 
managing the future infrastructure projects. 
Under IUIDP, the division of role and responsibility between the central and 
regional governments became more intricate. As responsibility was shared, the three levels 
of government became more dependent on each other. This interdependence made the 
14 This was a common practice in the bureaucracy during Suharto period. 
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decision making laborious and lengthy. More time was needed for bargaining and 
negotiation for all decisions on urban services needed approval from the provincial and 
national levels. In addition, a shared arrangement created the problem of accountability. 
Since the responsibility was shared, it was difficult to identify who was responsible for 
which decision. This shared responsibility provided no incentives to local governments to 
appropriately perform their duties. 
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Figure 7 .1. Organizational Structure for the Provision of Urban services 
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Decentralization of Basic Health Services 
Responsibility to provide basic health services, like urban services, has long been 
delegated to local authorities. In 1952, to implement Law No. 22 of 1948 on regional 
government, the Department of Health transferred the responsibility to provide basic health 
care to all provinces, and regencies/municipalities in Java and Sumatra. The formal transfer 
was also made to the four provinces in Kalimantan in 1956, Irian Jaya in 1969 and East 
Timor in 1976. 15 Interestingly, such a transfer was never made formally to Bali, West Nusa 
Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, and provinces in Sulawesi. Despite this fact, these provinces 
had performed these functions since their formation in the early 1950s (CPIS, 1995: 1). 
Up to the 1970s, having access to health care was a real problem in Indonesia, 
especially for those living in rural areas. Due to budget constraints, publicly available health 
services were largely run in district hospitals, with non-hospital staff working in a relatively 
small number of peripheral facilities in rural areas. In the early 1970s, as the economy grew, 
the central government began to play a major role in the provision of health services. In 
1974 a special grant was introduced to expand the availability of health services throughout 
Indonesia. A community health centre (Puskesmas) was built in every sub-district. By 1984, 
the number of Puskesmas had increased to 6,954, from 1,227 in 1968.16 At the same time, 
the number of hospitals had also grown and remained an important component of the health 
system. The centrepiece of the government's health system was, however, the Puskesmas, 
which provided curative outpatient care and undertook preventive health activities in rural 
areas. Each health centre had 13-15 employees, including a doctor, 4-6 nurses and 
15 Responsibility for primary health care was transferred to provinces in Java through Government Regulation No. 49 of 1952 and to district level through Government Regulation No. 50 of 1952. The transfer of such 
responsibility to Sumatera was made through Government Regulation No. 51 of 1952, and to Kaiimantan through Government Regulation No. 22 of 1956. 16 The data were taken from the 1984 Pocket Book of Statistics, issued by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. 
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midwives, and various technical and paramedical workers. On average, each Puskesmas had 
three Puskesmas Pembantu (sub-centres), each staffed by a midwife or a nurse (Lieberman, 
1996:6). The expanded number of Puskesmas caused the government spending (excluding 
foreign loans and grants for salaries) on health to rise by 172 percent in real terms during 
the first four years of Repelita III (1979/80 - 1983/84). 
Why Decentralize 17 
As a result of increased access to modem health care, the infant mortality rate, a 
useful broad-gauge of health outcomes, had fallen to roughly 86 deaths per thousand in 
1980 from a 1970 level of more than 100 deaths per thousand.18 Despite this success, infant 
survival and other health outcome indicators remained at unsatisfactory levels, especially in 
the eastern islands and economically underdeveloped areas in Java and Sumatera.19 
Meanwhile, Puskesmas, the main provider of the government's services, tended to be 
underutilized. The centres were poorly managed and their staffs were unmotivated to 
perform their tasks. As a result, people preferred to seek help from private providers, 
although they had to pay more than three times the fee charged by Puskesmas. 20 This 
situation raised concern about the quality of services provided by Puskesmas. 
The Department of Health believed that providing additional funds alone might not 
improve the quality of health services. The way in which basic health care was planned and 
delivered also needed to be reformed. Basic health care had been provided through a 
17 Most of the information for this section was obtained through my involvement in the project, especially 
during the evaluation process, which took place between 1991-1992. Interviews were also conducted with Dr. 
Dedi, the Chairman of the Planning Bureau, Ms. Mawarwati, the Executive Secretary of H.P III, and Dr. Ludy 
and some other project staff in East Kalimantan, in July 1997. 
18 These figures were taken from the 1995 World Bank Report. 
19 A study by Kasto and Sembiring showed that in 1980 infant mortality rates (IMRs) were much higher in the 
eastern provinces such as NTB (189), NTT (128), Sulawesi Tengah (130), and Maluku (123). 
20 While Puskesmas ' fee in 1990 was only Rp 600,-, a private provider usually charged Rp 2000,- for every 
visit. 
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complicated mechanism because responsibility was shared by the three different levels of 
government. At the central level, there was the Department of Health, which prepared 
national policies and standards in health and ensured the achievement of national targets, 
especially through centrally funded projects. At provincial level, Kanwil Depkes (the 
regional office of the Department of Health) supervised the implementation of centrally 
funded projects and provided technical assistance to provincial and district government, and 
the provincial health office (Dinas Kesehatan Tingkat I) co-ordinated the preparation and 
implementation of projects funded by provincial budgets. At the district level, Kandepkes 
(the field office of the Department of Health) administered medical and para-medical staff 
seconded to district level and the district health office (Dinas Kesehatan Tingkat II) 
prepared locally funded projects and performed day-to-day supervision of all projects 
implemented at the Puskesmas level (see figure 7 .2). 
The vast majority of government's health services, whether curative, preventive, or 
promotive, were provided by Puskesmas. The funding of Puskesmas activities, however, 
came from several budget sources: central government development budget (APBN DIP), 
central government routine budget (DIK), provincial development budget (APBD I DIP), 
district development budget (APBD II DIP), and Inpres Kesehatan (a specific grant for 
health purposes). 21 In some areas, Puskesmas also received financial assistance from the 
Department of Transmigration. 
These funds were channelled through a number of different projects (DIP and 
DIPDA). Funds from the Department of Health, for example, came from eight different 
projects (DIPs): Puskesmas Development, Communicable Disease Control, Maternal and 
21 DIP (daftar isian proyek) is a document that specifies the detailed allocation of the government budget for a 
specific project. DIK (daftar isian kegiatan) is a document that specifies the detailed allocation for salaries, 
office maintenance, and other routine activities. 
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Child Health and Family Planning, Health Education, Community Participation, Nutrition 
Improvement, Clean Water Supply and Control and Environment Health. These eight 
projects came from two different sectors: 1) Health, Social Welfare, Women 's Role, 
Population and Family Planning~ and 2) Housing and Settlements. 
Each source had its own specific procedures in terms of planning, budgeting, 
implementation and monitoring and supervision. This fragmentation made it difficult for 
each level of government to know what resources were available to Puskesmas. The 
absence of such information, coupled with inflexibility in the use of each fund, caused 
inappropriate investment decisions and lower efficiency in the allocation and management 
of resources (Bureau of Planning, 1991a: 1).22 Fragmented planning and implementation 
also meant that no single agency had clear responsibility for the overall planning and 
implementation of basic health care programs. Under this situation, no one level of 
government felt completely responsible for ensuring an adequate level of the services. 
The officials of the Planning Bureau in the Department of Health believed that the 
establishment of an integrated planning, budgeting and implementation mechanism would 
increase the efficiency in the use of resources. They also believed that making district 
authorities fully responsible for the provision of basic health services would improve 
responsiveness because district officers were believed to know better local needs and 
conditions, and their proximity to sub-districts was also expected to enable them to 
effectively supervise delivery of basic health services by Puskesmas. To implement this 
idea, the responsibility for basic health care needed to be formally assigned to the district 
governments. 
22 Budget allocated to one specific project could not be reallocated to other projects. Facilities attached to one 
particular project could not be used for other projects. 
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The need to decentralize the responsibility for primary health care provision was 
also strengthened by the fact that in the mid-1980s Depkes faced a significant cut in its 
budget allocation, as a result of decreasing central government revenue from oil taxes. The 
officials of Depkes realized that a significant reduction in the central budget for health 
meant that the per capita government spending in health would decrease significantly. It 
also meant fewer funds would be available for the operation of the health centres because 
approximately 40 percent of the expenditure would be spent for health workers. If the 
government did not want to see the quality of health care provided by Puskesmas 
deteriorating, this reduction had to be compensated from other sources, including from 
provincial and district budgets. Decentralizing part of the burden to finance basic health 
services to local authorities was seen as part of the solution to the problem. 23 
The decision to decentralize the responsibility for basic health care provision was 
reinforced by the World Bank. To encourage the Department of Health to experiment with 
decentralization, this agency agreed to sponsor the implementation of such an initiative in 
two provinces: East Kalimantan (Kaltim) and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB). To provide a 
legal basis for the implementation} the Department of Health issued Government Regulation 
No. 7 of 1987 on the transfer of part of responsibility in health to regional government. 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1987 
Government regulation No. 8 of 1987 was basically intended to formalize the 
transfer of responsibility for basic health care to regional governments. As previously 
discussed the responsibility for basic health care was devolved to regional governments in 
23 In addition to decentralization, Depkes also encouraged private sector to take part in the provision of basic health care. 
236 
the 1950s. Since the 1970s, however, the central government had increasingly intervened in 
local affairs. Intensive central intervention blurred the division of responsibilities between 
the three different levels of government. Although responsibility for basic health care was 
never formally withdrawn from the district authorities, in practice decisions on the level of 
services and the deli very methods were made at the central level by the Department of 
Health. This practice made local governments feel limited responsibility for the quality of 
services provided by public health centres. To make district authorities accountable for 
basic health services, the task needed to be formally reassigned to them. 
It was stipulated in Government Regulation No 8 of 1987 that all basic health care 
and its referral services were to be performed by regional governments (see table 7 .2). 
Although most of the transferred tasks listed in this regulation had been long carried out by 
the provinces and districts, this regulation empowered local authorities not only to perform 
but also make decision over the transferred functions. Unfortunately, this regulation also 
made the responsibility of all regional governments uniform, and therefore, it was criticized 
for treating the regencies the same way as the municipalities. Municipalities tended to have 
more experienced medical and paramedical staff than the regencies because big cities 
usually offered more opportunities for career development as well as urban amenities. This 
was contrary to regulations introduced during the 1950s, which assigned different health 
tasks to different regions. Consistent with the framework put forward in Law 5 of 1974, 
Government Regulation No. 8 of 1987 also emphasized that the role of the Depkes would 
be limited to providing technical standards and conducting technical supervision over the 
transferred tasks. This regulation also stated that the Department of Home Affairs would 
carry out general supervision over local affairs. While the nature of technical supervision to 
be performed by Department of Health was defined in detail in this regulation, the form of 
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general superv1s1on to be performed by the Department of Home Affairs was left 
1 . d 24 unexp aine . 
To enable regional governments to finance the transferred functions, Regulation No. 
14 of 1987 required that the transfer of funds accompany the transfer of functions from the 
central government. Again, this provision was very much consistent with the policies 
stipulated in Law No. 5 of 1974. However, the regulation did not indicate how this 
stipulation was to be implemented. 
Table 7 .2. The Division of Responsibilities in the Health Sector 
Functions Center Province District 
Policy making Set targets, standards Provide technical Provide proposals for 
assistance to districts Heal th Pro grams 
Curative and Special/ref err al Major Hospital District hospital and 
promotive hospital Puskesmas 
Services Dispensaries/drug 
supplies Dispensaries 
Preventive Public Health and Services Rural water and 
sanitation 
Health Recruitment and Administration 
Personnel training 
Source: summarized from Government Regulation No. 8 of 1987. 
Health Project (HP III) 
The HP III, which was implemented in Kalimantan Timur (Kaltim) and Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (NTB) from 1989 to 1993, was generally intended to enhance efficiency 
24 The failure of Law No. 5 of 1974 to clarify the meaning of the general supervision often raised conflict between the Department of Home Affairs and the technical ministries. Uncle'ar definition, for example, 
enabled The Department of Home Affairs staff to get involved in rather technical matters, such as the preparation of curriculum for nursing school, or the technical aspect of the water supply. 
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and promote the quality of basic health services through integration of health planning and 
budgeting activities, and decentralization of responsibility to manage and finance basic 
health services to the district authorities. Under this project, district authorities were made 
responsible for the services performed by Puskesmas, and to enable them to control 
Puskesmas activities, they were given the authority to plan and supervise the execution of 
health programmes by Puskesmas. 
Like IUIDP, HP III also intended to integrate the planning and budgeting 
mechanism through the preparation of the multi-year program (the macro plan). The macro 
plan specified actions to be taken and contributions made by each level of government 
during the five-year implementation period.25 To allow district officials to prepare the 
macro plan, the Department of Health hired a team of consultants from the University of 
Indonesia to assist the district governments. In addition, the Department of Health also 
organized training courses for local health officers. 
With regard to funding, the Department of Health was quite realistic and intended to 
provide the largest share of HP III funding. Participating districts were, however, required 
to spend their revenues from health fees entirely for basic health services. To increase local 
revenues for the health sector, district governments were allowed to introduce different fees 
for different services in different geographical areas. Lower fees, for example, were charged 
at facilities serving poor populations. In addition, revolving funds for drugs were 
established in district hospitals and Puskesmas to ensure the sustainability of drug 
funding. 26 Under this scheme, the hospitals and health centres were given the authority to 
25 The macro plan serves the same purpose as the PJM. 
26 Under this scheme, the hospitals and Puskesmas were given full authority to manage the drug fund and 
ensure the availability of the drugs they needed. Previously, the drugs were centrally purchased at provincial 
level. This often created the problem of mismatch between what they need and what they received from the 
provincial government. 
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procure drugs. Besides, hospital and Puskesnias managers were also permitted to retain part 
of the revenues they collected and use the funds to finance locally initiated activities that 
could motivate local health staff to improve their service quality. 
Unlike IUIDP preparation, which was difficult and lengthy, the preparation of HP III 
did not take much time. Firstly, most of the necessary documents were prepared solely by 
the Depkes. Secondly, only a few local governments participated in HP III whereas, IUIDP 
was introduced nation-wide. Thirdly, the Department of Health made it clear from the 
beginning that the Department would continue providing grants for major investment. Local 
governments were only expected to contribute fees they collected from health services for 
the operation and maintenance of health facilities in their districts. In the case of IUIDP, in 
addition to operation and maintenance costs, local authorities were also required to 
contribute to capital investment. 
_ Following the signing of the loan agreement between the government of Indonesia 
and the World Bank in 1989, the project management office was established in the 
Department of Health in Jakarta. The Secretary General was made the Project Director, 
responsible for the overall direction of the project, and the Head of Bureau of Planning was 
the project officer, responsible for all technical and administrative aspects of the project. In 
doing his task, the project officer was assisted by a project secretariat headed by an 
Executive Secretary who managed all the administrative matters. As many of the HP III 
innovations dealt with issues outside the purview of the Secretary General, to ensure smooth 
coordination and timely implementation of HP III activities, a Central Technical Task Force 
to review and guide implementation of the project was formed. It was chaired by the 
Director General for Community Health. 
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A similar organizational structure was also formed at provincial and district levels. 
At provincial level, the chief of Kanwil Depkes was made the provincial project officer and 
also the chairman of the Provincial Technical Task Force Team. At district level, the head 
of the District Health Office was also appointed as the project implementation officer and 
chairman of the District Technical Task Force Team. Some advisors were also hired and 
attached to the Provincial Secretariat to help the provincial government to manage the 
implementation of the project. 
Decentralization of health planning and implementation to kabupaten and 
kotamadya was done in two steps. In fiscal year 1990/1991, authority was transferred to the 
provincial government. The staffs of the provincial health office was given the 
responsibility to prepare a plan and budget for all basic health care programs, based on 
information provided by district health offices. The role of Kanwil was reduced to ensuring 
that the decisions made by the provincial governments were in conformity with national 
policies and standards. The provincial health officers were also made responsible for 
supervising the project execution by Puskesmas. In the following year, responsibility to plan 
and implement basic health care programs was further delegated to district health offices. 
The role of the provincial dinas was gradually shifted to assisting district health staff in 
carrying out their tasks. 
Decentralizing the authority for health planning and implementation to the district 
level was not withou~ problems. One obstacle was a lack of trained staff at the district health 
offices. Young medical doctors, who had just completed their compulsory assignment at 
Puskesmas, preferred working at a hospital to taking a managerial position in a district 
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health office. 27 This was because hospitals offered more opportunities for career 
development. Lack of trained staff made it difficult for the district health offices to fulfil 
their obligation. Consequently, to ensure that HP III progressed as scheduled, the project 
provincial secretariat was forced to intervene in the process of project implementation at the 
local level. The dominant role of the provincial secretary, especially in East Kalimantan, 
raised concern about the project's tendency to undermine the importance of strengthening 
local capacity in .assuming the transferred functions. When one of the World Bank advisers 
attached to . the Project Secretariat presented her assessment on the achievements of the 
project to the National Development Planning Board in 1992, Dr. Kristiadi from LAN 
openly criticized her emphasis on the physical progress and financial disbursement, and her 
lack of interest in the process of organizational and staff development at local level. 28 
Another obstacle to strengthening local autonomy was inflexibility in the use of 
funds from the World Bank. To ensure that local governments properly spent the funds, the 
Bank strictly required that the money be spent according to the agreed financing plan, which 
was made prior to loan negotiation. Such a requirement limited local innovation. Moreover, 
as mentioned above, the Bank staff also tended to be more interested in timely loan 
disbursement than local empowerment. It was not surprising if they tended to rely on the 
Project Secretariat rather than the formal government organization in ensuring the timely 
and appropriate execution of project activities. This practice obviously became a hindrance 
to the strengthening of local autonomy. 
27 It was compulsory for fresh graduate medical doctors to serve two years in rural areas outside Java or five years in rural Java. 
28 In her presentation, the Bank advisor praised the timely implementation of the project in East Kalimantan 
and criticised the slow progress of the project in West Nusa Tenggara. Unlike in East Kalimantan, where the provincial secretariat played a significant role in the project execution, in West Nusatenggara, the chairman of the provincial project officer tried to have the jobs done by the involved units or staff. 
242 
Despite all the obstacles, innovations introduced by the HP ill had some positive 
features. The decentralization of health planning and budgeting provided more opportunity 
to local health managers to influence the content of health programs. Before the project, 
their role was limited to supplying information to provincial and central levels. Mechanisms 
introduced by HP ill gave local staff more opportunity to shape the content of the programs 
to be implemented in their districts. The project also enabled them to have a clearer idea of 
the available resources and flexibility in their use, and therefore, to prepare a more rational 
health plan. 
Unfortunately, the National Development Planning Board was still unwilling to 
formally accept procedures initiated under HP ill. Consequently, HP III budgets were still 
to be processed through the traditional bottom-up Rakorbang procedures (see Chapter N). 
This policy had created dualism in the planning system. In addition, the central government 
was still reluctant to recognise the accounting system developed for the drug revolving 
funds. Inflexible attitudes of the central officials discouraged the introduction of reform 
ini ti ati ves. 
Another important innovation under HP III was the introduction of budget 
consolidation. During the preparation period, it was agreed that, to improve efficiency all 
budgets from the Department of Health would be consolidated into one single DIP (project). 
This innovation had also been agreed by relevant parties during the loan negotiation, and 
therefore had also been included in the project document. During the implementation, 
however, this policy could not be easily implemented. The obstacles were both 
administrative and political. Those eight DIPs came from two different sectors in the 
National Budget. This meant they were under the administration of two different divisions 
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in the National Development Planning Board. 29 Since each sector had its own objectives 
and targets , and its own monitoring and reporting system, consolidation would require a 
significant change in the way achievements were monitored and evaluated. Moreover, 
opposition was also found in the Department of Health itself. As the two sectors were 
administered by two different directorates general, there was fear among officials that a 
combined project would reduce their influence over the tasks carried out in the regions. 
After three years delay, it was finally decided that only six DIPs from Health, Social 
Welfare, Women's Role, Population and Family Planning sector would be consolidated into 
one DIP, while the two projects from the Housing and Settlements sector were to be 
administered under separate DIPs. 
Budget consolidation proved to be one of the greatest achievements of HP ill. This 
initiative enabled Puskesmas staff to perform all related activities at one time. Previously, 
Puskesmas ' employees executed specific projects separately and prepared separate reports 
on physical as well as financial progress for every single project. Consolidated budgets 
enabled them to reduce time spent on paper work and integrate the activities for child and 
maternal care with others. Moreover, consolidated DIP had also enabled local officials to 
adjust funding and activities as implementation proceeded. This encouraged better use of 
resources and increased responsiveness to local needs. 
Tariff discrimination was another success story. To assess the affordability of the 
services for the customers, an American consulting agency (RAND Corporation) was hired 
to do the study. Fees for health services were then doubled in some Puskesmas located in 
urban areas in the two provinces. Fees for hospitals were also increased proportionately. 
29 As previously mentioned, the organizational structure of the National Development Planning Board followed the structure of the national budget. Changes in the budgeting procedures might require significant changes in the working procedures within this Board. 
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Preliminary analysis had shown that this initiative, together with the establishment of 
revolving funds for drugs , had improved utilization of Puskes1nas and increased revenues 
from health fees. In some districts , health revenues could cover most of the operational and 
maintenance expenditures of health centres. Formerly, health centre fees covered only 10% 
of the recurrent costs of these facilities (World Bank, 1999: 140). Tariff discrimination was 
expected to reduce government spending on rich areas and to spend more for health services 
in poor villages. 
:HP ill and Local Autonomy 
:HP ill might have achieved many of its objectives. Revolving funds for drug 
ensured the a ailability of drugs in district hospital and Puskesmas. Tariff discrimination, to 
some extent increased the budget available for the operation of Puskesmas and district 
hospitals. Budget consolidation had given Puskesmas staff more flexibility in the execution 
of health programs. Despite these achie ements, the project did not contribute much to 
strengthening local discretion. The central government retained its control over decision-
making. 
Local invol ement in planning budgeting and implementation of the health 
programs v as increased significantly. The dominance of the central government's share in 
:HP ill financing hovve er encouraged • "Cal authorities to propose projects they believed to 
be priorities of the central go ernment. This practice reduced the ability of local 
go ernment to respond to local needs. The need to seek approval from the centre for 
projects prepared by the district authorities al o undermined the autonomy of local 
go ernment . The insistence of pro incial health officers to continue supervising Puskesmas 
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activities further reduced the importance of district health officials in the implementation of 
health programs. 
The involvement of a donor agency in the project limited room for local initiatives. 
The World Bank seemed to emphasize the output rather than the process of implementation. 
Therefore, instead of giving more opportunities to local authorities in achieving project 
objectives, it tended to encourage the active role of the project secretariat at the central as 
well as provincial level. 
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Figure 7 .3 . Organizational Structure for the Provision of Primary Health Care 
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Figure 7 .4. Programming and Budgeting Procedures before and After HP III 
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Decentralization as Administrative Expansion 
In both cases, it was clear that the decision to decentralize was primarily motivated 
by the need to maintain and expand the government's ability to provide public services. The 
drop in oil revenues significantly reduced the ability of the central government to continue 
financing local services. The gap needed to be filled through the mobilization of local 
resources. Therefore, in both cases, the focus was on shifting fiscal responsibility over the 
provision of local services to local authorities. 
The need to make local authorities the autonomous providers of local services did 
not seem to be important to those central ministries because the perception that local 
government only implemented decisions made by the centre was still strongly held in the 
Indonesian bureaucracy. Law No. 5 of 1974 made local governments subordinate to the 
centre. This perception shaped the way they defined decentralization. Decentralization was 
regarded as a reliable means for gathering information about needs and an effective method 
for delivering services to local communities. But the authority to make decisions, therefore, 
remained at the centre. This practice did not seem to be opposed by local governments for 
they believed their main task was to support the achievement of national goals. Moreover, 
their performance was assessed by the centre based on their contributions to . the 
achievement of national targets. 30 
Public officials also tended to believe that effective and efficient provision of public 
services could be achieved through better integration of the three levels of government. 
Decentralization was seen as a means of integrating administration at those three levels. In 
this sense, the idea of autonomous local government contradicted this belief. Moreover, the 
30 In his directives during the dissemination of the pilot project on decentralization in LAN in 1997, Yogi S. 
Memet, the Minister of Home Affairs, clearly stated that the function of the district government was to 
implement policies set by the center, and the function of the provincial government was to supervise the 
execution of the policies by local authorities. 
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political environment during the New Order government caused bureaucrats to neglect the 
importance of promoting the role of local councils in local decision-making and the need to 
establish mechanisms for ensuring that government services were in conformity with local 
needs and preferences. 
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Chapter VIII 
Decentralization in the Post-New Order Era 
This chapter discusses Indonesia's experience implementing decentralization in the 
post-New Order Era. This chapter analyses how the failure of Suharto's government to 
devolve power affected the concept of decentralization introduced in the post-New Order 
Era. As previously discussed, the fall of Suharto's regime allowed the opening of a new 
chapter in the history of decentralization in Indonesia. The lifting of authoritarian 
constraints allowed the regions to openly raise their demands for broader regional autonomy 
and even independence in some parts of the Outer Islands. To counter such demands, 
President Habibie's government issued Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional government to 
replace Law No. 5 of 1974. This law required that broad-ranging power be shifted to district 
authorities. In addition, the government also issued Law No. 25 of 1999 on fiscal balance 
that allowed regional governments to retain a substantial share of revenues produced in their 
regions. These two laws triggered a major institutional reform that could be expected to 
affect the relationships between the centre and the regions and between the government and 
society. 
Circumstances following the fall of Suharto made the country adopt a "big bang" 
approach to decentralization. Suharyo (2003: 1) considers this as the right choice given the 
long time reluctance of the central government to devolve real authority to regional 
governments during the New Order Era. In January 2001 the government commenced 
implementation of the regional autonomy policy, despite the fact that hundreds of 
regulations necessary for implementation were still being prepared. Six weeks later, the 
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government, now led by President Megawati Soekamoputri, announced that the two laws 
were to be amended for they might jeopardize national integration. This announcement 
triggered debate between the nationalists who supported the government's plan to revise the 
laws and scholars who wanted a chance for the two laws to be implemented. While the 
legislation may have had its shortcomings, the decision to revise the law only a few weeks 
after it came into force was seen as an indication of the government's half-hearted approach 
to regional autonomy. 
Indonesia is still 1n its early stage in implementing political decentralization. 
Problems associated with the implementation of decentralization have been widely exposed. 
The program, nevertheless, has resulted in a more balanced relationship between the centre 
and the regions. Euphoria following the lifting of central control has been evident, but 
regional autonomy has contributed to the promotion of democracy and encouraged people's 
participation in local decision-making. 
Background of the Decentralization Program 
The end of Suharto's rule gave rise to widespread demands for democracy and 
empowerment, including broader regional autonomy. Strongest demands for autonomy 
have mostly come from provinces rich with natural resources such as Aceh, Riau, East 
Kalimantan and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya). In Aceh and Papua, the aspirations for broader 
autonomy spurred political and armed conflicts. In other provinces, regional pressures were 
still limited to political demands. But this did not rule out the possibility of more regions 
adopting a tougher stance against the central government, if the government did not show 
its commitment to regional autonomy. 
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To prevent the country from splitting up as a consequence of separatism, the MPR 
issued its decision No. XV of 1998 on Regional Autonomy, Revenue Sharing and Fiscal 
Relations within the Framework of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This decision 
promised broader autonomy to the regions and fair revenue sharing between the centre and 
the regions. In an attempt to win public support, President Habibie, who succeeded 
President Suharto, immediately drafted the bills necessary for implementing the MPR's 
decision. 
At the same time, the issue of regional autonomy had also triggered a debate 
between the supporters of federalism and those who wanted to retain the unitary system. 
The supporters of a federal system mostly came from the Outer islands. 1 But some 
prominent Javanese leaders also showed their support for federalism. The chairman of the 
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) Amin Rais and the former 
Minister of Finance Mar'ie Muhammad were among those who openly called for 
consideration of a federal system. Amin wanted to consider federalism as a long-term 
objective of Indonesia, the first step of which would be giving broader autonomy to the 
regions.2 Mar'ie, however, saw the establishment of federal state as an urgent necessity to 
dissolve growing tension and upheaval in the regions. A loose federal system could 
accommodate the spirit of regionalism and provide a political solution to regional unrest 
which, unless given an outlet, could lead to unilateral action that would break up Indonesia.3 
1 In October 1999, the provincial legislative body of East Kalimantan urged the central government to form a 
federal state. People in Riau Province were split into two groups: those who demanded a federal system and 
those who wanted independence. Students from South Sulawesi also marched on the street to demand a federal 
system. 
2 Republika, 3 September 1999, 'Indef: Broader Autonomy as the First Step to Federalism'; Jakarta Post, 18 
November, 1999, 'Amin says federal state remains a viable option' .. 
3 Jakarta Post, 6 May 1999, 'Mar'ie sides with the federalist camp'. 
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Supporters of the unitary system mostly came from the nationalists and the military. 
They argued that a federal system could be the first step to national disintegration because 
federalism might instigate the emergence of sub-nationalism, which may challenge the unity 
of the nation. Minister of Defence General Wiranto and the chairman of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party- Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan or PDI-P) Megawati 
were among the main supporters of the unitary system.4 
Such political circumstances made President Habibie' s government introduce 
political decentralization through the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional 
Government. The concept of decentralization introduced in Law 22 of 1999 differs greatly 
from those introduced earlier, which focused more on administrative decentralization. In 
addition, the government introduced fiscal decentralization through the issuance of Law No. 
25 of 1999 on fiscal balance. This law gives the regions a better share of revenues collected 
in their regions. It was aimed at addressing regional demands for a fair share of revenues 
between the centre and the regions. 
Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government 
Law No. 22 of 1999 was basically designed for the establishment of a democratic 
system of local government. In Article 1 of this Law, decentralization is defined as the 
transfer of authority to autonomous regions. Regional autonomy is no longer defined in 
terms of the responsibility to support national development, but in terms of the rights of the 
regions to make decisions over responsibilities fallirig within their jurisdictions. This 
4 Kompas, 3 May 1999, Federalism is impossible, and Republika, 14 December 1999, the Position of the Military in Regional Autonomy Era. 
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indicated the government's intention to shift its policy from transferring administrative 
authority to the transfer of political power to the regions. 
Under Law 22, the power was largely transferred to the districts (kabupaten and 
kotamadya), by passing the provinces. 5 The goal was to empower the district governments . 
Article 2 of this Law establishes two levels of autonomous government, at the provincial 
and the district levels. Unlike Law No. 5 of 1974, the relationship between the two levels of 
government is no longer hierarchical. (Article 4 (2)). As a consequence, the terms" first" 
and "second" levels are no longer used in Law No. 22. 
Law No. 22 defines an expanded role for the regional governments. As stipulated in 
Article 7 of this Law, all functions except those reserved for the central government are 
decentralized to the regions. The authority reserved for the central government includes 
foreign relations, national defence and security, monetary and fiscal affairs, religion and 
policy formulation on macro-economic development planning, state economic institutions, 
development of human resources, the exploitation of strategic natural resources and the use 
of high technology. 
In contrast to Article 7 which gives authority to exploit strategic natural resources to 
the central level, Article 8 empowers the regions to manage national natural resources 
within their territories, including those related to exploration, exploitation, conservation and 
management of marine resources. It seems that this article was added in response to regional 
demands for more control over their natural resources. But such a contradiction became a 
source of conflict between the central and regional governments, as the Law did not clarify 
the meaning of II strategic II in this context. 
5 The term 'region' covers both provinces and districts. 
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Law No. 22 also limits the scope of authority in the provinces. In Article 9 it is 
stated that the provinces are given authority to administer cross-district matters and any 
field, which is currently beyond the capacity of a particular district to handle. As the 
provincial government also functions as an administrative unit, the provinces are also 
responsible for exercising central authority given to the Governors. The authority of the 
districts, according to Article 11, is residual. But the districts are expected to carry out as a 
minimum the functions of public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, 
communications, industry and trade, investment, environment, security, cooperatives and 
labour force. This Article was probably intended to ensure that those functions were 
decentralized to the districts, even in cases where managerial capacity is limited. Previously, 
most of those functions were held at the provincial level. 
Law No. 22 strengthens the power of the regional councils (DPRD) at both 
provincial and district levels. This body, according to Article 18 of the Law, is empowered 
to elect and, if necessary, discharge the regional head and deputy regional head. The DPRD, 
together with the regional head, prepares policies at the regional level and promulgates 
regional legislation (Peraturan Daerah - Perda). The DPRD's approval is necessary for 
regional annual budget allocations (APBD). 6 
The DPRD is also empowered to supervise the implementation of regional policies, 
including the implementation of regional legislation and regional revenue and expenditure 
budgets and the implementation of international cooperation in the region concerned. To 
exercise its supervisory function, the DPRD is given the power to express opinions, propose 
regional legislation and stipulate budget expenditure. 
6 Under Law No. 22 of 1999, the central approval for APBD is no longer needed. 
256 
Law No. 22 also makes the DPRD the principal agent for accountability in the 
region. Article 19 of this Law empowers the DPRD to require the accountability of the 
regional head, to seek information from the regional head and conduct investigations into 
the implementation of regional policies.7 Article 20 paragraph (1) of Law No. 22 also 
empowers the DPRD to call people to provide it with information. Government officers or 
members of the community refusing the request as intended in paragraph (1) can be 
imprisoned for a maximum period of one year for contempt of the DPRD. Procedures for 
exercising those powers are to be prepared by the DPRD and should be included in the 
DPRD's Tata Tertib (Code of Conduct). 
The DPRD elects a regional head and a deputy regional head for a five-year period 
through a democratic process - in contrast to the old system under which the formality of an 
election in fact disguised the reality of appointment. The two candidates who obtain the 
most votes are appointed the Head and Deputy Head of the Region. After completing their 
term in office, the regional head and his or her Deputy may be elected for the second time. 
The regional head and deputy regional head are sworn in by the President or another official 
on behalf of the President. It is not clear what would happen if the President refused to 
swear in a Governor or Bupati-elect. 
Article 43 defines the responsibilities of regional head, which includes ensunng 
national integration, enf arcing laws and regulations, maintaining order, proposing bills for 
regional legislation and, with the approval of the DPRD, promulgating regional legislation. 
Article 44 empowers regional heads to lead the implementation of the government's 
functions in the region, based on policies approved by the DPRD. 
7 See also Articles 44. 
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In pe1forming his or her duties and authorities the regional head shall be responsible 
to the DPRD. An accountability report should be presented to the DPRD at the end of the 
fiscal year. In addition, a regional head needs to present his or her accountability report on 
special cases as requested by the DPRD (Article 46). The regional head is also obliged to 
report on the implementation of his or her duties to the President through the Minister of 
Home Affairs once a year or as requested by the President. 
Law No. 22 gives the regional administration authority over the management of the 
regional bureaucracy. In Article 68 it is stated that regional administrations decide the 
structure of regional government organization, based on guidelines provided by the central 
government. In Article 76, it is also stipulated that the regions have the authority to recruit 
new staff, appoint them, assess their performance, promote them, pay their salary and 
allowances, and improve their capacity through training programs. The implementation is to 
be detailed in a government regulation. 
As previously mentioned, Law No. 22 gives the regional head the authority to 
promulgate regional legislation, with the approval of the DPRD. In article 70, it is stipulated 
that legislation issued by regional governments should not be in conflict with national 
interests, other regional legislation and regulations issued by a higher level of government. 
It is not clear in the Law whether the central government could revoke legislation issued by 
the regions. 
Law No. 22 requires the formation of the Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah 
(Advisory Council for Regional Autonomy, DPOD). Its membership consisted of the State 
Minister for Regional Autonomy, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Defence, and the State Minister for the Utilization of the State Apparatus, the 
State Secretary, 3 representatives of regional associations and 6 regional representatives. 
258 
This committee is given the task of advising the President on: a) the formation , the abolition 
and amalgamation of regional governments; b) fiscal relations; and c) regional capacity to 
carry out decentralized functions. In carrying out its tasks, this committee is assisted by a 
secretariat, which is responsible to the chairman of the DPOD. 
Law No. 25 of 1999 on Fiscal Balance 
As previously mentioned, Law No. 22 was accompanied by Law No. 25 on Fiscal 
Balance. Under this Law, all transferred functions are the financial responsibility of the 
regions through their expenditure budgets. This expenditure, according to Article 5, is to be 
financed from the following sources: the region's own revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or 
PAD), the equalization fund (Dana Perimbangan), loans and other legitimate revenues. 
Own revenue here includes revenue from local taxes and levies, profits made by regional 
enterprises and other legitimate sources. The equalization fund consists of shared taxes, 
general grants (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) and special grants (Dana Alokasi Khusus or 
DAK) for special programs. 
This law also specifies the formula for sharing revenues between the different 
governments. This sharing formula was basically introduced to address the aspirations of 
the resource-rich regions to enjoy a greater share of revenue derived from their resources. 
As previously discussed, following the fall of Suharto protests had escalated in Aceh, Riau, 
East Kalimantan and Irian J aya over the perceived unfair distribution of revenue by the 
central government. In response to these demands, the central government agreed to provide 
the regions with a significant share of revenue derived from their resources. 
Under this law, regional governments retained 90 percent of revenue from land 
building tax and 80 percent of revenue from logging, mining and fishing activities. In 
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addition, they would also get 15 percent of revenue after tax from oil and 40 percent from 
natural gas. Besides this, the regional government would also control about 40 percent of 
funds for forestation. 
At the same time the law was also designed to ensure that resource-poor areas were 
able to share in national development. Article 7 of this law stipulates that at least 25 
percent of the national budget should be redistributed to the regions (22.5 percent is for the 
regencies/municipalities and the remaining 2.5 percent for the provinces) for the purpose 
of equalization. This general grant (DAU) is given in the form of a block grant. The 
distribution of this fund is to be determined by DPOD based on the needs and economic 
potential of the regions. 8 The detailed formula is to be specified in a government regulation. 
As stipulated in Article 8, the central government also provides a special grant 
(DAK). This fund is intended to finance projects that are considered of high priority from 
the national perspective, such as reforestation and compulsory education. This type of grant 
needs a matching budget from the regional government. 
The law has raised concerns about the increasing inequality between regions. An 
official from the National Development Planning Agency (B appenas) calculated that if the 
Law were applied, the four resource-rich provinces would make enormous gains, while 10 
provinces would face bankruptcy. But, an official of the Department of Finance argued that 
through DAU the central government could ensure that a minimum level of public service 
would be provided in each district.9 
8 DPOD plays a limited role in the distribution of DAU. The distribution is actually done by the Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, based on survey conducted by a number of 
universities. 
9 Kompas, 27 August 1999. 
260 
Initial Implementation of Regional Autonomy Plan 
Following the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999 and Law No. 25 of 1999, general 
elections were held for members of legislative bodies at national and regional levels. In 
October, the MPR was formed. Following its formation, this supreme body elected 
Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth President of Indonesia, to replace President Habibie. 
To show his strong commitment to regional autonomy, President Wahid included in 
his cabinet the position of the State Minister for Regional Autonomy, responsible for 
preparing the necessary arrangements for implementing regional autonomy. In addition, he 
appointed Ryaas Rasyid, the main drafter of Law No. 22, to the newly created position. 
Since Law No. 22 was not sufficient to provide a legal basis for implementing 
regional autonomy, Ryaas' first task was to coordinate the preparation of more than 200 
new regulations to enforce the laws. Besides this, he also had to amend many other laws to 
synchronize them with the implementation of regional autonomy. At the same time, the 
Minister of Finance, Bambang Sudibyo, also prepared five regulations to enforce Law No. 
25 on fiscal balance. Those regulations clarify formulae on sharing profits from natural 
resources and on cross-subsidies from resources-rich regions to less developed ones. 
Up to December 1999, little progress had been made on preparations for the regional 
autonomy program. Meanwhile, the regions were impatient to exercise their authority. 
Some non-governmental organizations openly criticized the government for being tardy in 
its preparations to implement the regional autonomy plan. 10 In December 1999, the 
parliament also urged the government to implement regional autonomy to minimize the 
threat of national disintegration and separatist activities. 
1
° For example, the Community of West Kalimantan and the Council of Bishops. 
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In response, the Central Government announced its decision to double its grants to 
the troubled provinces of Aceh, Riau and Irian J aya. In February 2000, the government 
stated that the regional autonomy plan would be implemented in April 2000, although most 
of the supporting regulations had yet to be prepared. A few months later, the Government 
postponed the implementation of Law No. 22 of 1999 to September and then to January 
2001. 
Despite the deadline of January 2001, Ryaas indicated that the implementation 
would partly depend on the readiness of the regions to carry it out. A full implementation of 
regional autonomy would be conducted in provinces and regencies if, from the perspective 
of their human resources and managerial skills, they were prepared. 11 Laode Ida, a 
researcher from the Center for Regional Development Studies (PSPK) suggested that the 
government set a timeframe for the transitional phase in implementing the regional 
autonomy law. 12 
In April 2000, President Wahid signed a decree on the formation of the DPOD. This 
committee was in charge of providing advice to the President and Parliament on the 
formation of new autonomous units. The implementation of regional autonomy had also 
provided some impetus for communities and ethnic groups to demand separate provinces 
or district status. By the end of year 2000, four new provinces and almost 40 new districts 
had been formed. 13 
At the same time, the President also signed decree No. 52 of 2000 on the 
Coordinating Team for the Implementation of Law No. 22 of 1999 and Law No. 25 of 1999. 
11 Jakarta Post, 6 March, 2000, 'Regional autonomy not as easy as it sounds'. 
12 Jakarta Post, 1 May 2001 , 'Regional autonomy needs transitional period: researchers'. 
13 Demands to have a separate province were first raised in Gorontalo, Kepulauan Riau and Bangka-Belitung 
in the early 1960s. During Suharto's rule, these demands were effectively neutralized. While the Law on the 
formation of Gorontalo and Bangka-Belitung provinces was signed in 1999, the Law on the formation of 
Kepulauan Riau province was adopted in October 2002. 
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The State Minister for Regional Autonomy chaired this team and its members consisted of 
high-ranking officials from all related ministries. This team was responsible for preparing 
the strategy for the implementation of the two laws, drafting supporting regulations for 
implementing them and monitoring the progress of implementation. This team would 
report directly to the President. 
In May 2000, one year after the enactment of Law No. 22, the government 
promulgated Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 on the authority of the central and 
provincial governments. This was the most crucial and long-awaited regulation for it would 
provide the basis for local governments to exercise their authority. 
Unfortunately, this regulation failed to clarify the division of power between the 
different levels of government. All activities to be performed by the central and provincial 
government are listed in this regulation, but it is not clear what powers are actually being 
devolved to the district level. Moreover, responsibility over most sectors is shared. 
Meanwhile, it is not clear how the coordination should be done. As a scholar noted, the 
regulation fails to clarify where the power to govern lies. 
Another problem with this regulation is that it expanded the role of the central 
government in almost every sector. In this regulation, the authority of the central 
government to formulate national norms and standards is interpreted as the obligation of the 
central government to provide detailed guidelines for the implementation of all activities 
taking place in the regions. Those guidelines obviously reduce the autonomy of the districts. 
Besides, it was very unlikely that those guidelines could be made available by the target 
date of 1 January 2001. 
In August 2000, President Wahid reformed his cabinet and merged the Office of the 
State Minister for Regional Autonomy with the Department of Home Affairs. Under this 
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new arrangement, the responsibility to coordinate the implementation of the regional 
autonomy plan was given to the Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy Surjadi 
Sudirdja. 
To some scholars, the closure of the State Ministry of Regional Autonomy indicated 
that the Government did not consider regional autonomy a priority. The Central 
Government's half-hearted approach to regional autonomy policy was also underlined by 
the appointment of Surjadi Sudirdja - a retired military officer - as the Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy because he did not seem to support the implementation of 
. 1 1· 14 reg1ona autonomy po icy. 
To ensure that the regional autonomy plan would be effectively implemented, Ryaas 
Rasyid, who was appointed the Minister for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
(Men.PAN), proposed the formation of a special constitutional body. This body, according 
to Ryaas, could act as a propeller engine to boost sectoral decentralization. It could take the 
form of a decentralization council, whose members would come from government 
ministries. The council would prevent centralistic ambitions in the bureaucracy and cut the 
red tape to bring about concrete and effective changes. Ryaas's proposal was, however, 
rejected by President Wahid. Instead, he established the Directorate General of Regional 
Autonomy within the Department of Home Affairs to take up the tasks previously 
performed by the State Ministry for Regional Autonomy. Differences between President 
Wahid and Ryaas Rasyid on the way to pursue regional autonomy policy finally led to 
Ryaas' resignation from the cabinet. 
14 In a press conference held in Jakarta 19 March 2000, Surjadi Sudirdja emphasized that most regions were 
unprepared , and they even did not know what regional autonomy was (see also Media Indonesia, 20 March 
2000). 
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In late September 2000, President Wahid signed Government Regulation No. 84 of 
2000 on the guidelines on the structure of regional governments. This regulation provides 
another deviation from the original intention of Law No. 22. In Article 68 of the Law, it is 
stated that regions have authority to decide the design of their organization, based on the 
distinctive needs and conditions of their regions. To the contrary, Government Regulation 
No. 84 of 2000 encouraged the establishment of a uniform structure for regional 
administrations. 
Government Regulation No. 84 of 2000 introduces a "one size fits all" hierarchy for 
regional officials. At the provincial level, the top position is the Provincial Secretary at 
eselon Ia. 15 Below the Provincial Secretary are the heads of provincial Dinas at eselon Ila. 
At the district level, the top position is the District Secretary, at eselon Ila. Below the 
Secretary are the heads of District Dinas at eselon Ilb. 
This regulation was criticized for it did not take into account the different sizes of 
provinces and districts. For example, the secretaries for Mojokerto Municipality with 
100.000 citizens and Surabaya Municipality with almost 3 million residents have the same 
status. Clearly the task of the Secretary of the metropolitan city of Surabaya is much more 
complex than that of the Secretary of the town of Mojokerto. 
The lack of logic in the regulation is best illustrated by comparing a small province 
with a large city. The entire Province of Bengkulu is smaller than the City of Surabaya, but 
the rank or eselon of the Secretary of Bengkulu Province is higher that that of Surabaya 
Municipality. 16 
15 Administrative positions in the Indonesia'_s bureaucracy are stratified into five levels of eselon (eselon I, 
eselon II, eselon II, eselon IV and eselon V). Each eselon is differentiated into two classes, A (senior) and B 
Uunior). Eselon I is the highest eselon and eselon Vis the lowest eselon. 
16 See Discussion Paper No. 14 on Guidelines for Organizational Planning, Program on Capacity Building, 
Asian Development Bank in cooperation with University of Canberra, SMEC International and PT Intersys. 
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Following the promulgation of Regulation No. 84 of 2000, all district authorities 
rearranged their organizational structures. A number of new working units (dinas, badan 
and kantor) were formed in many districts to take up the tasks previously performed by the 
field offices of the central and provincial governments. Regulation No. 84 did not set a limit 
on the number of working units to be formed, and therefore, there was great concern in the 
centre that the regions would establish more units than they really needed. 
The evidence available shows that following the rearrangement the number of 
working units in many districts, especially in the Outer Islands, tended to increase. 
Kabupaten Minahasa, for example, established more than 20 service units ( dinas) and a 
dozen of offices (kantor) and agencies (badan). But districts in the Central Java and in the 
Special Province of Yogyakarta tended to down size. Kabupaten Kudus , for example, only 
had 7 dinas and 9 other working units (see table 8.1) 
Tabel 8.1. Number of District Working Units before and after Decentralization 
No. District Before After Change 
1. Minahasa (North Sulawesi) 20 34 14 
2. Bolaang Mangondow (North Sulawesi) 16 25 9 
3 Gorontalo (Gorontalo) 13 25 12 
4. Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) 25 33 8 
5. Sanggau (West Kalimantan) 18 25 7 
6. Magetan (East Java) 22 26 4 
7. Kudus (Central Java) 16 16 0 
8. Karo (North Sumatra) 15 19 4 
9. Simalungun (North Sumatra) 39 1'/ 28 -11 
Source: Smeru Field report, 2002. 
Government Regulation No. 84 of 2000 also upgraded the status of the head of a 
dinas from eselon ID to II. Such an upgrading has caused the number of eselon II positions 
17 This number may not be accurate because Simalungun is only a small district. Even larger district such as 
the City of Banjarmasin had only 25 working units before decentralization. 
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in each district to increase from 1 to a range of 15 to 36. 18 As a consequent, the number of 
eselon III and IV positions also grew significantly. 19 As the holders of eselon positions are 
entitled to position allowances ranging from Rp 140,000 to Rp. 3.5 million per month, the 
policy to upgrade the status of dinas had caused local government payrolls to increase. 
To cut the red tape in the provision of public services, Government Regulation No. 
84 abolished eselon V (the lowest eselon) at the district level. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of this policy created more inefficiency. Most eselon V positions were 
actually upgraded to eselon IV, although many of them were too small to have an eselon IV 
status. This created the problem of inequality for the holders of these newly upgraded 
positions who were on a much higher monthly allowance, despite the fact that they still 
performed the same tasks. This also added to the increase in the budget for personnel. 
Government Regulation No. 84 was accompanied by the Presidential Decree No. 61 
of 2000 that set the schedule for the closure of the central government's regional offices in 
all districts. Following the issuance of this decree, 1nost field offices of the central 
departments and agencies were abolished and their tasks as wen as staff vvere transferred to 
related units under provincial and district goven1ments. By the end of 2000, almost 2 
n1i1lions central civil servants, including school teachers and medical staff, had been 
transfe1Ted20 This has a significant impact on the local goverrunent payrolls. 
In addition to Regulation No. 84, the central government introduced in October 2000 
Government Regulations No. 96 to 101 related to the management of civil servants. In 
contradiction to Regulation ·No. 84, these regulations give the regional heads full authority 
18 Based on data available in the State Ministry of the Utilization of the State Apparatus. 
19 Each dinas head supervises three to four sub-dinas heads, and each sub-dinas head supervises three to four 
section heads. 
20 They did not physically move for they had been in the regions, but working in the field organizations of the 
central departments and agencies. 
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to manage their own personnel. Under regulation No. 96 of 2000, regional heads are fully 
responsible for defining formasi (size of local government), recruiting new personnel, 
appointing staff, assessing performance, promoting staff and paying salaries and 
allowances. 
To implement Law No. 25, the Department of Finance issued Government 
Regulation No. 104 on fiscal balance in November 2000. This regulation defines the 
detailed formula for sharing revenues from the exploitation of natural resources in the 
regions. It also defines the formula for calculating the amount of general grant allocations 
(DAU) to each province and district. In addition, the government also issued its regulation 
No. 105 of 2000 on financial management and accountability for the transferred activities. 
This regulation provides the detailed procedures for preparing and implementing the annual 
revenue and expenditure budget (APBD). It also stipulates mechanisms that can be used by 
the DPRD in controlling the implementation of annual budgets by the executive. Besides 
these, the government also issued Regulation No. 106 of 2000 on financial management -and 
accountability for the deconcentrated activities. 
At the same time, the government issued Regulation No. 108 of 2000 on the Form of 
Accountability of the regional head. Some provisions of the regulation appear to be 
deliberately contrary to Law No. 22, perhaps in an effort to overcome some senous 
problems being faced by a large number of regions across the country, where the DPRDs 
were not taking their duties as supervisors on behalf of the electorate seriously, but appeared 
intent merely on opposing the incumbent Head of the Region. 21 
21 Following the enactment of Law No. 22 of 1999, DPRD in most regions the DPRD tended to find fault 
regional head 's accountability report. 
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Regulation No. 108 of 2000 requires the regional head to present a report on the 
implementation of the budget (APED) in accordance with the Region's Strategic Plan 
(Rencana Strategis or Renstra) to the DPRD. This report should be read in a plenary session 
within three months of the end of fiscal year. 22 The DPRD has one month to evaluate it. 
The DPRD can reject the report on the ground that the budget deviates from Renstra. The 
decision to accept or reject is made in a plenary session that must be attended by 2/3 of the 
members. Any decision to reject the report must be carried out by a 2/3 majority, which 
must include at least one member from each faction. 23 If the report is rejected, the regional 
head has 30 days to improve the report. The improved report is evaluated by the same 
procedure. 
When a majority of less than 2/3 votes to reject the annual accountability report, a 
mediator (Independent Commission) is needed. This Commission is an independent panel 
formed by the Minister of Home Affairs in the name of the President, or by the Governor in 
the name of the Minister, whose task is to investigate the reasons why the DPRD rejected 
the accountability of the Head of the Region. 
If the report is still rejected, the DPRD can recommend that the regional head and 
his deputy be dismissed. Upon receiving such a recommendation, the president or governor 
would form an independent commission of enquiry (komisi penyelidik independent), 
consisting of local experts who are non-partisan, and acknowledged by the community. If 
the commission finds that the DPRD decision is not in accordance with the applicable 
22 Renstra contains a regional vision, mission, objectives, strategies, programs and activities. It is prepared 
shortly ( one month) after the elections based on policies agreed between the DPRD and regional head. 
23 The figure of 2/3 quorum comes from article 50 of Law No. 22 of 1999, which applies not to accountability 
but to meetings on the dismissal of regional head. The requirement of obtaining the support of at least one 
representative from each faction will be a significant restriction. 
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stipulations, the decision is overturned and the DPRD must rehabilitate the good name of 
the regional head. There is no provision to challenge the decision of the commission. 
Regulation No. 108 also requires the regional head to present his or her report to the 
DPRD no later than two months before the end of his term of office. The scope of the 
report, according to Article 7 of the regulation, should cover performance of his or her 
duties in general governance and in development during the whole period of his office, 
measured against the Renstra. The DPRD has one month to evaluate the report. If they have 
not completed the evaluation in one month, the report is to be taken as accepted. If the 
DPRD finds that performance falls short of the Renstra then the DPRD may reject the 
report. As for the annual report, the decision is made in the plenary session that must be 
attended by 2/3 members and any decision to reject the report must be carried by a 2/3 
majority, which must include a member of each faction. 
Regulation No. 84 also provides for the regional head to present his or her 
accountability report on specific issues to the DPRD. The regional head or the deputy may 
prepare this report on his or her own initiative, or at the request at least 1/3 of the members 
of the DPRD. The regional head may be called before the DPRD. Within one month of 
receiving the explanation, the DPRD must conduct a meeting to debate it. The DPRD can 
form a special committee (panitia khusus or Pansus) to examine the statement, and on the 
basis of the committee's findings, the DPRD may decide to accept or reject it. If the DPRD 
rejects it, it hands the matter over to the appropriate parties. Permission to initiate criminal 
investigation must be obtained from the President for Governors and or Department of 
Home Affairs for Bupati and W alikota. If the regional head and deputy are charged as 
suspects, they are to be temporarily suspended. If they are then found guilty, they are to be 
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dismissed, but if not guilty they are to be restored to the office and their good names 
rehabilitated. 
The Beginning of the Regional Autonomy Era 
In January 2001 the government entered a new era with the implementation of the 
regional autonomy policy. The policy was greeted mostly by pessimism at the national 
level, as officials feared that it would lead to a period of bureaucratic chaos. The chairman 
of the MPR Amien Rais, for example, said that he was pessimistic as he predicted the 
pitfalls ahead. Ryaas Rasyid, who drafted the regional autonomy law, also predicted the 
policy would be counterproductive because most regions were not sufficiently prepared to 
run autonomous administrations. 24 
Despite the apparent pessimism 1n Jakarta, regional administrations were very 
optimistic about the new regional autonomy policy. A speaker of the local council in West 
Sumatera, for example, stated that his office was ready to face its new responsibility. But 
Ramlan Surbakti, a political scientist at Airlangga Univerity in Surabaya and a member of 
Ryaas' team that drew up the initial autonomy law, warned that the regions might face the 
problem of inadequate human resources in their rush to obtain more control over their 
affairs. As previously discussed, well-trained civil servants usually work for the central 
departments or agencies.25 
In line with the implementation of regional autonomy, the central government 
allocated funds to the regions to finance their administrations, including civil servants' 
wages and development programs. The amount of DAU allocated to the regions for the 
24 Jakarta Post, 2 January 2001, 'Pessimism Greeted Regional Autonomy on Day One'. 
25 Jakarta Post, 30 December 2000, 'All 364 regencies prepared for regional Autonomy: Apkasi'. 
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fiscal year of 2001 reached Rp 60.5 trillion. In addition to DAU, the government also 
allocated special funds to accelerate the implementation of prioritized programs such as 
education and reforestation. 
The first few weeks of implementing the autonomy law was characterized by 
complete uncertainty, misperception and confusion among all parties on the direction of the 
decentralization process. For example, there was uncertainty about the future career of the 
central administrative staff, who had previously worked for the regional offices of the 
central departments in the provinces and districts.26 Officially the regions should employ 
them. However, the regions made it clear that those who represented the central elite were 
not welcome to join the local bureaucracy. As a compromise, some position including the 
position of the deputy chairman, were then created in each dinas for the transferred staff. 27 
There was also confusion in some regions about how they would pay the salaries and 
allowances of civil servants working for the local bureaucracy. Previously, all civil servants 
expenses were paid by the central government through its SDO scheme28 while local own 
revenue was spent only for development activities. Under Law No. 25, the SDO scheme 
was abolished and central subsidies were channelled through DAU. But in some districts, 
the amount of DAU they received was much lower than their expenses for civil servants 
because DAU was intended to fill the gap between local expenditures and revenues without 
taking into account additional salaries. This meant that the districts would have to spend 
part of their own revenue for personnel. Regional administrations regarded this policy as 
unfair and refused to pay the transferred staff. Finally,· additional subsidies were given to 
ensure that all civil servants were paid. In addition, 1.2 million of elementary school 
26 School teachers and medical staff were automatically employed in their former schools or hospital. 
27 Based on interview with Mr. Suryanto, the former Deputi to the State Minister for the Utilization of the 
State apparatus. 
28 SDO is subsidy for autonomous unit (see Chapter IV). 
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teachers were still paid through SDO. Therefore, in the fiscal year 2001 local government 
payrolls grew only by approximately 46 percent (World Bank, 2003:14). Salary payment, 
however, increased by 321 percent in North Sumatra Province, 258 percent in East Nusa 
Tenggara and 255 percent in West Nusa Tenggara (Suharyo, 2003: 6). 
In the fiscal year 2002, local government payrolls increased dramatically, as local 
authorities had to pay salary and allowances for all local civil servants. In addition, the 
government policy to consolidate "the cost of Ii ving allowance" with the basic salary that 
resulted in salary increases from 14 to 30 percent had also caused the budget for personnel 
to further increase. The impact of those policies to local budgets has been significant, 
especially in small regions with little income.29 To reduce the burden, Dr. Darsono, the 
Director General of Regional Autonomy proposed that allowances in poor districts to be 
reduced by half. This idea was, however, rejected by other officials.30 
In most regions, the transfer of authority to the regional head over the management 
of civil servants has been abused. Following the introduction of this regulation, most 
districts wanted to recruit new staff, despite the fact that vacant positions could actually be 
filled by the transferred civil servants from the central and provincial governments. 
Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara, which is rich with natural resources, planned to recruit 8617 
new staff. Kabupaten East Flores, one of the poorest districts, wanted to have 2981 new 
staff (see Table 8.2). This tendency has raised concerns over the growing size of the 
29 As revealed by the Director General of Budget Anshary Ritonga in a meeting in the Department of Home 
Affairs in October 2001, total budget for salary and allowances of local civil servants and honoraria for 
member of local councils in some districts increased by ten-fold. See also Media Indonesia, 3 April 2002, 
Faisal isyaratkan rasionalisasi PNS. 
30 To reduce local government payrolls , Government Regulation No. 8 of 2003 was introduced to replace 
Government Regulation No. 84 of 2000. In this new regulation, the number of dinas at the district level was 
restricted to 14. In addition, the government also issued a circular that requires regional government to get 
approval from the centre in defining the size of local bureaucracy, including the number of new staff to be 
recruited. 
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bureaucracy. The central government finally decided to set quota on the number of new 
recruitment for every district and province. But some regions ignored such a policy. The 
province of Banten, for example, insisted in recruiting more than 900 new staff, despite the 
fact that this province could not afford to pay for the salary and allowances of those newly 
recruited staff. 
Tabel 8.2. Recruitment of New Staff in Several Districts in 2001. 
No. District Proposed Quota 
1. Kutai Kartanegara 8617 200 
2. City of Kediri 4297 450 
3. East Flores 2981 100 
4. Kabupaten Na tuna 200 350 
5. Kabupaten Kendari 1000 100 
Source: the State Ministry for the Utilization of the State Apparatus 
In most regions, the process of selection was never made transparent. This has become the 
concern of the community. 31 In addition, the authority of the regional head to appoint staff 
to eselon positions has been abused in many regions. Regional heads tended to appoint their 
followers to strategic positions, without considering their experience and educational 
backgrounds. As a result, many district officials were not qualified for their positions. In 
Kabupaten N atuna, none of the staff working in the district treasury office has experience or 
training in financial management, and a graduate from political science chaired the district 
31 Hundreds of complaints were sent to President through Tromol Pos 5000. 
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health office. In Kabupaten West Lombok, an elementary school teacher was appointed 
head of the district public works office. This tendency of appointing inappropriate people 
has raised concerns about the quality of local administration. 
In most provinces, there has been pressure on the regional head to grant government 
positions to local people, regardless of the qualifications required. In some regions, the 
demand for granting positions to locals was extended to multi-national companies. In Riau, 
students broke into the Caltex headquarters several times to demand the appointment of 
natives of the province to some positions. In East Kalimantan, local people blockaded the 
only access to a mining site because they did not feel that the existence of this mining 
activity benefited natives of the region. This trend has put some mining companies in limbo, 
and had a negative impact on the campaign for wide regional autonomy. 
In almost all regions, autonomy was perceived as the right of the regions to make 
policies at will. Many of those polices were in fact in conflict with the intention of regional 
autonomy. The policy to increase fees at local public health centres, for example, had 
reduced the access of the poor to health services. This was not in line with one of the 
objectives of regional autonomy, to provide better services to the community. 
The government's step toward financial decentralization has also encouraged 
regional administrations to use their power to generate revenues by creating new taxes. In 
four districts in East and South Kalimantan, for example, taxes were levied on mining 
companies operating within their regions, aside from the list of taxes payable by the 
company under the Contracts of Works (CoWs) awarded by the Central Government to the 
companies. This policy was obviously in conflict with that set by the Department of Mining 
and Mineral Resources. 
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In East Java, many districts imposed a number of distribution taxes on goods 
moving in and out of the region. In Lampung, local administrators had also introduced 
distribution taxes on all goods entering from other provinces and those to be shipped or 
delivered out of the provinces. The imposition of such taxes, according to Soy Pardede of 
Kadin, had severely hurt local businessmen. Such taxes also created domestic trade barriers 
that would cost Indonesia the competitiveness of its product and impede growth of local and 
foreign investments. Trade barriers can create economic isolation among the regions, he 
said.32 
Regional governments' hunger for cash had also caused overexploitation of natural 
resources. In Riau, the provincial and district administrations were competing with each 
other to issue permits for sand quarrying, despite opposition from local fishermen because 
of environmental degradation. 33 In Irian and Kalimantan, for example, the district 
administrations issued legislation that permitted some companies to exploit forests. A 
million cubic meters of logs were sent out of the provinces. In January 2001, even before 
the implementation of regional autonomy, the central government revealed that millions of 
hectares of forest had been found to be either damaged or in a critical condition. This 
included national parks and conservation forests. 34 
The fight to control natural resources had also increased tension among districts and 
between the different levels of government. In East Java, a group of fishermen called for a 
ban on fishing boats from neighbouring areas entering certain waters. Conflict occurred 
between Serang Regency in Banten and the Department of Transportation over the 
32 Jakarta Post, 4 April 2001, 'Decentralization of fiscal rules threatens domestic trade'. 
33 According to the Minister for Fishery and Marine Resources, Rukhmin, Riau exported sand with the value 
of approximately Rp 2 trillions (US$ 200 million) a year. From 80 percent to 85 percent of land reclamation in 
Singapore used sand from Riau. Singapore is estimated to need 1.8 billion cubic meters of sand in the next 
eight years. Demand is expected to increase with more reclamation projects already announced in Malaysia. 
34 Jakarta Post, 23 December 2000, 'Forests endangered by regional autonomy'. 
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management of Serang seaport. Meanwhile, Jakarta had a quarrel with the Tangerang 
District over the revenue received from Sukarno-Hatta international airport. 
Six weeks after the formal implementation of the Regional Autonomy Law, the 
Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy, Surjadi Sudirdja, announced that the 
government and the House of Representatives would review it. In his announcement, he 
revealed that that around 3000 regional rules had been issued. If more than 300 regencies 
and municipalities pursued different policies, he predicted that the existing problem would 
become more complex, and the administrative role of provinces would become important.
35 
The plan to revise the regional autonomy law was strongly opposed by the district 
heads and local legislative councils. Most scholars also demanded that the Law be given a 
chance. Deddy Supriadi from Bappenas, for example, said that despite its shortcomings, 
implementing regional autonomy was inevitable. 36 However, the plan to restore some of the 
authority of the provinces was naturally supported by the provincial governments because 
Law No. 22 had significantly reduced their powers. Since the enactment of this Law, bupati 
and walikota had tended to disregard provincial policies. 
The issue did not get much attention from President Wahid and the parliament, as 
conflict between them was escalating. Abdurrahman Wahid was finally dismissed from the 
presidency in July 2001.37 The MPR then elected the Vice President Megawati as the fifth 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. In early August 2001, President Megawati formed 
35 Jakarta Post, February 2001. 
36 Kompas, 1 May 2001, 'Regional Autonomy needs transition period: Researchers'. 
37 The crisis began in early February 2001 when the DPR issued its first memorandum, accusing President 
Wahid of violating his presidential oath and failing to take vigorous measures to suppress corruption. On 30 
April 2001 the DPR issued the second memorandum. For details, see ICG, Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, 
Indonesia Briefing, 21 February 2001 and Indonesia's Presidential Crisis: the Second Round, 21 May 
2001 [available at www.crisisweb.org]. 
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her cabinet and chose retired lieutenant general Hari Sabarno as the Minister of Home 
Affairs. 
Following his appointment, Hari Sabamo said that smoothing the shaky 
implementation of regional autonomy was one of his main priorities, including ensuring that 
regional autonomy would not break up the unitary state. He admitted that the new 
government under Megawati was very concerned about rising regional chauvinism. This 
was one of the reasons for revising the laws, he said.38 This news did not come as a surprise, 
as President Megawati came from a strong nationalistic background. A few months earlier, 
she openly criticized the autonomy concept, saying that the laws, especially on regional 
autonomy, went against the principle of Indonesia as a unitary state, as laid down in the 
1945 Constitution.39 
The central moves to revise autonomy laws met strong resistance from leaders of 
Apkasi (Association of Bupatis) and Adeksi (association of local legislative councils), who 
saw the plan as part of the move to re-centralize the government. Apkasi chairman Syaukani 
demanded that the central government postpone its plan to revise the autonomy law, 
pending a comprehensive evaluation involving both central government and local 
administrations. He said that moves by the Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabamo to amend 
the two laws proved that the central government had no political will to implement regional 
autonomy.40 
Despite objections from Apkasi and Adeksi, on 26 October 2001, the Minister of 
Home Affairs Hari Sabamo asserted that the government would continue revising the law 
on regional autonomy. He said the government would not postpone the revision of the law 
38 Jakarta Post, 27 October 2001, 'Revision of regional autonomy goes on: Hari'. 
39 Jakarta Post 15 May 2001, 'VP criticizes regional autonomy law'. 
40 Jakarta Post, 18 October 2001, 'Plan to revise regional autonomy law criticized'. 
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on regional autonomy, because local administrations had issued many regulations that 
contradicted the law. The government, according to Hari Sabamo, appreciated the 
objections of Apkasi and Adeksi. But, he said, they should have addressed their objections 
to the House and not to the Government because the plan to revise the laws had been made 
in response to demands from the People's Consultative Assembly and the House of 
R · 41 epresentat1 ves. 
Meanwhile, the plan to revise the law was also criticized by Ryaas Rasyid, the 
former minister. He argued that revision was not necessary. "What we need now is not a 
revision, but rather support, in the form of government regulations and presidential 
decrees," he said. He argued that the underlying problem was that the government was not 
ready to issue the hundreds of supporting regulations badly needed for the implementation 
of the law. 42 
On the contrary, AS Hikam, a researcher from National Institute of Science and the 
former Minister for Research and Technology under President Wahid, told the government 
to go ahead with its plan to revise the autonomy law. He warned that the disputes sparked 
by conflicts of interests between the central government and regional administrations in 
connection with the implementation of regional autonomy could endanger national unity. 
He said that the implementation of regional autonomy could be the beginning of the end of 
the republic of Indonesia, if the disputes continue. He also expressed his concern about the 
divisive sentiment among local leaders, who demanded that positions within their 
41 Jakarta Post, 27 October 2001, 'Revision of Regional autonomy goes on'. 
42 Jakarta Post, 18 October 2001, 'Plan to revise regional autonomy law criticized'. 
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administrations be given to local people. If such sentiment was adopted overwhelmingly, he 
said, it would become a boomerang for national integrity.43 
Andi Mallarangeng, former assistant to the State Minister for Regional Autonomy, 
however, believed that regional autonomy would be able to strengthen national unity if it 
were implemented properly. But, the Law had only been implemented half-heartedly. This 
had caused disappointment among many regions, he said. He admitted that the autonomy 
law had its shortcomings. But he also warned that the government's plan to revise the law 
should not be aimed at reversing the intention of the decentralization program.44 
In January 2002, Megawati insisted on revising the Law, saying that it was 
necessary for preventing the country from breaking up. The districts, however, made it clear 
that they were not willing to give up any of their newly won powers and budgetary 
responsibilities. 45 
Confronted with constant opposition from the districts, Megawati criticized the 
district heads, saying that they were still confused on how to implement the Autonomy Law. 
Such confusion, according to 11egawati, had resulted in deviations from the concept of 
regional autonomy itself. A few days earlier, she had warned that excessive and ridiculous 
regionalism in recruiting civil servants would eventually weaken the performance of 
regional administrations and hurt the country as a whole. At the same time, she also 
attacked regional heads for buying houses in Jakarta for their representative offices, when in 
fact there were a lot of hotels in the capital city.46 
It seemed that the central government's attempt to reassert its power could not be 
easily accomplished. Opposition to the government's move to revise the autonomy law has 
43 Jakarta Post, 27 November 2001, 'Regional autonomy beginning of the end for Indonesia'. 44 Jakarta Post, 27 November 2001, 'Regional autonomy beginning of the end for Indonesia ' 45 Jakarta Post, 12 February, 'Megawati slams regionalism in recruitment'. 
46 Jakarta Post, 4 March 2002, 'Mega wati steps up attacks on regional governments'. 
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been widespread. The government's proposal to include a prov1s1on that empowers the 
president to dissolve local councils in the revision has been widely attacked. Two big 
factions in the DPR, the Golkar and the PAN, also rejected Megawati 's plan to revise the 
autonomy laws. As the general elections were approaching, it seemed that all political 
parties would need strong support from local elites, and therefore would not take a gamble 
by supporting Megawati's plan. 
Why the Regional Autonomy Plan Has Gone Wrong 
Nearly two years after its formal implementation, the regional autonomy law has 
sparked long-standing conflicts between the different levels of government. The central 
government believes that the program has gone too far and insisted on revising the Law. 
Jakarta's efforts to get back some of the lost power and resources from the regions include a 
campaign suggesting the widespread presence of corruption, nepotism and collusion 
practices in the regions. At the same time, opposition to the government's plan has also been 
widespread, ranging from regents, mayors, local councillors, to scholars and political 
parties. 
Experiences of other countries shows that transition from a centralized to a 
decentralized system of regional government could take a long time, and Indonesia is still in 
its early stage of this transition. Nevertheless, the progress of decentralization has been 
significant. Local authorities are now performing more functions . Regional autonomy, 
according to a recent study by a group of researchers, has encouraged democratisation and 
made local officials closer to the community. In some districts, mechanisms for consultation 
between local council and the community have also been established. The existence of 
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NGOs has encouraged local communities to articulate their needs and to provide checks and 
47 balances on government programs. 
Despite this, the implementation of regional autonomy policy has also created many 
problems in the country. The decentralization of the government's functions to local 
authorities has caused the government's expenses to increase dramatically. Fiscal 
decentralization has also encouraged regional administrations to use their power to generate 
revenues rather that create an environment, which is conducive to business activity. The 
trend toward forest degradation is increasing because many regional administrations treat 
forests as a source of revenue. The implementation of regional autonomy has instigated 
ethnic tension and raised concerns about human rights violations in the regions. 
Officials tended to regard the concept of Law No. 22 as the source of problems 
associated with the implementation of regional autonomy policy. However, the drafters of 
regional autonomy laws saw the excesses as the result of the government's poor preparation 
in implementing the Law. It seems that both the inadequacies of the law and its poor 
implementation contributed to the shaky start for regional autonomy. The fact that the 
program was initiated when Indonesia was experiencing deep economic and political crisis 
has also influenced the outcome. 
Unlike Law No. 5 of 1974, which only decentralized administrative authority to the 
regions, Law No. 22 of 1999 devolved decision-making power to the regions. This law was 
based on the assumption that giving regional communities the authority to make decisions 
on their own affairs would reduce potential conflict between the centre and the regions. This 
47 The study was made by a group of Indonesian scholars in mid 2000 and sponsored by the Asia Foundation. 
It has yet to be published. 
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would also increase participation 1n the policy process, and therefore enhance the 
government's responsiveness to the needs of the people in the regions. 
One problem with Law No. 22 was that it was based on the assumption that all 
prerequisites for democracy were in place. Its drafters seemed to assume that political 
parties were already functioning as channels for people's aspirations. They also seemed to 
assume that mechanisms for checks and balances were effective. Based on these 
assumptions, the DPRD was made the principal agent of accountability at the local level. 
The regional head was made accountable to DPRD. Unfortunately, the drafters of autonomy 
Law seemed to forget that the current political system did not provide an effective 
mechanism for ensuring the DPRD's accountability. In Indonesia people vote for a party 
and the result of the election determines the allocation of seats for political parties in the 
central as well as the local parliament. A person lacking popular appeal may get elected 
simply because he/she is on the leading party's list. In such circumstances, it is hard to 
check the conduct of the local councillors. 
Actually, Article 24 of Law No. 22 stipulated that DPRDs prepare their own 
mechanisms for accountability in their codes of conduct. A study by a group of consultants 
showed that all local councils prepared their own code of conducts, but mostly based on the 
one previously set by Suharto's administration. None really touched the issue of 
accountability. Mostly they just repeated the statement found in Law No. 22. None 
described principles of accountability or codes of ethics in their code of conducts. Law No. 
22 of 1999 also introduced public disclosure as another means of accountability. Most 
283 
DPRD meetings were open to the public. But meetings on crucial matters, such as 
procurement, were closed to the public.48 
In the absence of an effective accountability mechanism, most local councils tended 
to abuse the power they had. Corruption was rampant in the DPRD in the election and 
accountability of the regional head. The Bupati of Natuna regency, for example, was 
suspected of bribing 12 members of the DPRD and the case was filed in the provincial 
court.49 In Jakarta, it was also suspected that Governor Sutiyoso's decision to allocate a 
significant portion of the APBD for car allowances in 2000 and new cars in 2001 for all 
members of the legislative council was related to the acceptance of his accountability report 
by the DPRD.50 There has also been concern about parliamentary abuse of public funds. In 
most regions, a large amount of public funds were spent for salary and allowances for the 
councillors. A study by Smeru shows that the income of provincial and local councillors has 
increased three times after decentralization.51 
Another problem with Law No. 22 was that many of its stipulations are ambiguous. 
This was due to the fact that the law was prepared in haste by the Habibie Administration in 
order to counter growing regional discontent. As the concept of regional autonomy laid 
down in the Law was unclear, it was difficult to ensure that the law was properly translated 
into action. 
The fact that all of the drafters of Law No. 22 were excluded from the preparation 
process made matters worse. It was not surprising that many of the supporting regulations 
48 See Discussion Paper on Capacity Building, prepared by Asian Development Bank in cooperation with 
University of Canberra, SMEC International and PT Intersys. 
49 Kompas, 19 July 2002. 
50 Media Indonesia, 22 February 2001, 'Kendaraan Dinas Anggota DPRD DKI J angan Dikaitkan dengan LPJ' . 
51 Provincial councillors in Jakarta received more than US$100.000 a year. Local councillors in Natuna 
received about US$60.000 a year. 
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were actually in conflict with the intention of the Law. Regulation No. 84 of 2000 on the 
organization of regional government, for example, introduced a uniform structure of 
regional government. This policy was quite contrary to intention of Article 67 of Law No. 
22. It also contradicted the principle of fiscal decentralization introduced by Law No. 25. 
Another problem with the Law was that it required more than 200 supporting 
regulations for its implementation. It was clear from the beginning that the drafting of those 
supporting regulations would take years to complete.5
2 Unfortunately, most regions were 
impatient to see the Law implemented for fear that delay would allow central officials to 
shift the direction of regional autonomy to a more centralized arrangement. Being pressured 
by parliament, the government decided to commence the implementation of the regional 
autonomy policy in January 2001, despite the fact that most supporting regulations had yet 
to be drafted. The absence of guidelines from the centre had encouraged the regions to 
introduce their own rulings, many of which were in conflict with the objectives of regional 
autonomy. 
In addition to the Law's shortcomings, the implementation of the regional autonomy 
policy has also been hampered by lack of support from central officials. Following the 
enactment of Law No. 22, a number of central agencies initiated Laws in their sectors in an 
attempt to take back part of their lost power from the regions. One example was Law No. 43 
of 1999 on Civil Servants' Management, which was issued only a few months after the 
enactment of Law No. 22. This Law gave the authority over the management of all civil 
servants to the President. This Law also required the central government's approval for staff 
recruitment and promotion in the regions. On the contrary, Law No. 22 of 1999 
52 Ross Worthington of the Australian National University, when interviewed by Jakarta Post in November 
2000, criticized the hasty implementation of regional autonomy policy in Indonesia. He said Indonesia needed 
five to 10 years to make the necessary . preparations for the implementation of regional autonomy. 
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decentralized the authority over the management of local civil servants to local 
administration. This contradiction has created tension between the central and regional 
governments. 
Another example was Law No. 22 of 2001 on the mining sector, which allowed the 
central government to retain the right to award lucrative mining contracts and set the terms, 
including how the profit and royalties or fees should be shared out. This Law conflicted 
with the Article 8 of Law No. 22. This has caused disappointment in some regions. 
The chaotic implementation of regional autonomy policy was also the result of poor 
coordination between different government agencies at the central level, which resulted in 
conflicting regulations on regional autonomy. For example, the accountability system 
introduced by Government Regulation No. 104of2000 on Financial Management is not in 
line with the mechanism laid down in Government Regulation No. 108of2000 on the Form 
of Accountability. Government Regulation No. 104 of 2000 requires the regional head to 
report the implementation of the annual budget to the DPRD quarterly. Meanwhile, 
Government Regulation No. 108 of 2000 requires the regional head to present its report on 
the implementation of the annual budget at the end of the fiscal year. This contradiction 
created confusion and uncertainty. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the political environment surrounding the 
formulation of the regional autonomy law and its implementation has greatly affected the 
content and outcome of the program. The democratic principles of local self-governance 
introduced in the autonomy law are a reflection of the country's euphoria following the 
lifting of authoritarian restrictions. But officials were used to centralism, paternalism and 
authoritarianism. The chaotic implementation of the program also reflected the 
government's lack of confidence to experiment with more independent regional 
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administrations. The program was introduced when the country was experiencing economic 
crisis. Therefore, conce111 was high on the costs and benefits of decentralization. 
Indonesia's attempt at political decentralization involves a complicated institutional 
reform that could take a long time to produce results. In its third year of implementation, 
more problems may come up, but the positive impacts of the program should also be 
recognized. 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
Decentralization has been long overdue in Indonesia. Attempts to devolve power to 
regional levels have been initiated since the 1950s. But the progress has been very slow. Not 
until recently have the regions been given the opportunity to make major decisions over 
their own affairs. But the implementation of the regional autonomy policy, starting from 
January 2001, has been characterized by increasing vertical and horizontal conflicts that 
might lead to the nation's disintegration. This concern causes the debate on the right form of 
decentralization for Indonesia to continue. 
Attempts to implement decentralization were actually intensified in the New Order 
government. Since the mid 1980s, a great number of projects on decentralization were 
initiated. But they had little impact on the improvement of local autonomy. The failure of 
the New Order government to devolve power to regional government was primarily due to 
the limited scope of decentralization introduced in Law No. 5 of 1974. Functions were 
decentralized to regional governments but authority for making decision over those 
functions remained at the centre. In fact, under the New Order government, regions were 
treated more like administrative units, depending on the central government for their 
authorities, policies and resources. 
Despite the rhetoric that claimed this Law was aimed at promoting regional 
autonomy, this study shows that the concept of "real and responsible autonomy" laid down 
in Law No. 5 of 1974 was intended to establish a system of regional government that could 
ensure effective central control over all activities taking place in the regions. Regional heads 
were made the "sole administrators" in their regions and they were appointed by the central 
288 
government from those who were loyal to the central authority. The village head was made 
accountable to the district head and village administrators were made civil servants. This 
became a very effective mechanism for controlling the regions down to the villages. 
The concept of decentralization introduced in Law No. 5 of 1974 was greatly shaped 
by the vision of the New Order government on the appropriate central-regional relationships 
that could support the achievement of its objectives. Decentralization was promised when 
the New Order government came to power in 1966 and desperately need for support from 
political parties and regional governments in restoring political stability following the 1965 
attempted coup. But its military leaders did not really believe that decentralization would be 
effective in solving the messy and complicated political, economic and social problems that 
they inherited from its predecessor. Their experience with continued political instability and 
a collapsing economy under President Sukarno's rule made them consider the formation of a 
strong state as the country's first priority in order to ensure political stability and economic 
development. Therefore, centralization of authority was seen as necessary. 
The increased role of non-party technocrats in the regime also contributed to the 
establishment of a more centralized decision making process. The planning model 
introduced by the technocrats during the 1970s required a system of centralized 
mobilization and allocation of state resources. This situation finally led to the decision to 
replace the concept of "broader regional autonomy" with the concept of "real and 
responsible autonomy'. To implement the concept of "real and responsible autonomy", the 
government introduction of Law No. 5 of 1974 on principles of government at regional 
levels. 
Law No. 5 of 1974 required that most public services were to be performed by the 
district authority. This law, however, failed to clarify: 1) what power over which 
responsibility was to be given; and 2) how the responsibilities previously performed by the 
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central government would be financed by district authorities. Such arrangements were to be 
further regulated by the government. But, during the implementation no real attempts were 
ever made to clarify these two issues. 
When the government experienced financial difficulties in the mid-1980s, some new 
initiatives on decentralization were introduced. Responsibility over some functions was 
decentralized to regional governments. But the main objective of the program was not to 
promote local self-governance. Instead it was designed to shift part of the central financial 
responsibility for providing public services to regional governments. Therefore, the program 
focused more on strengthening the capacity of local administrations to perform local 
functions, including the capacity to finance the transferred functions. Meanwhile, the 
authority to make decisions over the transferred tasks remained at the central departments. 
The situation remained the same until the fall of Suharto government. 
Environment during which Law No. 5 of 1974 was implemented had also 
contributed to the failure of implementation in the New Order administration. The pressure 
for decentralization in the New Order Indonesia was low, and therefore the issue did not get 
much attention from the policy makers. As a result, no real attempt was made to implement 
the Law. Criteria for defining the transferred functions, the very basic prerequisites for 
implementing decentralization, were only made available twenty years after the enactment 
of the Law. It was not surprising that the policy did not make progress. As Grindle and 
Thomas (1991:6) note, if there is no perception of crisis and the stakes for the government 
are low, issues are usually left in the hands of middle-level decision makers and change 
tends to be no more than incremental. 
This study concludes that the absence of pressure for regional autonomy was 
primarily due to the ability of the central government to repress such demands through 
several measures. Firstly, restrictions put on political parties, the press and all social 
290 
organizations effectively reduced people's opportunity to express their aspirations. 
Secondly, the flows of central funds to the regions through the Inpres Program ensured that 
local elites had generally accepted the centralized system of government. Thirdly, the 
appointment of local informal leaders, who retained their legitimacy because of their 
traditional patron-client networks, to strategic positions in the regional bureaucracy in the 
troubled provinces, helped the New Order regime prevent the mobilization of support 
behind local demands for regional autonomy. Fourthly, the government's ideological 
campaign that placed emphasis on the failure of regional autonomy during the fifties and on 
the danger of autonomy to national integration, provided justification for central domination 
over the regions. 
The fall of the New Order regime opened another chapter in Indonesia's experience 
with decentralization. The extraordinary political circumstances following the fall of 
Suharto government farced the MPR to promise broader autonomy to the regions and fair 
revenue sharing between the centre and the regions. In an attempt to win public support, 
President Habibie, who succeeded President Suharto, immediately drafted the bills 
necessary for implementing the MPR's decision, which were then adopted by the DPR. In 
May 1999, President Habibie signed Law No. 22 of 1999, which shifts broad powers to 
district authorities, and Lavv No. 25 of 1999, which allows regional governments to retain a 
substantial share of revenues produced in their regions. 
The concept of decentralization introduced by the Habibie' s government differed 
significantly from the one implemented during the New Order administration. Mounting 
demands for democratization forced the Habibie' s government to introduce political 
decentralization. To address regional demands for a fair share of revenues between the 
centre and the regions, this government also implemented fiscal decentralization. As Smith 
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argues, the distribution of power between levels of government, as well as the choice of 
institutions for decentralization, is the outcome of contending political forces (1985:201-2). 
The fear that the central government would be reluctant to devolve power to the 
regions has also created pressure to adopt a "big bang" approach in implementing 
decentralization, despite the fact that most of the necessary supporting regulations were still 
not available. But the implementation of decentralization policy has sparked long-standing 
conflicts between the different levels of government. Most central officials, who were used 
to administrative centralization, did not feel that the concept of political decentralization 
introduced suited Indonesia's situation. Popular demands for political decentralization was, 
however, very strong and the stakes for the government were high. 
Attempts to modify the direction of decentralization were consistently made by the 
central officials during its implementation through the issuance of sectoral laws. A plan to 
revise the legislation upon which the regiona'l autonomy policy was based has also been 
prepared by Megawati' s government. Opposition to such a plan has been widespread, 
ranging from district heads to political parties. The implementation of decentralization 
program has strengthened not only the position of regional governments but also the 
community. Therefore, a full return to Suharto's centralized system seems impossible. 
This study shows that having a decentralized system of regional government has 
been one of the objectives that the nation has been trying to achieve since its independence. 
The founders of the republic believed that such a system would promote the development of 
modem and democratic government in the country. It would allow the government to reach 
the community. But more than fifty years after its independence, the country is still 
struggling to realise such an objective. This study shows that the obstacles have been 
political rather than technical. It was hard to form a national consensus on: 1) what powers 
should or could be given to sub-national levels of government; 2) to which levels the 
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powers should be given; and 3) how central control over the regions should be enforced so 
that national integration could be maintained. As Turner and Hulme (1997:152) argue that 
"all system of government involves a combination of centralized and decentralized 
authority. However, finding a combination of central control and local autonomy that 
satisfies regime needs and popular demands is a persistent dilemma for government." 
The socio-economic and political environment in Indonesia has been unsupportive 
to decentralization. And this fact has also contributed to the failure to promote regional 
autonomy in Indonesia, especially during the New Order administration. The accountability 
mechanism was not in place. The party system was not competitive, and those who 
represented the government dominated local councils. Local politicians did not have much 
influence in local councils. Local bureaucrats often paid little regard to local politicians who 
were considered less educated and less experienced. The press was controlled, and local 
pressures were weak. As a result the transfer of authority to local level did not make the 
local councils responsive to local needs. Decentralization finally failed to promote better 
services to the people. 
In the New Order period, misinformation has also created misperceptions about the 
meaning of decentralization. For many years, decentralization was seen as the problem of 
distributing roles between the central and regional bureaucracies. Debates surrounding 
decentralization tended to focus on the redistribution of power and finance from the central 
to regional government. In this sense, decentralization was only perceived as the transfer of 
authority from the central to the regional bureaucracy and, therefore it was not the concern 
of the general population. This made the pressure for decentralization low. 
Considering recent political development in Indonesia, decentralization seems to 
have more opportunity to progress in the near future. The importance of decentralization is 
now widely accepted and the socio-economic and political environment following the fall of 
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Suharto's administration seems more conducive to decentralization. The awareness of local 
authorities to improve local capacity to manage their own affairs has been increasing 
recently. Concern has also been growing among local communities about the direction and 
also results of decentralization. In some districts, a new planning and budgeting mechanism 
was introduced to ensure people's participation. Community organizations were formed to 
provide checks to local councils as well as regional heads. Local press has also been very 
critical. Pressures to have direct elections for the recruitment of local councillors and for 
regional heads have been increasing. The implementation of Law No. 22 of 1999, to some 
extent, has contributed to the development of a more democratic system of government. At 
the same time, decentralization seems to progress parallel to the process of democratization 
in Indonesia. 
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